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Abstract 
 
The Taiwanese transnational corporation Foxconn Technology Group holds more 
than 50 percent of market share in global electronics manufacturing. Its 1.4 million 
employees in China far exceed its combined workforce in 28 other countries that 
comprise its global empire. This sociological research assesses the conditions of a 
new generation of Chinese workers on the basis of the intertwined policies and 
practices of Foxconn, international brands (notably Apple), and the local government, 
as well as the diverse forms of collective actions workers deploy to defend their 
rights and interests. 
  
The Chinese industrial working class, now composed primarily of young rural 
migrants and teenage student interns, is a result of actions by local officials to 
mobilize students as “interns” through vocational schools. This use of student labor 
helps fulfill corporate needs for short-term labor at times of peak demand, 
circumventing the law, and dragging down social and economic standards. My 
fieldwork documents for contemporary China the ways in which the integration of 
the electronics manufacturing industry in global supply chains has intensified labor 
conflicts and class antagonism. 
 
Within the tight delivery deadlines, some Foxconn workers leveraged their power to 
disrupt production to demand higher pay and better conditions. While all of these 
labor struggles were short-lived and limited in scope to a single factory, protestors 
exposed the injustice of “iSlavery,” garnering wide media attention and civil society 
support. Contradictions of state-labor-capital relations, however, remain sharp. In the 
contentious authoritarian system, notwithstanding the resilience of the Chinese state 
in the face of sustained popular unrest over the last two decades, my ethnographic 
study highlights the unstable nature of precarious labor in its hundreds of millions. 
 
(272 words)  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
To die is the only way to testify that we ever lived 
Perhaps for the Foxconn employees and employees like us 
we, who are called nongmingong,1 rural migrant workers 
the use of death is simply to testify that we were ever alive at all 
and that while we lived, we had only despair. 
—An anonymous Chinese rural migrant worker2 
 
During 2010, 18 workers attempted suicide at Foxconn Technology Group’s facilities 
where Apple and other branded products are fine-tuned and assembled in China. 
They ranged in age from 17 to 25 — the prime of youth. Fourteen died, while four 
survived with crippling injuries (see Appendix 1 for a list of suicides at 
Taiwanese-owned Foxconn). These shocking events focused world attention on the 
manufacturing supply chains of China’s export industry and the experience of 
working within them. What had driven these young rural migrant workers to commit 
such a desperate act?  
 
After the spate of suicides, and facing a storm of public and international criticism, 
Foxconn strove to minimize reputational damage by claiming that the suicide rate at 
its plants was below the national rate of 23 per 100,000 people.3 Liu Kun, the 
corporate public communications director, pointed out that Foxconn had “more than 
1,000,000 employees in China alone [in 2010],” and that the reasons for suicides 
were multiple. The workers who attempted suicides suffered from individual 
psychological problems such as poor mental health, depression, distress over heavy 
debts, or family and other personal problems. “Given its size, the rate of self-killing 
at Foxconn is not necessarily far from China’s relatively high average,” reported The 
Guardian newspaper.4 But it is impossible to ignore the fact that the suicides were 
by young people employed by a single company, the majority working in one 
industrial district of Shenzhen, on the northern border of Hong Kong. The Foxconn 
                                                      
1 Rural migrant workers (nongmingong 農民工 or mingong 民工). 
2 The blog post entitled “Zhiyou siwang zhengming women cenjing huozhe” (只有死亡証明我們曾
經活著) was removed three days after its first appearance online on 27 May 2010.  
3 Michael R. Phillips, Xianyun Li and Yanping Zhang, 2002, “Suicide Rates in China, 1995-99,” The 
Lancet 359, pp. 835-40. 
4 Jonathan Watts, 28 May 2010, “Foxconn Offers Pay Rises and Suicide Nets as Fears Grow Over 
Wave of Deaths,” The Guardian. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/28/foxconn-plant-china-deaths-suicides 
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suicide cluster represents a phenomenon that has no precedent in China’s industrial 
history, and perhaps in that of any other country.5 
 
Foxconn hired western and Chinese psychologists and psychiatrists to defend it in 
the wake of the plague of worker suicides at the company. After “the 9th Foxconn 
jumper” committed suicide on 11 May 2010 (seven had passed away since January), 
nine Chinese sociologists6 formed an independent team to issue a public statement 
calling on Foxconn and the Chinese government to act decisively to end the tragic 
chain of suicides. It reads: 
 
From the moment they [the new generation of migrant workers] step 
beyond the doors of their houses, they never think of going back to 
farming like their parents. In this sense, they see no other option when 
they enter the city to work. The moment they see there is little 
possibility of building a home in the city through hard work, the very 
meaning of their work collapses. The path ahead is blocked, and the 
road to retreat is closed. Trapped in this situation, the new generation 
of migrant workers faces a serious identity crisis and this magnifies 
psychological and emotional problems. Digging into this deeper level 
of societal and structural conditions, we come closer to understanding 
the “no way back” mentality of these Foxconn employees.7 
 
Unlike the first wave of internal migrant workers, who left the countryside to work 
in special economic zones in coastal China for several years before returning home, 
the younger and better-educated cohorts now massing in China’s cities appear to 
reject the regimented hardships their predecessors silently endured as cheap labor 
                                                      
5 Pun Ngai, Shen Yuan, Guo Yuhua, Lu Huilin, Jenny Chan and Mark Selden, 2014, 
“Worker-Intellectual Unity: Trans-Border Sociological Intervention in Foxconn,” Current Sociology 
62(2), pp. 209-22; and, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 2014, Vol. 12, Issue 11, No. 3, March 17. 
http://japanfocus.org/-Shen-Yuan_/4093; Jenny Chan, 2013, “A Suicide Survivor: The Life of a 
Chinese Worker,” 2ew Technology, Worker and Employment 28(2), pp. 84-99; and, The Asia-Pacific 
Journal Vol. 11, Issue 31, No.1, August 12. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Jenny-Chan/3977; Jenny 
Chan and Pun Ngai, 2010, “Suicide as Protest for the New Generation of Chinese Migrant Workers: 
Foxconn, Global Capital, and the State,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 37-2-10, September 13. 
http://japanfocus.org/-Jenny-Chan/3408; Jenny Chan, 23 May 2010, “Dying Young,” Hong Kong: 
Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior. http://sacom.hk/archives/640 
6 The nine signatories of the open statement dated 18 May 2010 are: Shen Yuan (Tsinghua 
University), Guo Yuhua (Tsinghua University), Lu Huilin (Peking University), Pun Ngai (Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University), Dai Jianzhong (Beijing Academy of Social Sciences), Tan Shen (China 
Academy of Social Sciences), Shen Hong (China Academy of Social Sciences), Ren Yan (Sun Yat-sen 
University), and Zhang Dunfu (Shanghai University). 
7 Full text in Chinese: http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/2010-05-19/13214206671.shtml; English translation: 
http://sacom.hk/appeal-by-sociologists-address-to-the-problems-of-new-generations-of-chinese-migra
nt-workers/ 
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and second-class citizens. In their defiant deaths, the workers call on the Chinese 
nation — and international society — to wake up before more lives are sacrificed.8  
 
 
The large banner on the ground reads, “What is the price of a human body?” The banner on 
the top right says, “Dreams shattered.” Taiwanese demonstrators place flowers to remember the 
Foxconn Chinese worker victims on 28 May 2010. Photo credit: Wang Hao-zhong.  
 
Through their own expressions, workers share their frustrations, their hopes for a 
better future, and their fight for decent work and human dignity. Foxconn worker 
Yan Jun wrote this poem in memory of her brothers and sisters who had committed 
suicide: 
 
For My Departed Brothers and Sisters
9
 
 
I’m just like you 
 
I was just like you: 
                                                      
8 Jenny Chan, 2011, “iSlave,” 2ew Internationalist, Issue 441, 1 April. 
http://newint.org/features/2011/04/01/islave-foxconn-suicides-workers/  
9 Yan Jun (her pen name)’s poem is entitled “Zhi wo siqu de xiongdi jiemei” (致我死去的兄弟姐妹). 
The poem was dated 27 May 2010, following the “12th jump” in five months since January at 
Foxconn’s facilities in Shenzhen, Guangdong. 
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A teenager leaving home 
Eager to make my own way in the world 
 
I was just like you: 
My mind struggling in the rush of the assembly line 
My body tied to the machine 
Each day yearning to sleep 
And yet desperately fighting for overtime 
 
In the dormitory, I was just like you: 
Everyone a stranger 
Lining up, drawing water, brushing teeth 
Rushing off to our different factories 
Sometimes I think I’ll go home 
But if I go home, what then? 
 
I was just like you: 
Constantly yelled at 
My self-respect trampled mercilessly 
Does life mean turning my youth and sweat into raw material? 
Leaving my dreams empty, to collapse with a bang? 
 
I was just like you: 
Work hard, follow instructions and keep quiet 
 
I was just like you: 
My eyes, lonely and exhausted 
My heart, agitated and desperate 
 
I was just like you: 
Entrapped in rules 
In pain that makes me wish for an end to this life 
 
Here’s the only difference:  
In the end I escaped the factory 
And you died young in an alien land 
In your determined bright red blood 
Once more I see the image of myself 
5 
 
Pressed and squeezed so tightly I cannot move. 
 
—Yan Jun, a former female worker 
(Translated by Greg Fay and Jeff Hermanson) 
 
Foxconn workers and their peers in other workplaces have taken individual and/or 
collective means to resist unbearable social deprivations and workplace abuses. 
While some have seemingly become fatalistic, the others are transcending intra-class 
differences in unity. 
 
 
Foxconn workers flood in and out of the Longhua factory in Shenzhen, Guangdong. Hon Hai 
Precision Industry Company, known by its trade name Foxconn, is headquartered in Taipei. 
Foxconn — Fushikang, in Chinese — literally means wealthy and healthy. Photo credit: 
University Research Group. 
 
Chinese Workers in Global Capitalism 
 
China has over one fifth of the world’s population, and its workers account for nearly 
30 percent of the world’s total labor force.10 Among the Chinese workers, an 
all-time high of 269 million are rural migrant workers, up by 2.4 percent over the 
                                                      
10 Ching Kwan Lee, ed., 2007, Working in China: Ethnographies of Labor and Workplace 
Transformation, London: Routledge, p. 1. 
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previous year.11 These internal migrants are primarily engaging in manufacturing, 
construction, and service industries, in which social and economic rights remain 
severely restricted. Many of these workers are employed by private domestic firms 
and transnational corporations, including Foxconn, the leading Taiwan-based 
investor and the world’s largest electronics producer. Foxconn presents itself as an 
ideal employer for those who want to get on in life — particularly young people 
moving from the countryside to the city to find work. Today, with a global 
workforce of over 1.4 million, most of Foxconn’s workers are in China. 
 
A generation of rural migrants who were born in post-socialist China in the 1980s 
and 1990s has grown up. Decollectivization, which was accompanied by the 
provision of small plots of contracted land to family members12 who were then free 
to engage in agricultural and non-agricultural productive activities and to leave the 
land, revealed the existence of a vast rural labor surplus that could fuel China’s 
export-oriented industrialization. The 1982 population census, the first census 
carried out after the economic reforms, showed that 7 million peasant migrants had 
crossed county boundaries to nearby industrial towns to seek employment.13 As 
early as 1985, approximately 12 million township and village enterprises, successors 
to collective rural industries and brand new entities, were registered under the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Ten million of these were privately-run, hiring tens of 
millions of rural workers who left the land.14 In the city, millions of urban youths 
returning from the countryside after the Cultural Revolution,15 and the unemployed 
graduates waiting to be assigned to work units16 were encouraged to start businesses 
to support themselves and relieve pressure on the state sector to create jobs. Labor 
                                                      
11 At the time of government survey, the number of Chinese rural migrant workers included those 
who had been employed outside their villages and towns for more than six months in the year and 
those who did non-agricultural work in their villages and towns for more than six months in the year. 
See National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2014, “2013 2ian Quanguo 
2ongmingong Jiance Diaocha Baogao” (Monitoring and Investigation Report on the Chinese Rural 
Migrant Workers in 2013) 2013年全國農民工監測調查報告. 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201405/t20140512_551585.html 
12 The state contracting of farmland, based on the rural household size, is distinctive to the 
contemporary Chinese political economy. In March 2003, the central government implemented the 
Rural Land Contracting Law, which upholds the “thirty-year no-change rule” to household contracted 
farmland, and allows land-use rights holders to rent out their contracted land. 
13 Liang Zai and Ma Zhongdong, 2004, “China’s Floating Population: New Evidence from the 2000 
Census,” Population and Development Review 30(3), p. 470. 
14 Yasheng Huang, 2008, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 73-81. 
15 For an in-depth historical study about the “sent down” educated youth during the political 
campaigns, see Thomas P. Bernstein, 1977, Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages: The 
Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
16 Emily Honig and Gail Hershatter, 1988, Personal Voices: Chinese Women in the 1980’s, Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, pp. 244-50. 
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mobility from within rural and urban China, as well as movement from rural to urban 
areas, would explode in subsequent decades. 
 
The large influx of foreign direct investment to China since the early 1990s,17 
together with the availability of internal migrants and the restructuring of state 
enterprises, resulted in radical changes in the composition of the industrial working 
class.18 Rural migrant labor was quickly channeled to new industries and the cities 
through social networks and government paths. 19  Poverty alleviation officials 
facilitated labor migration from inland villages to prosperous urbanizing areas on the 
eastern coast in accord with Deng Xiaoping’s call to “let some get rich first.” The 
goal of local governments was to obtain remittances and assure the development of 
marketable skills in young migrants. In the words of a Sichuan Communist Party 
secretary, “We consider migrant labor to be a kind of cooperation between eastern 
and western parts of the country.”20 As state-guided market reforms accelerated in 
the decade of the 1990s and thereafter, the intricate links between private and 
international capital and the state deepened. 
 
Local states facilitated the growth of a labor market to promote economic 
development and accumulate wealth. From the early 2000s, rural migrant workers 
were no longer fined, repatriated to their place of household registration, detained in 
public security offices, or even beaten to death as sometimes happened in the recent 
                                                      
17 During the 1980s, foreign investment was still relatively very small in China’s economy. Foreign 
direct investment projects in manufacturing industries were minuscule, labor-intensive, 
low-technology, and export-oriented. Most of them were cross-border investments from Hong Kong, 
Macau, and Taiwan. From the early 1990s, foreign investments from the United States, Japan, and 
other developed nations have heavily shaped China’s labor, legal, and business reforms. See for 
example, Yasheng Huang, 2003, Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment during the Reform Era, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; You-tien Hsing, 1998, Making Capitalism in China: The 
Taiwan Connection, New York: Oxford University Press; David Zweig, 2002, Internationalizing 
China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Mary Elizabeth 
Gallagher, 2005, Contagious Capitalism: Globalization and the Politics of Labor in China, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press; Scott Wilson, 2009, Remade in China: Foreign Investors and 
Institutional Change in China, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Barry Naughton, 2007, The Chinese 
Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, ch. 17. 
18 On reviewing the changing labor market in China, see Albert Park and Fang Cai, 2011, “The 
Informalization of the Chinese Labor Market,” From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalization: Markets, 
Workers, and the State in a Changing China, edited by Sarosh Kuruvilla, Ching Kwan Lee and Mary 
E. Gallagher, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 17-35; Eli Friedman and Ching Kwan Lee, 
2010, “Remaking the World of Chinese Labour: A 30-Year Retrospective,” British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 48(3), pp. 507-33. 
19 Arianne M. Gaetano and Tamara Jacka, eds., 2004, On the Move: Women in Rural-to-Urban 
Migration in Contemporary China, New York: Columbia University Press; Loraine A. West and Zhao 
Yaohui, eds., 2000, Rural Labour Flows in China, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 
University of California. 
20 Quoted in Dorothy J. Solinger, 1999, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, 
the State, and the Logic of the Market, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 71. 
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past, when poor migrants were unable to present authorities valid legal papers.21 By 
December 2007, according to one estimate, only 40 percent of China’s older labor 
force was still in agriculture.22 For this cohort of rural youth, the future lay in the 
cities. 
 
The children of post-Mao China have grown up with new hopes and dreams. As of 
2009, the majority (65 percent) of the 145 million migrant workers had completed 
nine years of formal education, and 13 percent had attained a high school diploma.23 
Young rural residents increasingly express a desire to broaden their horizons and 
experience a modern life and cosmopolitan consumption in megacities such as 
Shenzhen, Shanghai and Beijing, as well as other fast developing cities in inland 
provinces.24 Indeed, while they retain the rural registration associated with their 
home village, some have grown up in and around cities and have little knowledge of 
or familiarity with agriculture or rural life. The city is not only their home, the only 
home they have known; it is also where everything appears to be happening. The 
countryside seems alien and far away.25 
 
Young rural migrants comprise the majority of the new Chinese industrial labor force, 
who are concentrated in private enterprises and international firms. In a 2007 survey 
conducted in Beijing and other major cities, 70 percent of the 4,637 rural migrant 
worker respondents working in manufacturing, services, and extractive and 
construction industries aspired to “receive technical training,” the key step toward 
fulfilling their dream of rising within the system.26 The contrast is clear with those 
                                                      
21 The abolition of the detention and repatriation system in 2003 came only after the torture to death 
of a male migrant college graduate, Sun Zhigang, by Guangzhou officials, which triggered a national 
protest against discrimination of rural migrants by local residents and officials alike. 
22 Barry Naughton, 2010, “China’s Distinctive System: Can It Be a Model for Others?”, Journal of 
Contemporary China 19(65), p. 458. 
23 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2010, “2009 2ian 2ongmingong 
Jiance Diaocha Baogao” (Monitoring and Investigation Report on the Rural Migrant Workers in 2009) 
2009 年農民工監測調查報告. 
http://www.360doc.com/content/13/1016/14/7157405_321860376.shtml  
24 All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 2010, “Guanyu Xinshengdai 2ongmingoing Wenti de 
Yanjiu Baogao” (Research Report on the Problems of the New Generation of Rural Migrant Workers) 
關於新生代農民工問題的研究報告. 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2010/06-21/2353233.shtml; All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions, 2011, “2010 2ian Qianye Xinshengdai 2ongmingong Zhuangkuang Diaocha ji Duice Jianyi” 
(Survey and Some Proposals Regarding the Conditions of the New Generation of Rural Migrant 
Workers at Enterprises in 2010) 2010 年企業新生代農民工狀況調查及對策建議. 
http://acftu.people.com.cn/GB/67582/13966631.html 
25 Pun Ngai and Lu Huilin, 2010, “Unfinished Proletarianization: Self, Anger and Class Action of the 
Second Generation of Peasant-Workers in Reform China,” Modern China 36(5), pp. 493-519. 
26 China Youth and Children Studies Center, 2007, “Zhongguo Xinshengdai 2ongmingong Fazhan 
Zhuangkuang ji Daiji Duibi Yanjiu Baogao” (New-Generation Chinese Rural Migrant Workers 
Development Conditions and Inter-Generational Comparative Research Report) 中國新生代農民工
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who were born in the 1960s and who said that their primary concern was “making 
money.” Low-wage workers, while aspiring to make a better living than previous 
generations, face more acute economic and social problems in a society 
characterized by “polarization of class relations”27 and commodification of basic 
social services, such as housing, education, and medical care.28  
 
In their own words, we can hear the aspirations for personal freedom and success of 
this new generation. As a young woman worker in Beijing commented, “If I had to 
live the life that my mother has lived, I would choose suicide.”29 If many among the 
first generation of rural migrants drawn to the emergent labor market in 1980s and 
1990s returned to their villages to marry, settle in, and raise children,30 the times 
have changed. The second generation has its eyes firmly on the cities. And large, 
modern high-tech companies are manufacturing rosy dreams for the dreamers. 
Foxconn’s recruitment slogans read: “There’s no choosing your birth, but here you 
will reach your destiny. Here you need only dream, and you will soar!”31 “Your 
potential is only limited by your aspirations!”32 At the center of transnational 
production, Chinese workers face pressures compounded by fierce global 
competitions and a disciplinary regime at work. The cost of living in large cities and 
towns, far higher than ever before, is another major source of stress, anxiety, and 
frustration faced by migrant working people. Some have joined with trans-border 
labor campaign groups to pressure brands and supplier-factory boss to respond to 
their primarily economic demands. This nascent alliance of workers and 
non-governmental labor organizations in advancing grassroots labor activism can be 
seen as a response to limitations of state-sanctioned dispute-resolution institutions 
and mechanisms. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
發展狀況及代際對比研究報告. No. 9 (June). http://www.cycs.org/Article.asp?ID=7879 
27 Pun Ngai, 2011, “Global Labor — A Chinese Perspective,” Global Dialogue (International 
Sociological Association) Vol. 1, Iss. 5. http://isa-global-dialogue.net/category/volume-1/v1-i5/  
28 Zhan Shaohua, 2011, “What Determines Migrant Workers’ Life Chances in Contemporary China? 
Hukou, Social Exclusion, and the Market,” Modern China 37(3), pp. 243-85; Deborah S. Davis and 
Wang Feng, eds., 2009, Creating Wealth and Poverty in Postsocialist China, Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press. 
29 Quoted in Yan Hairong, 2008, 2ew Masters, 2ew Servants: Migration, Development, and Women 
Workers in China, Durham: Duke University Press, p. 25. 
30 “Wage work in the city,” comments Sally Sargeson, “became the means for self-actualisation [of 
women migrants] in family and village” during the 1990s. See Sally Sargeson, 1999, Reworking 
China’s Proletariat, Houndmills: Macmillan, p. 219; also, Ching Kwan Lee, 1998, Gender and the 
South China Miracle: Two Worlds of Factory Women, Berkeley: University of California Press; Pun 
Ngai, 2005, Made in China: Women Factory Workers in a Global Workplace, Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
31 Chusheng wufa xuanze, zai zheli, weilai you ni bawo. Zai zheli zhiyao you mengxiang, ni jiu neng 
feixiang (出生無法選擇，在這裡，未來由你把握。在這裡只要有夢想，你就能飛翔！). 
32 Xinxiong you duoda, wutai jiu you duoda (心胸有多大，舞台就有多大). 
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Investigating Foxconn: Research Questions 
 
Foreign-invested firms dominate China’s booming electronics and information and 
computer technology industry, accounting for 72 percent of the industry’s total sales 
in 2010.33 How do global capital and the Chinese state shape the class experience 
and capacity of a new generation of rural migrant workers? In what ways do workers 
make sense of the transnational production regime they inhabit and attempt to 
contest the forces that shape their working and social lives? How is the labor market 
being re-institutionalized in China through the actions of giant contract 
manufacturing firms such as Foxconn? What are the implications for state and firm 
governance when more than a score of Foxconn workers jump to their death and 
when in their wake a wave of protests, riots, and strikes occur across China? 
 
In this dissertation I aim to document the lives and struggles of China’s new working 
class through the lens of Foxconn and its relationship to Apple and the Chinese state. 
Beginning from the spring of 2010 I have been participating in a multi-university 
Foxconn Research Group to jointly carry out fieldwork in 12 major cities, including 
Shenzhen, Shanghai, Kunshan, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Tianjin, Langfang, Taiyuan, 
Wuhan, Zhengzhou, Chongqing, and Chengdu, where Foxconn runs giant 
manufacturing sites and research and development centers. My field trips included 
primarily those in Shenzhen and Chengdu between 2011 and 2012 (elaborate later in 
this chapter), supplemented with a four-day visit to the Foxconn Chongqing 
dormitory town in mid March 2011. This research about Foxconn’s labor practices 
and production system in China — a collective as much as an individual endeavor — 
began from 2010 through the present.34  
                                                      
33 World Trade Organization, 2012, “Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat, China,” p. 119. 
http://www.hse.ru/data/2012/07/06/1255031799/China%20-%20s264.pdf 
34 See, for example, Jenny Chan and Mark Selden, forthcoming, “Class, Incomplete 
Proletarianization, and the New Generation of Chinese Workers,” Handbook on Class and Social 
Stratification in China, edited by Yingjie Guo, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar; Jenny Chan, Pun 
Ngai, and Mark Selden, forthcoming, “Trade Union and Labor Protest: Foxconn, the Chinese State, 
and Transnational Labor Activism,” The Companion to Labor and Media, edited by Richard Maxwell, 
London: Routledge; Jenny Chan, Pun Ngai and Mark Selden, forthcoming, “Apple’s iPad City: 
Subcontracting Exploitation to China,” Handbook of the International Political Economy of 
Production, edited by Kees van der Pijl, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, ch. 5; Jenny Chan, Pun Ngai 
and Mark Selden, 2013, “The Politics of Global Production: Apple, Foxconn, and China’s New 
Working Class,” 2ew Technology, Work and Employment 28(2), pp. 100-15; and, The Asia-Pacific 
Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 32, No. 2, August 12. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Jenny-Chan/3981; Pun Ngai 
and Jenny Chan, 2013, “The Spatial Politics of Labor in China: Life, Labor, and a New Generation of 
Migrant Workers,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 112(1), pp. 179-90; Pun Ngai and Jenny Chan, 2012, 
“Global Capital, the State, and Chinese Workers: The Foxconn Experience,” Modern China 38(4), pp. 
383-410; Li Changjiang and Jenny Chan, 2012, “Fushikang zouchu xibu” (Foxconn: Going West)〈富
士康走出西部〉, Wo zai Fushikang (Working in Foxconn)《我在富士康》, edited by Pun Ngai, Lu 
Huilin, Guo Yuhua and Shen Yuan, Beijing: Intellectual Property Rights Press. 
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Foxconn’s meteoric rise to become the world’s largest electronics manufacturer in a 
span of four decades (from 1974 to the present) has been hailed as a model of East 
Asian manufacturing prowess illustrative of China’s dynamic export-oriented 
industry.35 By 2009, Foxconn had already gained a 44 percent share of the world 
market in electronics manufacturing.36 Currently, the company provides assembly 
and engineering services to global brands, and it makes over 50 percent of the world’s 
electronic products. Its largest buyer by far is Apple, but its clients are a Who’s Who 
of global electronics producers including IBM, Microsoft, Google, Intel, GE, HP, 
Dell, Cisco, Amazon, Sony, Panasonic, Toshiba, Fujitsu, Nintendo, Samsung, LG, 
Acer, Huawei, and Lenovo. The Taiwanese-owned industrial behemoth places its 
name on none of the millions of products it produces annually for brands, operating 
in anonymity.  
 
My argument is that the tragedy of China’s workers is not Foxconn’s sole 
responsibility, although, as the world’s largest electronic manufacturer, it is an 
enormous player. The source of the problems experienced by Chinese workers 
extends far beyond the factory floor to the profit squeeze that Foxconn and other 
manufacturers have to face from the world’s leading giants.37 Because Apple is one 
of the world’s most profitable electronic companies, Foxconn the largest employer of 
industrial workers, Apple its largest client, and China one of the largest producers 
and exporters of advanced electronic goods, this research concentrates on the 
seminal Apple-Foxconn relationship in order to chart its consequences for labor. I 
assess the direct impact of Apple’s outsourcing practices on workers’ lives in its 
supply chain. I also examine the role of the Chinese state and the state-controlled 
unions in the All-China Federation of Trade Unions in structuring labor conditions, 
and how they in some situations discharge their responsibility to protect worker 
citizens. In all, I aim to explain how the integration of the electronics manufacturing 
industry in global capitalist production has intensified labor conflicts and class 
antagonism, and seek an alternative to the despotic labor regime.  
 
Apple and other transnational corporations have responded to chronic labor problems 
                                                      
35 Chen Run, 2010, Fushikang 2eimu (Foxconn Insider)《富士康內幕》, Changsha: Hunan Literature 
and Art Publishing House; Zhang Dianwen, 2005, Hu yu Hu (Tiger and Fox)《虎與狐》, Taipei: 
Tianxia Wenhua.  
36 Thomas Dinges, 27 July 2010, “Foxconn Rides Partnership with Apple to Take 50 Percent of EMS 
[Electronics Manufacturing Services] Market in 2011,” iSuppli. 
http://www.isuppli.com/Manufacturing-and-Pricing/News/Pages/Foxconn-Rides-Partnership-with-Ap
ple-to-Take-50-Percent-of-EMS-Market-in-2011.aspx 
37 Jenny Chan, 2010, “Foxconn: The Global Predator,” Global Dialogue (International Sociological 
Association) Vol. 1, Issue 2. http://isa-global-dialogue.net/foxconn-the-global-predator/ 
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in supplier factories by reiterating their commitment to good governance in an 
attempt to distance themselves from responsibility and burnish their reputation 
internationally. This is in part a response to the growing anti-sweatshop movement in 
the electronics industry from within the United States, Europe, and more recently 
Greater China.38 Many image-conscious technology companies, probably none more 
than Apple in our digital age, have professed noble ideals of corporate citizenship, 
environmental, labor and social responsibility in their supplier codes of conduct. 
Violations of factory workers’ fundamental rights in export-oriented industries 
nevertheless remain intractable, prompting scholars and practitioners of corporate 
responsibility to promote the leverage of private and public power to create “just 
supply chains.”39 The main effort of public-private partnerships is to call on a shared 
commitment of national governments, transnational corporations, and 
non-governmental labor organizations to better protect workers. 
 
Frederick Mayer and Gary Gereffi suggest that the consolidation of capital in China 
potentially strengthens state regulation or “public governance” of transnational 
firms. 40  Similarly, Richard Locke understands the Chinese government to be 
incentivized to “play a positive role in promoting collaborative buyer-supplier 
relations” in its pursuit of sustainability and global competitiveness.41 I challenge this 
assessment, which tends to downplay capitalist contradictions and power relationships 
in transnational production on the one hand, and the strong collaboration between 
capital and the state in wealth accumulation on the other hand. Chinese workers, as 
discussed in the empirical chapters (from chapters 3 to 10), unveil the harsh reality 
behind the mainstream discourse of “corporate ethics” and “social harmony.”42 
 
Research Methodology 
 
My project is about the conditions of labor in China as seen through the words and 
actions of employees, including particularly rural migrant workers and student 
interns, who are most central to the hidden abode of production. This sociological 
                                                      
38 Ralph A. Litzinger, 2013, “The Labor Question in China: Apple and Beyond,” The South Atlantic 
Quarterly 112(1), pp. 172-78. 
39 See for example, John Ruggie, 2013, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human 
Rights, New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company; Boston Review, 21 May 2013, “Forum: Can 
Global Brands Create Just Supply Chains?” 
http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/can-global-brands-create-just-supply-chains-richard-locke 
40 Frederick Mayer and Gary Gereffi, 2010, “Regulation and Economic Globalization: Prospects and 
Limits of Private Governance,” Business and Politics 12(3), pp. 15-17. 
41 Richard M. Locke, 2013, The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in 
a Global Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 19. 
42 Hexie shehui (和諧社會). 
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intervention is political because the company I have chosen as my research site, 
Foxconn, makes things for famous names, through supply chains where 
responsibility is uncertain, where passing the problem to others is part of a game, 
where the reality of working conditions is contested, and a shared or common 
evidence base is never accepted. Therefore the researcher must enter this world with 
personal integrity, and not expect the gathered data to be received without political 
scrutiny and challenge, because in this environment, knowledge is very much power, 
and can have causal effects on the lives of workers. 
 
“To a large degree,” leading technology brands “use many of the same suppliers, as 
opposed to other industries where one company may have a clear set of proprietary 
suppliers.”43 I have chosen to look at one large final-assembly supplier that is 
Foxconn, and not the myriad of suppliers that feed components to this firm. This 
in-depth case study is significant, because Apple’s competitors, as we will see in the 
following chapters, are heavily involved with Foxconn, and many of the arguments 
made in this dissertation about the relationship between Foxconn and Apple could 
equally be applied to them. In the language of statistical representation, my findings 
on transnational corporate power can be generalized to a broad understanding of the 
buyer-supplier dynamics in outsourced electronics production. 
 
My research orientation is critical engagement with a contentious subject: the 
conditions of workers in contract manufacturing in China. Within this terrain, large 
firms rule, but are unequally positioned within the supply chain. In thinking about 
“what is a case?,”44 I frame Foxconn as a representative or archetypical case of a 
global labor regime in the contemporary Chinese political economy. The mystery 
that my investigation seeks to explore is not only the “inside story” of Foxconn; it is 
also the nature of the relationship between Foxconn and its brand-name buyers, as 
well as that between Foxconn and the Chinese state. These are the relationships that 
shape conditions on the factory floor and ultimately workers’ lives. A study of the 
most powerful electronics contractor enables me to draw out the deep contradictions 
among labor, capital, and the Chinese state in global production. 
 
Discussing the ethnographer or the ethnographic self in social inquiry, Michael 
Burawoy notes that “everyone carries and uses social theory, cognitive maps of the 
                                                      
43 Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition, 2009, “2008 Annual Report — Collaborating to Promote 
Social and Environmental Responsibility in the Global Electronics Supply Chain,” p. 3. 
http://www.eicc.info/documents/2008AnnualReport.pdf  
44 John Walton, 1992, “Making the Theoretical Case,” What is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of 
Social Inquiry, edited by Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 121-37. 
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world we inhabit.”45 When I went into the field, my own identities — as a young 
female university student researcher and Hong Kong labor rights campaigner — 
would have an impact on my interpretation of the social reality and my sampling of 
interviewees (out of a potential universe of 1.4 million Foxconn employees!). 
Moreover, in field encounters, as Steven McKay reflects on his experience, 
interviewees would try to make sense of my research by placing me “politically, 
socially, and culturally during our interactions.”46 In the wake of the public relations 
disaster of suicides in 2010, Foxconn managers and to a certain extent line leaders 
were highly alert to “researchers,” particularly critical sociologists, journalists, and 
labor advocates, who had been calling for an end to “stealth manufacturing” and 
more specifically, for Foxconn to “create humane labor standards.”47 As an activist 
affiliated with Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM),48  
I was unable to gain access to Foxconn factories to conduct participant observation. I 
therefore needed to approach my interviewees on my own, without gaining the 
cooperation of senior management for field access.  
 
Under the tight security apparatus put in place by both Foxconn and local states 
(including some trade union officials at the township, county, and municipal levels), 
where even employees’ wages are considered “confidential data,”49 the company’s 
business deals with global customers, costs and profits, or enterprise trade unions’ 
role with regard to worker protections are closely guarded secrets. It has been quite a 
delicate process for me to establish friendship and trust with workers and student 
interns, and to attempt to co-create changes at the grassroots level through these four 
years. Several worker victims’ families shared with me (primarily in my activist 
identity) their letters,50 and through a concerted effort of concerned scholars and 
labor organizers, in 2014, new rounds of dialogues with Foxconn and Apple 
                                                      
45 Michael Burawoy, 2009, The Extended Case Method: Four Countries, Four Decades, Four Great 
Transformations, and One Theoretical Tradition, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. xiii. 
46 Steven C. McKay, 2006, Satanic Mills or Silicon Islands? The Politics of High-Tech Production in 
the Philippines, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 24. 
47 International Scholars, 8 June 2010, “Create Humane Labor Standards at Foxconn and End ‘Stealth 
Manufacturing’ in Information Technology!”, Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior 
(SACOM), http://sacom.hk/archives/649; Taiwanese Scholars, 13 June 2010, “The Foxconn 
Employees and to Call to the Attention.” https://sites.google.com/site/laborgogo2010eng/ 
48 From January 2010, I have been serving as an advisor to SACOM Executive Committee and 
striving to engage wider audiences beyond the ivory tower. See also, Jenny Chan, 2012, “Biting the 
Rotten Apple: Taking on Foxconn,” Red Pepper, August. 
http://www.redpepper.org.uk/biting-the-rotten-apple/; Jenny Chan, 2013, “Who Speaks for China’s 
Workers?”, Labor 2otes, May. 
http://www.labornotes.org/blogs/2013/05/who-speaks-china%E2%80%99s-workers 
49 On page 5, section 4.4 of Foxconn Employee Handbook (September 2010), it is about the company 
rule on “confidentiality over wages/salaries” (xinzi baomi) 薪資保密. 
50 The workers’ and worker families’ letters, written in simplified Chinese and undersigned with 
fingerprints in red (a way to certify the letters’ authenticity), are on my file. 
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company leaders have now been made possible. 
 
Whose side are we on? “Sociologists tend to be leftists,” Matt Vidal argues, because 
we seek to grasp “the socially constructed nature of categories like race and 
nationality, the social and political nature of economies, and the structural power 
dynamics that reproduce inequalities within and across organizations, labor markets, 
national economies and the global economy.”51 My partisanship, or my taking sides 
with the working-class people, has evolved in my intellectual endeavor and engaged 
social actions.52 Feminist social scientists write about non-elite women whose lives 
might remain otherwise undocumented.53 The writing of the lives of ordinary 
Chinese working women and men is mediated by our own social theories and visions 
of a (better) future.54 In getting along with workers and student interns, I found that I 
have inevitably come close to intense human suffering. Most of the time the younger 
workers in their early to mid 20s raised a topic about “learning a skill” or “doing a 
part-time course,” and then sank into a long silence. At other times they talked about 
love and romance but dared not commit to marriage and make a home in the city 
where they worked. Insurmountable structural obstacles and class polarizations are at 
times holding back the aspirational young cohort. 
 
Is there a value-free sociology? Is not our sociological intervention driven by shared 
moral commitment?55 In this dissertation I have tried to represent the views of my 
informants across a range of subjects as truthfully as I can, recognizing that these 
individual laborers, while facing common problems, often have somewhat different 
ways of approaching these issues. They are not passive beings or completely 
powerless; they are active agents in accommodating or resisting the challenges they 
confront. Many of them, nevertheless, have been pushed into resistance and 
opposition by the harsh conditions they face as a new class of workers in China. In 
                                                      
51 Matt Vidal, 7 March 2014, “Politics of Social Science,” Work in Progress (Blog of the American 
Sociological Association’s Organizations, Occupations, and Work Section). 
http://workinprogress.oowsection.org/2014/03/07/politics-of-social-science/  
52 The sociological literature on methodological debates around “positionality,” “objectivity,” and 
“knowledge production” are voluminous. See for example, Alvin W. Gouldner, 1973, For Sociology: 
Renewal and Critique in Sociology Today, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin; Karen Lumsden, 2013, 
“‘You Are What You Research’: Researcher Partisanship and the Sociology of the Underdog.” 
Qualitative Research 13(1), pp. 3-18; Ralph Darlington and John Dobson, 2013, “Objective but Not 
Detached: Partisanship in Industrial Relations Research,” Capital & Class 37(2), pp. 285-97. 
53 Emily Honig, 1997, “Getting to the Source — Striking Lives: Oral History and the Politics of 
Memory,” Journal of Women’s History 9(1), pp. 139-57. 
54 For example, Jaesok Kim closes his book on Chinese women garment workers in a Korean-owned 
multinational by reflecting on the “bleak future” of labor in an age of capital flight and insecurity. See 
his Chinese Labor in a Korean Factory: Class, Ethnicity, and Productivity on the Shop Floor in 
Globalizing China (2013), Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
55 Michael Burawoy, 2014, “Sociology as a Vocation: Moral Commitment and Scientific 
Imagination,” Current Sociology 62(2), pp. 279-84. 
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addition to migrant workers and student interns, I come to learn that managerial staff, 
teachers (who were in charge of the student internship programs), and local 
government officials have invariably been drawn into a fiercely competitive 
high-tech industry in national development, and co-produce the dialectics of 
corporate domination and labor resistance within global capitalism. This writing, in 
piercing through the image of global corporate citizenship and a harmonious Chinese 
society, is a small part of the evolving trans-border movement to amplify workers’ 
voices. 
 
Research Data Collection 
 
By using qualitative research tools, such as semi-structured interviews and 
observations over an extended period of time, I aim to make sense of workers’ fears, 
desires, and rationales behind their individual and collective actions. During my 
fieldwork between 2011 and 2012, I lived in two working-class communities for six 
months and paid regular visits to workers and their families in private living rooms, 
factory dormitory open spaces, hospitals (where I met with injured workers), and 
other public places. Labor rights advocates and university researchers from Hong 
Kong and mainland China first introduced me to a number of interviewees. I then 
invited more workers, managers, student interns, and teachers (who were dispatched 
to the factories) to participate in additional interviews. Of the more than 30 Foxconn 
manufacturing complexes across the Chinese mainland, I chose two main field sites: 
Foxconn Shenzhen in Guangdong and Foxconn Chengdu in Sichuan. 
 
 Foxconn Shenzhen, 
Guangdong Province 
Foxconn Chengdu, 
Sichuan Province 
Founding year 1988 2010 
Factory 
locations 
1. Foxconn Longhua 
2. Foxconn Guanlan 
Both are in Bao’an District 
1. “Northern plant” 
2. “Southern plant” 
Both are in Pi County 
Number of 
employees 
Over 500,000 persons as of 2010; 
now more than 400,000 persons 
Nearly 200,000 persons 
Corporate 
buyers 
Apple, Dell, HP, Amazon, and 
many others 
Apple only 
Products iPads, iPhones, iPods, Kindles, 
printers, game-consoles, etc. 
iPads only 
 
Source: Author’s research data. 
 
17 
 
My selection of two Foxconn mega factories — rather than just one in a single 
locality — is useful to address labor issues of capital relocation from the coastal to 
lower-cost inland areas. From the Pearl River Delta industrial region of Guangdong 
to the new production centers in interior provinces, workers’ grievances have arisen 
from wage and benefit cuts as a result of (forced) transfer to inland factories, 
compulsory excessive overtime, speed-ups, dangerous working conditions, 
harassment and humiliation by management and security officers, arbitrary 
termination of contracts, and nonpayment of wages, work injury compensation and 
severance pay, as fully documented in this field research. Between mid 2010 and 
early 2014, I conducted 115 interviews in Guangdong and Sichuan provinces, and 
followed up with phone and email conversations with some of the closest 
interviewees upon returning to the university in the United Kingdom. They included 
43 Foxconn workers, 38 Foxconn student interns, 14 vocational school teachers in 
charge of internship programs, 14 Foxconn managers (in human resources, 
production, and product engineering), and 6 local government officials (in labor 
policy, social security, employment service, and economic development) (for the list 
of interviewees and supplementary details on data collection, see Appendix 2).  
 
I had interviews outside of Foxconn factory complexes where employees were not 
subject to company surveillance. My production worker and student intern 
interviewees worked in assembly, quality testing (functionality and audio/visual 
appearance), packaging, laser soldering, component cleaning, metal processing, 
polishing, label sticking, glass screen inspection, and logo scanning. In restaurants, 
internet cafés, shopping centers, street-side stalls, basketball courts, parks, roller 
skating rinks, discos, and non-government workers’ centers, I recorded interviews 
and co-produced videos56 with the consent of the workers. In addition, I collected 
photos and original documents from interviewees (including wage statements, 
employment contracts, employee handbooks, and dormitory regulations). Primary 
evidence is supplemented by company annual reports, scholarly studies, government 
statistical yearbooks, reports from labor rights’ groups, and journalistic accounts. 
 
In China, while the government has attempted to channel disputes into juridical and 
bureaucratic institutions of dispute resolution, many more aggrieved workers have 
organized direct actions to safeguard their rights and interests. To track legal cases, I 
attended Foxconn employee hearings at the district-level labor dispute arbitration 
committee and city intermediate court in Shenzhen during 2011 and 2012. As audio 
                                                      
56 One of these short documentaries was uploaded to YouTube, see SACOM (Students and Scholars 
Against Corporate Misbehavior), June 2011, “The Truth of the Apple iPad” (6m 30s). 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V3YFGixp9Jw 
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and visual recording was not allowed, I wrote fieldnotes immediately following the 
trials. Moreover, between 2013 and the first quarter of 2014, I conducted follow-up 
interviews with worker activists involved in riots, strikes and/or protests at Foxconn 
factories based in Shenzhen, Chengdu (provincial capital of Sichuan), Zhengzhou 
(provincial capital of Henan), Wuhan (provincial capital of Hubei), and Taiyuan (a 
fast-growing city in Shanxi). I paid attention to the causes of labor discontents and 
the settlements and outcomes of the collective actions. 
 
In addition to the key informants from the enterprise and vocational schools, I 
interviewed six local government officials at Longhua town (Shenzhen) and 
Hongguang and Pitong towns (both are in Chengdu) to better understand the 
collaboration between business and local states. The officials shared with me policies 
about employment and social services, economic development, labor recruitment, and 
above all school-business joint educational programs.57 Indeed, the provincial and 
lower-level governments actively intervened in the labor market to facilitate 
corporate expansion. At government buildings, administrators assisted walk-in job 
applicants to prepare interviews at Foxconn and other private enterprises. Some 
administrators also set up recruitment counters outside the Chengdu railway station 
to help Foxconn’s hiring. Others issued directives to schools to fulfill internship 
requirements at companies under their jurisdiction. Through a snowball sampling, I 
had opportunities to talk to student interns, teachers, and managers who implemented 
the internship plan at Foxconn factories. 
 
Finally, on 16 December 2013, in my dual role as an independent researcher and a 
nonprofit labor organization advisor,58 I wrote to the chief executives of Foxconn 
(Terry Gou) and Apple (Tim Cook) to express concerns about working hours, wages 
and benefits, student interns, worker safety, and union organization at the 
supplier-factory level.59 On 31 December 2013, I received a reply from a Foxconn 
representative, Dr. Martin Hsing, Executive Director of Global Social and 
Environmental Responsibility Committee.60 On 18 February 2014, I also heard from 
Ms. Jacky Haynes, Senior Director of Apple’s Supplier Responsibility Program,61 
together with the enclosed 40-page 2014 Progress Report. In the following chapters I 
present the company statements as appropriate. 
                                                      
57 Xiaoqi hezuo (校企合作). 
58 That is, my advisory role with Hong Kong-based SACOM (Students and Scholars Against 
Corporate Misbehavior). 
59 Professors Pun Ngai and Mark Selden are co-researchers, whose deep engagement in Foxconn 
labor research has had a lasting impact on my academic studies and outreach to the two companies. 
60 The 7-page Foxconn statement (31 December 2013), in English, is on file. 
61 The 1,500-word Apple response in email correspondence (18 February 2014) is on file. 
19 
 
 
Overview of Chapters 
 
This dissertation analyzes the structural conditions and working-class agency of the 
young cohorts of Chinese workers. By looking into the high-tech electronics 
manufacturing industry, I assess the changing socioeconomic circumstances 
favorable to worker self-organization, as China has become deeply integrated in 
global production as the world’s leading industrial producer and exporter, and as a 
crucial site for foreign investment and capital accumulation. Chapter 2 reviews the 
social science literature to explain the dynamic relationships among class 
consciousness, interests, and collective actions. Notwithstanding oppressive 
structures of the state, global capital, and the market, scholars have witnessed 
frequent occurrences of labor actions in China since the early 1990s. Previous 
studies show that workers acquire their consciousness in everyday practices as well 
as explosive moments of struggles. As the “big buyers” and “big suppliers” are 
becoming highly inter-dependent, a source of Chinese workers’ power emerges: at 
the key node of global production, a critical mass of workers acting together is 
capable of disrupting the continuous work flow, and hence increasing their 
bargaining power. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 provide a historical account about the rise of Foxconn and Apple in 
corporate-led globalization since the 1970s. This concrete developmental process is 
deeply integrated into China’s opening and liberalization of its national economy. I 
draw on extensive archival research, as well as first-hand interviews with local 
government officials, managers, and workers to situate Chinese workers in a fast 
changing society. Politics and work have long been intertwined, but now this occurs 
in a geopolitical context of internationalization. The Chinese state has implemented a 
series of industrial and labor market reforms to enhance its power through foreign 
engagement. It has also fragmented the interests, identities, and mobilization efforts 
of the working class. In the “electronic workshop of the world,” production workers 
of Foxconn are subject to multilayered power in a buyer-driven global supply chain. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 look into the working conditions of two groups of Foxconn 
workers: rural migrants and student interns. Based on my field data, I characterize 
the corporate culture as militaristic and labor relations as hierarchal. Productivity, 
cost effectiveness, and market competitiveness are prioritized, while violations of 
labor laws are numerous. How do the workers attempt to express their needs in terms 
of wages and benefits, occupational safety and health, and dormitory facilities? In 
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what ways do the interns, or “student workers,” understand their internships on the 
line? Government education departments demand that vocational schools send 
students to labor-wanting Foxconn factories. Schools become the labor contractors. 
The abuse of intern labor and migrant workers is a result of collusion among the 
local state, company, and global buyers in capitalist accumulation. 
 
Production and consumption are interconnected spheres. Chapter 7 discusses 
workers’ social and family lives as well as their living conditions in the city. Factory 
dormitories as physical and socio-cultural spaces are potential resources in labor 
mobilization, though they are also tools for managerial control. They are a frequently 
negotiated site of contestation between labor and capital, and a place emergent from 
the withdrawal of the local government from worker housing provision. Outside of 
employer-provided dormitories designed primarily for individual worers, migrant 
families who bring children with them to the city face a heavy financial burden 
securing housing. Decent work and upward social mobility remains a distant 
“Chinese Dream” for many. 
 
Chapters 8 and 9 document lawsuits and extra-legal activisms waged by aggrieved 
workers to defend their dignity and rights. While class consciousness is situational 
and transient in nature, at times of crisis the awakening of consciousness is 
heightened, and this can be observed in workers’ slogans, poems, and open letters. 
Despite severe limitations, Foxconn workers employ a wide array of organizing 
strategies and tactics of resistance, including taking their boss to court, going on 
strike, rioting, threatening mass suicides, organizing a slowdown on the assembly 
line, and staging protests at the factories and in the dormitories. These instances of 
individualistic and/or collective conduct serve to protect one’s class interest as well 
as moral status (such as the right to human respect and negotiation on an equal 
footing). Local government officials react quickly to break the workers’ front in 
high-profile incidents. Workers face a formidable alliance of capital, including 
international capital, and the Chinese state, but also demonstrate their strong 
capacities for class actions. 
 
My conclusion (chapter 10) highlights the contributions of this labor study and the 
social transformation at the grassroots level in global capitalism. Some workers have 
accumulated organizing skills and public communications techniques in successive 
struggles. Meanwhile, the geography of production is changing. As capital moves 
rapidly to central and western regions, workers are now living closer to their native 
place, and they can draw on local family and social networks to make their demands. 
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I anticipate that in the long run working-class power can emerge as a new force in 
factories, in their households, and in the local communities. As the primary labor 
force in China’s economic development, young workers aspire to develop technical 
skills, earn living wages, enjoy comprehensive welfare, marry, educate their children 
in good schools, and hold the full range of citizen rights in the cities they inhabit. 
Against all odds, Chinese workers are joining hands with civil society organizations 
to call for social and economic equality. In the contentious authoritarian system, 
notwithstanding the resilience of the state in the face of sustained popular unrest over 
the last two decades, I point out the unstable, volatile nature of precarious labor in its 
hundreds of millions. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Labor Politics of Global Production 
 
Labor politics begins with the laborers themselves: their geographical 
origins, gender, popular culture, educational attainments, work 
experiences, and the like. These are the features of a worker’s milieu 
that structure lasting traditions of collective action. 
—Elizabeth Perry62 
 
This research, following Elizabeth Perry’s analytical approach, begins with workers’ 
defense of their own interests and their collective actions. Before the founding of the 
Chinese Communist Party in 1921 or the involvement of Marxist intellectuals and 
students in labor organizing at the turn of the 20th century, workers and other socially 
subordinate groups (such as peasants) had long created their own traditions and 
protest repertories to safeguard their collective interests.63 This chapter draws on 
historical and sociological literature to analyze workers’ subjectivities and persistent 
efforts in changing their socio-political and economic conditions. 
 
As China emerged as the “workshop of the world” with a shift of manufacturing 
from the developed countries of North American, Europe and East Asia to China and 
other developing countries, China has arguably become the “epicenter of world labor 
unrest” in the wake of global outsourcing and transnational manufacturing.64 In 
response to growing numbers of labor protests since the early 1990s, the state, 
central and local, has attempted to fragment workers’ identities, class interests, and 
mobilization efforts, and achieved some degree of success.65 Workers’ associational 
power remains weak, as official trade unions are politically restrained from leading 
strikes and protests. Tim Pringle however reminds us: “The absence of independent 
trade unions does not automatically preclude working class influence on most 
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aspects of the government’s labor relations policies, including wages.”66 Workers 
with higher awareness sometimes come together and find other ways to fight for 
their rights and interests. The struggle and progression of Chinese workers to be “a 
class for itself” is a long process. Different from the formation of a working class in 
Europe or other countries, China’s peasant laborers are entitled to agricultural 
land-use rights at birth; hence the means of production is not severed or expropriated, 
thanks to the socialist legacy since the late 1950s.67 In Marxist conception of labor 
process, Chinese migrant workers — rural residents who have left the farms to sell 
their labor for wages — are thrown in a semi-proletarianized situation. 
 
Under the auspices of the Chinese state, capital (domestic and international) has been 
able to manipulate and exploit “the stark divide between urban and rural citizens”68 
to maximize profits in the post-Mao era. During the 1980s and 1990s, the first wave 
of rural migrant workers participated in booming industries, construction, and 
services, whose wages were very low and welfare benefits and job security were 
virtually non-existent. 69  As market transformation continues, the relations of 
production — class relations — have been generally becoming more coercive, 
regardless of the ownership of capital. 70  From workers’ lived experiences to 
production technological advances, much has changed since the birth of a modern 
Chinese working-class movement more than a hundred years ago. And yet labor 
protest and political legitimacy remain inextricably linked.71 The durability of an 
authoritarian system in contemporary China is probably dependent on the 
party-state’s control over rising capital-labor conflict and other social discontents.  
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Class Consciousness and Collective Actions 
 
Capitalist industrialization has greatly transformed labor relations in the European 
countries since the late 18th century. Large factories amassed peasants turned workers 
in a specific mode of production, of which the primary goal is to maximize profits. 
Karl Marx distinguishes between “class in itself” and “class for itself” of nascent 
industrial workers: 
 
Economic conditions first transformed the mass of the people of the 
country into workers. The combination of capital has created for this 
mass a common situation, common interests. The mass is thus already 
a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle…the 
mass bedcomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself. The 
interests it defends become class interests. But the struggle of class 
against class is a political struggle.72 
  
At the end of the 19th century, foreign-owned factories began moving into coastal 
China. With the inflow of industrial capital, local businessmen and compradors 
gained more share in the emerging domestic and international markets. Port cities 
such as Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou were magnets of young adults, peasants 
and locals, to find new jobs.  
 
In the 1920s, despite the small number of factory workers, miners, rickshaw pullers, 
seamen, dockers, railway workers, and postal workers — an estimated 4 million 
throughout urban China73 — the militancy of labor in major economic sectors 
should not be underestimated. The maturity of the first-generation proletarians in 
early Chinese industrial capitalism was evident in their broad demand for humane 
treatment and social and economic rights. French historian Jean Chesneaux 74 
highlighted the significant contributions of Chinese workers in the nationalist 
revolutions during the eight years of struggles between 191975 and 1927, when the 
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Nationalist Party brutally suppressed the nascent labor movement. The growth of 
popular (especially working class) support for the Communist revolutionaries, and 
the evolution of working-class organizations brought about the institutional 
development of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) in 1925.76 
 
The strong capacity for independent collective actions of artisans, based on their 
associational life and shared identity, are well documented in Chinese and Western 
labor histories.77 Unskilled workers, on their own or in cross-class alliance, have 
also displayed their strength for self-protection, particularly in large factories where 
workers’ joint forces are potentially strong. Gail Hershatter shows that textile and 
cotton mill workers, iron and metal workers, and transport laborers in Tianjin, a 
modern industrial port city in the first half of the 20th century, were able to further 
their interests through “shifting alliances based on native place, kinship, patronage, 
and class.”78 But this kind of labor organization was not a simple or universal 
outcome of industrialization and urbanization, as if the growth of a homogeneous 
working class would naturally take place over time. Steve Smith underlined the 
intertwined character of the labor and nationalist movements in the distinctive 
historical context (from 1895 to 1927): “national and class identities tended to be 
mutually constitutive” because the Communist discursive and mobilization 
mechanisms functioned to “link the treatment of the Chinese nation at the hands of 
the foreign powers to the treatment of workers at the hands of capitalists.”79 
Throughout the 20th century to the present, “class and national consciousness,” in the 
concise analysis of Mark Selden, “have been generally complementary” in the 
formation of the Chinese working class.80 
 
In Shanghai prior to the mid 1940s, for example, Emily Honig found that “insofar as 
workers in [Japanese-owned] mills felt antagonistic toward their owners, it was to a 
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considerable extent as foreigners rather than as capitalists.”81 Some others did not 
exhibit anti-imperial sentiments. Importantly, women workers in large 
foreign-owned cotton mills, instead of small family shops or Chinese-run factories, 
were relatively contented with their pay and working conditions. To some, foreign 
bosses provided them with a relatively stronger sense of economic and social 
security compared to often more abusive labor contractors linked to local gangs. This 
close attention to workers’ subjective experience and world views82 is insightful: the 
formation of a collective identity as women and as workers, the consciousness of 
working-class interests, the participation in political and economic strikes, or the 
lack thereof, cannot be divorced from workers’ concrete situations in their workplace, 
the industry, and the larger society.83  
 
With the nationalization of industries during the 1950s through 1970s, the Chinese 
workers were liberated from capitalist exploitations. Under central planning, new 
workers, including peasant migrants settling in the city during the early years of the 
establishment of the People’s Republic, were provided with an “iron rice bowl” of 
permanent job tenure. The grades of wage rates were compressed to ensure a high 
level of income equality across urban work units.84 In the countryside, wealth 
distinctions between individual households were also minimized as farming and 
rural industries were collectivized. While urban-rural structural inequality remained, 
partly due to uneven geographical endowments and partly because of government 
development policies that favored workers over peasants, scholars note that the level 
was relatively low when compared to other Third World countries during the same 
period.85 After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the restoration of political 
stability, the central leadership under Deng Xiaoping introduced a series of rural 
reforms and foreign trade policies. Inequality widens and class conflict deepens. The 
set up of Special Economic Zones in Shenzhen and Shekou in South China in 1980 
                                                      
81 Emily Honig, 1986, Sisters and Strangers: Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills, 1919-1949, 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, p. 247. 
82 Charles Sabel in Work and Politics: The Division of Labor in Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982, p. 11) gives this definition: “The set of hopes and fears, together with the map 
of the social world that it establishes, is called a world view.”  
83 Elizabeth J. Perry, 2002, Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in 
China, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, ch. 5. 
84 Andrew G. Walder, 1986, Communist 2eo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry, 
Berkeley: University of California Press; Stephen Andors, 1977, China’s Industrial Revolution: 
Politics, Planning, and Management, 1949 to the Present, NY: Pantheon Books; Charles Hoffman, 
1974, The Chinese Worker, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press; Gail E. Henderson, and 
Myron S. Cohen, 1984, The Chinese Hospital: A Socialist Work Unit, New Haven: Yale University 
Press; Mark W. Frazier, 2002, The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace: State, Revolution, 
and Labor Management, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
85 See, for example, Mark Selden, 1993, The Political Economy of Chinese Development, Armonk, 
NY: M. E. Sharpe. 
27 
 
marked the re-opening of the domestic market to international capital after decades 
of self-reliant socialist practices. The world of work and labor has since drastically 
transformed. 
 
Phyllis Andors reported a strike by 2,500 workers at Sanyo electronics factory in the 
summer of 1985 at the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. She noted that the strike 
might be “partly explained by the tensions chacteristic of the Chinese-Japanese 
relationship” and “indicative of labor unrest elsewhere in the zone.”86 Whether the 
nationalistic or anti-Japanese motive was an underlying factor, 87  workers 
highlighted that “Sanyo pushed them too hard, demanding better quality and more 
efficiency.”88 While larger and more frequent labor protests and strikes in China 
(waged by urban laid-off workers and rural migrants) had not received much 
scholarly attention until the late 1990s through early 2000s,89 except the June 4th 
Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, a few researchers did document the prevalent 
exploitative labor policies in newly built private enterprises.90  
 
Class formation has occurred through the nurturance of class identity and collective 
mobilization among the Chinese migrant peasant-workers, in relative to the older 
socialist employees, who were shrinking in both numbers and political power in 
corporate restructuring, privatization, and bankruptcy.91 The passage of the 1994 
Labor Law at the national level nominally extended equal rights to all laborers, 
regardless of one’s place of household registration or the ownership of employing 
units.92 The promotion of labor legality has raised workers’ expectation of their 
rights.93 Concerning the politics of the second generation of migrant workers, 
                                                      
86 Phyllis Andors, 1988, “Women and Work in Shenzhen,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 
20(3), p. 34. 
87 Managers as “running dogs” and “traitors” were also noted in other labor conflicts at Japanese-, 
Taiwanese- and Hong Kong-owned factories, past and present, thus the uneasy Sino-Japanese 
relationships may not be assumed in short-lived labor outbursts. 
88 Phyllis Andors, 1988, “Women and Work in Shenzhen,” p. 35. 
89 Murray Scot Tanner, 2004, “China Rethinks Unrest,” The Washington Quarterly 27(3), pp. 137-56. 
90 See, for example, Anita Chan, 2001, China’s Workers under Assault: The Exploitation of Labor in 
a Globalizing Economy, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. 
91 Ching Kwan Lee, 2007, Against the Law: Labor Protests in China’s Rustbelt and Sunbelt, Berkeley: 
University of California Press; Ching Kwan Lee, 2007, “Is Labor a Political Force in China?” 
Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China, edited by Elizabeth J. Perry and Merle Goldman, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 288-52. 
92 From the perspective of state workers, however, the 1994 Chinese Labor Law institutionalized the 
end of lifetime tenure, with the replacement of limited-term individual labor contracts, in a more 
diversified economy. See, for example, Gordon White, 1989, “Restructuring the Working Class: 
Labor Reform in Post-Mao China,” Marxism and the Chinese Experience, edited by Arif Dirlik and 
Maurice Meisner, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 152-68; Martin King Whyte, 1999, “The 
Changing Role of Workers,” The Paradox of China’s Post-Mao Reforms, edited by Merle Goldman 
and Roderick MacFarquhar, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, pp. 173-96. 
93 Ching Kwan Lee, 2007, Against the Law: Labor Protests in China’s Rustbelt and Sunbelt, Berkeley: 
28 
 
observers find that young laborers were skilful in combining legalistic and 
extra-legal means to advance their individual or collective demands, rather than 
tolerating injustice.94 
 
During the work process, managerial control is crucial to extract labor power and to 
procure profit (that is surplus value) in capitalist production. Structurally, the 
disciplining of workers to conditions of factory production entails “the social control 
of physical and mental powers on a very broad basis.” 95  The subjective or 
ideological dimension96 of work, however, needs to be carefully examined. Michael 
Burawoy in his seminal work The Politics of Production succinctly explains: 
 
The crucial issue is that the interests that organize the daily life of 
workers are not given irrevocably; they cannot be imputed; they are 
produced and reproduced in particular ways. To assume, without further 
specification, that the interests of capital and labor are opposed leads to 
serious misunderstandings of the nature of capitalist control, if only 
because it provides an excuse to ignore the ideological terrain on which 
interests are organized…We must investigate the conditions under which 
the interests of labor and capital actually become antagonistic.97 
 
The nature of class opposition, or worker acquiescence, is dynamic; it is not a thing 
that exists in a static form. Under the right circumstances, workers share a common 
identity on their interests “as between themselves” and “as against other men whose 
interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs.”98 In other times, the 
unevenness or disjuncture of class experience between workers is observed.99 In the 
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Chinese society as in the West, workers — differentiated by age, gender, work 
experiences, skills, cultures, native-places, citizenship and so on — have come to 
realize or understand their class relations in numerous situations in their everyday 
life. In some cases, such a clear identification among the workers of their shared 
interests has inspired resistance and oppositional actions.100 In some other cases, this 
merely results in an internalization of their subordinate role. The realization of class 
consciousness is thus fluid, contingent, and varied.101 
 
Michael Mann highlights that working-class consciousness is a developing 
phenomenon, “a process not of being but of becoming.”102 It is possibly intensified 
in collective struggles but it is not confined to those very moments. While 
consciousness about workers’ collective interest may precede strikes or protests, it 
often strengthens during the actions themselves. Rick Fantasia emphasizes the 
interactions between workers in solidarity actions, in which workers’ ideas and 
behavior are transformed.103 What is interesting is the social group in action. Survey 
teams who aggregate the scores based on individual respondents’ attitude, perception 
of labor relations, or degree of job satisfaction often fail to predict the eventual 
outbreak of industrial actions. As Gordon Marshall concisely summarizes: 
 
An overemphasis on class imagery at the expense of class action can 
perhaps be attributed to the widely held belief among academic 
observers that it is somehow necessary for men and women to 
encompass society intellectually before they can attempt to change it. 
This premise is not confirmed by the history of class action on either 
a revolutionary or on a more modest scale…Consciousness is 
generated in and changed by social action.104  
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I take a less bounded conceptualization of class consciousness which would enable 
us to learn more about workers’ varied ways of expression, in both their discourse (a 
common saying about their work status or class position circulated among the 
working peers, protest slogans, or poems) and their organized actions. In rapidly 
transforming China, Pun Ngai concludes that “class consciousness is also constituted 
through everyday practices that may be performed anytime and anywhere and as 
such could hardly be reduced to moments of collective class struggle.”105 My 
ethnographic research will try to show that emergence and growth of working-class 
consciousness is embedded in and derived from the workers’ milieu, which is not 
confined to one single moment of labor protest. 
 
Social Class and the Chinese State 
 
The transformation from state socialism to capitalism (with Chinese characteristics) 
has fundamentally shaped labor relations, the mode of production, and the structure 
of social reproduction of labor.106 At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping and his allies promoted a 
developmental strategy centering on the Four Modernizations, namely, agriculture, 
industry, national defense, and science and technology. Soon, the four 
modernizations would be supplemented by privatization, liberalization, 
marketization, and globalization.107 Chinese state elites, central and localities, join 
hands with global capital to present market forces as universal, natural, inevitable, 
and irresistible.108 A modernizing project of “reform and opening” (gaige kaifang) 
affords many dreams and desires of all sorts, including for the hundreds of millions 
of rural migrant workers structured at the bottom rank in global factories oriented for 
export industrialization.  
 
The Chinese party-state’s hegemony is built upon its restoration of social order from 
the political radicalism in the aftermath of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
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(1966-1976) and its unprecedented and sustained economic growth, even when the 
gaps between the rich and the poor are widened.109 By contrast, during the old 
socialist days, socio-economic inequalities arising from private ownership of the 
means of production were eliminated from the mid 1950s through the mid 1970s. 
Nevertheless, new classes did emerge, in which workers and cadres were 
differentiated through unequal access to bureaucratic power, cultural capital, and job 
entitlements.110 In this section, we briefly review the politicization of class struggles 
during Mao’s China, follows with their de-politicization in the mid to late 1970s 
through the present. 
 
In large Chinese state firms, urban socialist workers had “property use rights” to gain 
access to a comprehensive range of facilities such as clinics and hospitals, cafeterias, 
nursery service, and technical schools. 111  Contract workers 112  and temps, 113 
composed of rural migrants, were however discriminated against and denied welfare 
benefits. In the latter half of the 1960s, underprivileged laborers and other 
marginalized social groups openly challenged the state regime, with initial support 
from Chairman Mao and his factions. 114  Politics was in command. Public 
condemnation of “capitalist roaders” and “Party persons in authority” contaminated 
with bourgeoisie values and practices were intense, resulting in widespread 
disruptions to the economy and society.115 In the wake of military suppression, the 
de-politicization of class from the top marked the beginning of a new epoch in the 
latter half of the 1970s.  
 
Under intense competition in the post-Mao era, many small and medium state firms 
went bankrupt, were privatized, or restructured, throwing an estimated 60 million 
urban workers out of work.116 With loans and subsidies from government either 
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reduced or eliminated, state-owned enterprises are responsible for their profits and 
losses with the pressures passed on to workers. William Hurst sharply observes that, 
during the 1990s through the early 2000s, “state firms became more, rather than less, 
politicized through reform.”117 Local government officials, including trade unions 
and women’s federations, advise laid-off workers to learn from entrepreneurial 
migrant workers to find new opportunities. They define the problem as personal, as a 
question of whether the individual worker is lazy, or is taking initiative to adapt to 
market changes and to advance with the times.118 
 
Neoliberals believe that “human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”119 
China well illustrates the stark reality that follows from this logic: increased income 
polarization and structural inequality based on class, exacerbated by state withdrawal 
from the lifetime employment and welfare protection of workers in state-owned 
enterprises and collective firms.120  
 
Meanwhile, with the influx of foreign direct investment and the relaxation of state 
restrictions on rural-to-urban migration since the 1980s, successive cohorts of 
internal migrant workers have simultaneously become the core of the new industrial 
working class and been exposed to market risks and uncertainty. With China’s 
emerging state capitalism, labor flexibility, production efficiency, and competition 
across enterprises with various forms of ownership and labor relations become 
imperative.121 Yet even as class contradictions sharpen across society, the language 
of class has largely disappeared from Chinese discourse. As Ching Kwan Lee and 
Yuan Shen demonstrate, under dual pressure from the state and academic institutions, 
many scholars who study workers in post-socialist China “shun class analysis and 
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define away labor issues as those of mobility, migration, and stratification.”122 The 
contemporary understanding is that the Chinese word jieji (class) connotes 
antagonism and confrontation in the Marxist sense, eliciting dark memories of 
bloody violence of class struggle in the recent past. Its replacement in social analysis, 
the concept of jiecheng (strata), receives official endorsement and wide public 
acceptance. Government policy-makers and academics analyze survey data on 
income distribution, educational attainment, and occupational prestige or rankings, 
and document the rise of a middle class, or a series of middle classes, in relatively 
wealthy China.123 The mainstream discourse highlights social mobility predicated 
on enhancing human resource capital in the image of the entrepreneur through 
continuing education and re-employment training.  
 
Incomplete Proletarianization of Chinese Rural Migrant Workers 
 
The structural obstacles faced by rural migrant workers, however, go far beyond 
individual motivations for upward mobility. Many of the young rural migrants desire 
for a relative degree of individual freedom, an alternate lifestyle, and economic 
autonomy, which is stimulated by the growing urban-rural disparity124 following 
de-collectivization. Some rural women also come to the cities in hopes of escaping 
arranged marriages, familial conflicts, and patriarchal oppression.125 These personal 
and familial decisions concerning out-migration — shaped by the state-led, 
urban-based development strategy — fit into the state’s goal of channeling labor 
migration from the countryside to coastal industrial areas, and more recently to 
inland provinces. Great differences between the big city and the remote countryside, 
which inherited uneven ecological resources and productive inputs in a vast nation 
like China, have not been eliminated, despite significant state intervention and 
remarkable achievements during the socialist decades.126  
 
In the Chinese political economy, internal migrant workers continue to be officially 
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classified as rural residents, including those who have lived and worked in cities for 
years, and indeed some were born and have spent their entire lives in cities. Recent 
government statistics indicate that nearly 30 million rural workers had migrated to 
urban areas with their spouse and children,127 and this trend of family out-migration 
continues. State provision of contract land for rural residents, including migrants 
living and working in the cities, could arguably facilitate national development and 
stabilize society while preserving a vast proto-peasantry.128 The original state-led 
accumulation strategy, based on the calculation that reproduction of villagers, 
including raising and educating children and eventual retirement, would take place in 
the rural areas, has been extended to the present, that is, to a time when hundreds of 
millions of migrant laborers have left the countryside for the cities under China’s 
capitalist transition. 
 
However, the desirability and sustainability of young people living in the traditional 
mode of rural-based social reproduction of labor is highly questionable. Rural 
migrants find themselves caught in a position of incomplete proletarianization.129 
The primary income of the scores of migrant factory workers is derived from wage 
labor. In the urban workplace, employers pay rural migrant labor less than their local 
counterparts, on the dubious assumption that the village will provide subsistence, 
housing, and security in old age.130 Based on the 2010 Chinese trade union survey, 
the surveyed 2,711 migrant workers (from 1,000 unionized enterprises covering 
state-owned, collective, domestic private, and foreign-invested enterprises) were 
paid less on all five categories of insurance and the housing provident fund than 
co-workers with urban hukou. Perhaps surprisingly, significant numbers of local 
workers lacked one or more mandated social insurance benefits at the time of the 
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survey. In all cases, however, migrants enjoyed far less coverage. The data suggest 
that the difference between the two segments of workers has narrowed at a time 
when both groups experienced welfare benefit cuts.131 
 
Class has become a dominant mode of Chinese working people’s experience of 
social reality.132 “Like other kinds of commodities,” Eli Friedman and Ching Kwan 
Lee emphasize, “the human capacity to transform nature can now be alienated from 
one person and sold to others.”133 Production efficiency and market competition 
across enterprises of various forms of ownership have become imperative.134 Indeed, 
government officials, from the Political Bureau down to township and village cadres, 
race against each other to “identify and support ‘winners’ in the economic 
competition.”135 Under these circumstances, local city governments have generally 
avoided improving the livelihood of migrant workers and families under their 
jurisdiction. Worse yet, local officials at the provincial, city, county, district, 
township, and village levels have fostered “a permissive regime of labor regulation” 
wherein central government rules are bent to the investors’ advantage, thus 
perpetuating the plights of Chinese rural migrants as an underclass.136 
 
Labor Control and Workers’ Rights 
 
Regional competition for capital accumulation — across the coastal provinces and 
between the interior regions — is very intense.137 Mary Gallagher points out that 
“the incentives, both political and economic, of attracting investment and export 
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markets on the part of local governments has led to an overwhelming emphasis on 
firm autonomy and flexibility at the expense of workers’ safety, health and rights.”138 
To ensure a good investment climate, local labor officials do not stringently enforce 
labor laws and regulations. They are far more interested in creating a 
business-friendly environment for building their political career. Based on his survey, 
Barry Naughton found that “cadres are subject to annual evaluations, in which they 
can score up to 100 points, of which more than 70 are awarded for outcomes that are 
directly linked to economic growth.”139 Not surprisingly, labor inspection by the 
local bureaucracy is to a large extent a systemic failure. 
 
The fundamental right to strike was included in China’s 1975 and 1978 Constitutions, 
but was eventually removed in 1982, reflecting the government leaders’ concerns 
over political stability and their fear of the possible influence of Polish Solidarity on 
Chinese activists.140 Strikers are thus not protected by Chinese law. But the absence 
of legislative protection has failed to curtail workers from going on strike.141 
Whereas strikes tend to have a more “immediate political effect than do such 
‘nibbling’ actions as absenteeism, pilfering, slowdowns, or sabotage,”142 scholars 
have also paid attention to labor court challenges 143  and collective worker 
petitions,144 which likewise have drawn great attention from state officials at various 
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levels. In fact, from the 1990s, persistent struggles by workers, especially laid-off 
urban workers (until the 2000s) and rural-to-urban migrants (through the present), 
have created intense pressure on the Chinese state to redefine its position toward 
labor conflicts. 
 
With growing labor and social unrest, the governments including trade union 
officials are compelled to respond tactically. Tim Pringle documents the government 
provision of free legal aid service to needy workers, direct trade union elections 
facilitated by local officials, and the establishment of worker support centers in large 
factory towns.145 Settlement of large-scale, high-profile worker strikes and protests 
through local government mediation is routinely undertaken to restore industrial 
harmony. 146  Xi Chen highlights that some local officials have used worker 
discontent to successfully negotiate additional resources from the center, and thus 
they are incentivized to step in to solve a few labor petition cases.147 Ching Kwan 
Lee and Yonghong Zhang also show that officials have skillfully employed 
sophisticated “protest absorption” techniques to maintain socio-political stability 
(literally in the Chinese expression “weiwen”).148 The durability of authoritarianism 
is built on limited accommodation to workers’ demands, while the deep-seated 
contradictions in capitalist production remain largely unaddressed.  
 
The state-labor power relations are not static but are changing. The Chinese state is 
seeking to raise domestic consumption and hence living standards, in part in major 
response to the struggle of aggrieved workers and farmers.149 Political leaders and 
business elites have perceived the threat of workers’ direct actions as so threatening 
to social stability that in certain periods both government and employers have been 
forced to grant certain policy concessions and propose higher wages. However, new 
opportunities for government officials, or bureaucratic capitalists, to accumulate 
private profit are abundant in high-tech industrial parks. 
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One specific area of state intervention is the labor market: not only the tapping of the 
rural labor reserve, but also of tens of millions of student interns (shixisheng) turned 
workers (xueshenggong). In light of a tight supply of low-cost workers in some 
regions and/or at high production seasons, government officials promoted a 
combination of work and study through workplace-based internships, taking 
advantage of the expansion of modern vocational education in the past decades. We 
have learned that interns at large electronics150  and automobile151 factories were 
not provided with skills training, but were simply treated as cheap labor. However, 
the triangular relationships or joint partnerships among local governments, 
vocational schools, and companies are yet to be explored in great depth.   
  
Moreover, an analysis of the exploitations of Chinese industrial labor — including 
both migrant and student workers — reveals a strong link to global capital. Many 
manufacturers have become contractors or subcontractors to branded merchandisers 
and retailers in transnational production. By 2000, 50 percent of global 
manufacturing production was in developing countries with production organized 
through international supply chains, and the trend has continued to accelerate.152 
How do Chinese workers respond to production demands in the globalized regime? 
What is their leverage of struggle in the multilayered network of corporate interests 
and state power? 
 
Global Outsourcing, Buyers, and Contract Manufacturers 
 
Capital concentration and consolidation are inherent to capitalism. As Karl Marx 
wrote in Capital, “one capitalist always strikes down many others.”153 Corporations 
exploit spaces of uneven development at home and abroad to maximize profit. 
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Capital transforms favoured rural and urban sites for industrialization, while 
excluding “other regions of the globe” from “new waves of economic 
transformation.”154 From the 1980s, with the demise of central planning in the 
Soviet Union, central and eastern Europe, and China, and the promotion of “free 
trade” in other emerging economies, the global structure of industrial production has 
fundamentally shifted. Through corporate outsourcing, restructuring, mergers and 
acquisitions, large companies expand market share onshore and offshore. Leading 
firms such as Apple and IBM, known as the “commodity chain drivers”155 or 
“market makers,”156 once produced many of their products in-house in their own 
countries. In recent decades they have preferred to set up hierarchically structured 
networks of independently-owned suppliers to produce their commodities.157 
 
“Global supply bases” have emerged in India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Vietnam, 
and other rapidly developing economies, but above all, in China, where production 
activities and market transactions are taking place at competitively low prices, high 
speed, and in huge volumes.158 Multinational giants seek to partner with a small 
number of highly efficient and strategically located contractors, while diversifying 
risks and minimizing costs through supply chain management.159  
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Giant manufacturers, rather than small workshops, are better able to “respond to 
shortening product cycles and increasing product complexity,” thus becoming 
powerful players in just-in-time production networks.160 They serve multiple clients 
to climb the global value chains. They have been upgrading and growing in size and 
scale. Richard Appelbaum finds that East Asian contractors, ranging from footwear 
and garments to electronics, have been integrating vertically in their supply 
chains.161 Joonkoo Lee and Gary Gereffi explain the co-evolution process that 
capital accumulation of smartphone leaders (such as Apple and Samsung) have 
advanced alongside innovation within their large assemblers. 162  Electronics 
manufacturers provide value-added services, component processing, and final 
assembly in “one-stop shopping” to technology firms and retailers. Not only 
production tasks, but also inventory management and logistics, are being 
concentrated in strategic factories, resulting in ever stronger mutually dependent 
relations between buyers and suppliers. 
 
And yet global buyers, facing strong competition, seek to lower costs, strengthen 
control over suppliers, and speed up to release newer products. Large buyers and 
retailers continue to dominate the business relationship and impose their will on their 
contractors. “The determination of retailers [such as Walmart] to cut costs to the bare 
bone leaves little room for contractors [based in China] to maintain labor 
standards.”163 Similarly, Edward Webster, Rob Lambert, and Andries Bezuidenhout 
highlight the power asymmetry between buyers and contractors, in which big firms 
like LG take advantage of their dominant market position to “actually demand cuts 
in costs” from suppliers.164 The buyer-driven pattern is characteristic of numerous 
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American, European, Japanese, and South Korean transnationals that dominate the 
electronics industry. Boy Lüthje observes that brand-name firms have focused on 
“product development, design, and marketing,” gaining a larger share of the value 
created in trade even as they abandon hardware manufacturing.165  
 
Intense bargaining by big buyers over costs and profits has kept a tight rein on 
producers. Garrett Brown argues that “contractor factories” are often not provided 
with financial support for corporate responsibility programs required by brands, 
“instead they face slashed profit margins and additional costs that can be made up 
only by further squeezing their own labor force.”166 Subject to strong demands from 
global brands, manufacturers in China and other countries compete against each 
other to meet production speedup, pricing, and quality goals, shaving profit margins. 
An ever quicker product release cycle, accompanied by shorter product finishing 
time, increases pressures on factory workers. Steven McKay concludes that 
high-tech commodity producers “focus their labor concerns on cost, availability, 
quality, and controllability” to enhance profitability in the export market.167 Price 
pressures lead manufacturing firms to compromise workers’ health and safety and to 
keep wages low. Workers’ adaptation, or resistance, to capitalist control has to be 
understood in this new context of global production, in which concentration of 
capital and supply chains at the country, sectoral, and/or firm level has reconfigured 
class and labor politics. 
 
Worker Resistance in Global Production 
 
The integration of manufacturers in global production networks, and tight delivery 
schedules for coveted products, has enhanced workers’ bargaining power at the 
workplace level. In her longitudinal survey of world labor movements since 1870, 
Beverly Silver documents the rise of new working class forces in sites of capital 
investment at specific historical conjunctures. She defines “workplace bargaining 
power” as the power that “accrues to workers who are enmeshed in tightly integrated 
production processes, where a localized work stoppage in a key node can cause 
disruptions on a much wider scale than the stoppage itself.”168 In the contemporary 
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context of social struggles, Frances Piven succinctly discusses the nature of 
“interdependent power” and highlights the fundamental fact that employers are 
dependent on workers’ consent to labor, perhaps more dependent than ever before in 
our modern world economy. She writes:  
 
Distinctive features of contemporary capitalist economies make them 
exceptionally vulnerable to the withdrawal of cooperation; in other 
words, to the strike power in its many forms. These features include 
extended chains of production, reliance on the Internet to mesh 
elaborate schedules of transportation and production, and just-in-time 
production doing away with the inventories that once shielded 
corporations from the impact of the production strike.169 
 
With workers’ growing awareness of the opportunities presented by the fact that 
giant corporations faced pressures to meet quotas for new models and holiday season 
purchases, they have come together to voice demands. The vast labor force at many 
workplaces are striving to expand social and economic rights, bypassing the 
management-controlled unions. 170  Access to internet and social networking 
technology also enables workers to disseminate open letters and to tweet urgent 
appeals for support.171 The number of worker protests and strikes has exploded in 
recent decades, even though the Chinese state has sought to redirect protest from the 
streets to the courts, and to encourage settlements with employers. Periodic and 
limited worker victories aside, managerial assault and/or state repression of labor 
protests are still commonplace. 
 
Elizabeth Perry observes that “labor movements are not merely the product of 
industrial structure or market conditions. The political setting also acts as a critical 
force in shaping the pattern of worker protest.”172 My field research attempts to 
show that new frontiers of organized resistance among a young cohort of industrial 
                                                                                                                                                      
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 13; see also, Erik Olin Wright, 2000, “Working-Class 
Power, Capitalist-Class Interests, and Class Compromise,” American Journal of Sociology 105(4), pp. 
957-1002. 
169 Frances Fox Piven, 2014, “Interdependent Power: Strategizing for the Occupy Movement,” 
Current Sociology 62(2), p. 226. 
170 For an example of workers’ disruptive power in an auto plant, see Beverly J. Silver and Lu Zhang, 
2009, “China as an Emerging Epicenter of World Labour Unrest,” China and the Transformation of 
Global Capitalism, edited by Ho-fung Hung, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 
174-87. 
171 Jack Linchuan Qiu, 2009, Working-Class 2etwork Society: Communication Technology and the 
Information Have-Less in China, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
172 Elizabeth J. Perry, 2002, Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in 
China, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, p. 162. 
43 
 
workers are opening up. As capital moves to lower-cost regions to take advantage of 
state privileges, including access to flexible labor, new sources of grievances arise. 
Angry workers sometimes take aim at their factory boss and global buyers in 
question, such that the multiple “stakeholders” including the company 
representatives of the supply chains and Chinese government officials are compelled 
to act. The bargaining power among workers, capital, and central/local state over 
labor rights has shifted at times of higher social awareness about rights protection, 
governance legitimacy, and global labor justice.173  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The Communist political leaders, guided by Marxist and Leninist doctrines, aimed to 
improve the lives of workers and peasants following the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949. The mode of socialist production was characterized by 
state appropriation of surplus labor for a high level of reinvestment and provision of 
full employment.174 In the first Chinese Constitution, adopted in 1954, the central 
leadership legitimized the working class as the vanguards in “a people’s democratic 
state.” The days when Chinese workers were glorified as a political force of 
advanced revolutionary consciousness, nevertheless, have long buried in the past. In 
recent years, while the government has made class compromise and socio-economic 
concessions to some extent,175  grievances continue to build up among a new 
generation in “the workshop of the world.” 
 
Transnational corporations have exported capital in searching for cheaper, 
disciplined, and more pliant labor, thereby circumventing tighter labor regulatory 
systems within certain nations. The resulting “successive geographical relocation of 
capital” has been facilitated by efficient transportation and communications 
technologies, regional and international financial services, and access to immigrants 
and surplus labor.176 The “race to the bottom,” however, has rarely proceeded 
without labor, social and/or environmental challenges at sites of new investment. 
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China, in its opening to foreign capital and international trade since the early 1980s, 
well exemplifies all these processes — and in an extreme form, where hundreds of 
millions of workers are being drawn into global production chains. Is it simply a 
matter of time before worker protests coalesce into larger and more sustained 
movements, inviting comparison with the great labor protests that erupted 
throughout China in the early 20th century?  
 
At the same time as producing more than 50 percent of the world’s electronics, 
Foxconn’s workers are simultaneously creating a new working class with potential to 
shape Chinese labor politics. In the following chapters, I show that some aggrieved 
workers have taken aim at reputation-conscious companies to defend their rights and 
interests. The question remains whether, and under what conditions, workers can 
effectively challenge the combination of corporate and state power to raise labor and 
social standards.  
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Chapter 3 
 
China’s Rise and Foxconn’s Empire 
 
As the largest electronics manufacturer in the world, Foxconn is 
realizing the dream that everyone can enjoy high quality 
products…Foxconn’s “one-stop” service for customers has been 
proved as the best service in the world. 
—Foxconn Technology Group177 
 
China’s economic reform is built on a strong foundation of socialist development. 
Between 1952 (when the First Five-Year Plan was launched) and 1978, national 
industrial output increased at an average rate of 11.5 percent annually.178 This “big 
push” development strategy focused on heavy industry, such as iron and steel, 
agricultural machinery, and natural resource extraction. From the early 1980s, the 
government has promoted labor-intensive industrialization to enhance national 
competitiveness in the world economy. In a span of two decades, the Chinese 
national economy had fundamentally undergone a transformation from one based on 
heavy industry, with guaranteed lifetime employment and generous welfare provided 
to urban state sector workers, to one that mainly relies on foreign and private 
investments and massive use of rural migrant laborers in light export-oriented 
industries. 179  In the electronics manufacturing industry, Taiwanese-invested 
Foxconn is king.180       
 
The corporate growth of Foxconn in China is unprecedented anywhere in the world, 
in terms of the size of workforce, the scale of its factories, and the speed of their 
geographic spread. From 1974, Foxconn’s drive for profits led it to internationalize 
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production. Taking advantage of China’s Open Door policy, in 1988 Foxconn was 
among the first group of Taiwanese companies to invest in coastal Guangdong. 
Today Foxconn has more than 30 factories in China alone, with each single factory 
complex employing from 80,000 to over 400,000 workers. Besides China and 
Taiwan, Foxconn has production facilities in Japan, South Korea, Australia, New 
Zealand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, India, United Arab Emirates, 
Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Hungary, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Turkey, Ireland, Scotland, Brazil, Mexico, Canada, and 
the United States (see Appendix 3 for Foxconn’s locations around the world). As 
such, Foxconn could be said to have built a global industrial empire. But the heart of 
that empire, including the lion’s share of the labor force, lies in China. 
 
This chapter narrates the historical development of Foxconn in the trajectory of East 
Asian and Chinese globalization since the 1970s. The expansion of Foxconn to 
become a powerful transnational corporation is inseparable from major brands’ 
global restructuring and China’s capitalist transformation. Between 1988 and 1999, 
foreign direct investments from Taiwan reached 9.3 percent of China’s total inflows 
of investments;181 and Taiwanese capital, combined with growing capital from Japan, 
the United States, Europe, and other countries since the early 1990s, have steadily 
increased. From coastal to central and western China, Foxconn gains local 
government support in terms of access to labor, land, and administrative services. 
Provincial and lower-level governments engage with large enterprises like Foxconn 
to maximize economic gains, and at times erect protectionist barriers against 
investment from other provinces or cities, such that China has reported a “one 
country, thirty-one economies” malaise. 182  In recent years, however, regional 
economic integration and stronger inter-governmental cooperation has been 
undertaken in pursuit of greater competitiveness. A notable example is the formal 
establishment of the Chengdu-Chongqing 183  Economic Zone in 2011 in 
southwestern China, following the regional development of trade and industries for 
more than a decade (in Chinese, the official abbreviations of Chengdu and 
Chongqing denote the new economic zone, Cheng-Yu jingji qu).184 Not surprisingly, 
a Chengdu-based Foxconn human resources manager said, “the future of Foxconn 
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has been tightly bound with Chengdu and Chongqing.”185 In fact, Chengdu is 
currently home of more than two hundred Global 500 companies.186 The rise of 
Foxconn and other large companies testifies to China’s global success, even if this 
comes at a high human and environmental cost. 
 
Japan, China, and East Asia 
 
Between 1990 and 2006, the expansion of intra-Asia trade accounted for about 40 
percent of the total increase in world trade.187 China’s growing dominance has 
reshaped regional production networks previously dominated by Japan and its former 
colonies Taiwan and South Korea. The rise of Japan and East Asian capitalism in the 
1950s and 1960s was integral to the Cold War geopolitical order. To contain the 
spread of Communism and consolidate its global economic reach, the United States 
provided military and economic resources to its “client states,” encouraged Taiwan 
and South Korea to open up their markets to Japanese trade and investment, and 
fostered the growth of a regional power centered on Japan’s export-oriented 
industrialization. 188  Japanese firms received subsidized loans to create new 
industries and exported finished products to Western markets. In the 1960s, Toshiba, 
Hitachi, Panasonic, Sanyo, Ricoh, Mitsubishi, Casio and others moved to Taiwan to 
start operations.189 Similarly, Japanese trading companies began sourcing garments 
and footwear from Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong. 
 
From the mid-1960s, IBM, the leader in business computing, shifted its 
labor-intensive production from the United States and Europe to Asia in order to cut 
costs.190 The microelectronics components of IBM System 360 computers were 
                                                      
185 Manager interviewee 3. 
186 Fortune Live Media, 2013, “Fortune Global Forum: Chengdu, 6-8 June.” 
http://www.fortuneconferences.com/global-forum-2013/ 
187 Giovanni Arrighi, 2009, “China’s Market Economy in the Long Run,” China and the 
Transformation of Global Capitalism, edited by Ho-fung Hung, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, p. 22. 
188 Mark Selden, 1997, “China, Japan, and the Regional Political Economy of East Asia, 1945-1995,” 
2etwork Power: Japan and Asia, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, pp. 306-40; Robert Wade, 1990, Governing the Market: Economic Theory 
and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization, Princeton: Princeton University Press; 
Peter Evans, 1995, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press; Ho-fung, Hung, ed., 2009, China and the Transformation of 
Global Capitalism, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
189 Gary G. Hamilton and Cheng-shu Kao, 2011, “The Asia Miracle and the Rise of 
Demand-Responsive Economies,” The Market Makers: How Retailers are Reshaping the Global 
Economy, edited by Gary G. Hamilton, Misha Petrovic and Benjamin Senauer, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 191-93. 
190 Steven C. McKay, 2006, Satanic Mills or Silicon Islands? The Politics of High-Tech Production in 
the Philippines, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 37-39. 
48 
 
assembled by workers in Japan, and then Taiwan, because “the cost of labor there 
was so low” that it was cheaper than automated production in New York.191 Radio 
Corporation America (RCA), the long-time consumer electronics giant, similarly 
moved to “take advantage of Taiwan’s cheap labor and loose regulatory environment” 
in the export-processing zones in the late 1960s.192 Electronics assembly grew 
rapidly in Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong (“the Asian Tigers”), 
and later Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and India.193 In these newly 
industrializing countries, most factory workers were young women migrants from 
the countryside, whose discipline and low cost labor contributed to the “economic 
miracle.”194 
 
From the late 1970s, China set up special economic zones to attract foreign capital 
and boost exports as the means to integrate regional and global economies. The state 
controlled workers’ self-organization and consequently wages to facilitate low-cost 
exports.195 Throughout the first three decades of rapid light industrialization, the 
manufacturing wages of “the Asian Tigers” rose from approximately 8 percent of 
U.S. wages in 1975 to over 30 percent in the 1990s through 2005; by contrast, 
China’s manufacturing wages over the years from 1980 to 2005 remained fairly low, 
at approximately 2-3 percent of U.S. wages.196 Long-term wage stagnation has 
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enhanced Chinese export competitiveness, but dampens domestic consumption. 
Ho-fung Hung concludes that private consumption in China has been rising in 
absolute terms since the 1980s, but it has grown far more slowly than fixed-asset 
investment. 197  Although a declining share of wages in total gross domestic 
product — that is, wage repression — is widely reported elsewhere, China’s divide 
between the rich and poor is enormous and widening.  
 
Since the late-1980s, China’s rural economy has deteriorated as the state prioritized 
urban-centered and export-oriented industrial policy.198 China’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization in 2001 brought about further challenges to villagers, who 
faced a flood of cheap subsidized crops imported from overseas. Despite gains 
associated with the elimination of agricultural taxes in the mid-2000s and the 
subsequent establishment of a minimal subsidy for the poor, with the departure of 
most young people for the cities, the prospects for agriculture and sustainable rural 
development have remained dim. 
 
China’s Wages and Rising Inequalities 
 
China’s wage competitiveness and labor productivity are among the attractions for 
international and domestic capital. In the face of labor unrest and popular discontent, 
since 2003, the new central government has taken some steps to improve farmers’ 
income and to raise minimum wages to stimulate consumption-led growth.199 The 
2004 Provisions on Minimum Wage requires local governments to raise minimum 
wages at least once every two years.200 Between 2008 and 2012, local governments 
raised minimum wages by an average of 12.6 percent annually, except for a wage 
freeze in 2009 in the wake of the world recession.201 In 2009, the average wage of 
China’s 145 million migrant workers working in the city was 1,417 Yuan/month, 
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including overtime premiums.202 To take an example from my research: between 
January 2009 and May 2010, Foxconn’s largest Longhua factory paid its new 
“unskilled” workers in Shenzhen 900 Yuan per month — the lowest statutory rate.  
 
Table 3.1 lists 12 cities with large migrant populations and shows that statutory 
minimum wages in inland cities are approximately one-quarter to one-third below 
those in large coastal metropolises (listed in the order of 2013 local minimum wages). 
At the end of 2012, the National Bureau of Statistics reported that the average total 
income of migrant workers in big coastal cities reached 2,290 Yuan/month (including 
overtime premiums, subsidies, and/or bonuses), an increase of nearly 12 percent over 
the previous year.203 In 2013, Shanghai at 1,620 Yuan/month and Shenzhen at 1,600 
Yuan/month had the highest minimum wages nationwide, while Chongqing in 
western China barely surpassed one thousand Yuan. 
 
Table 3.1 China’s Minimum Wages in 12 Cities, 2009-2013 
         Minimum Wages (Yuan/Month) 
 2009 2011 2013 
1. Shanghai 960 1,280 1,620 
2. Shenzhen, Guangdong Province 900/1,000* 1,320 1,600 
3. Tianjin 820 1,160 1,500 
4. Nanjing, Jiangsu Province 850 1,140 1,480 
5. Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province 960 1,310 1,470 
6. Beijing 800 1,160 1,400 
7. Langfang, Hebei Province 750 1,100 1,320 
8. Wuhan, Hubei Province 700 1,100 1,300 
9. Taiyuan, Shanxi Province 720 980 1,290 
10. Zhengzhou, Henan Province 650 1,080 1,240 
11. Chengdu, Sichuan Province 650 850 1,200 
12. Chongqing 680 870 1,050 
* Outside/inside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. From 1 July 2010, Shenzhen municipal 
government standardized minimum wages within the city. 
Note: Shanghai, Tianjin, and Beijing are large metropolitan cities; Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang 
the coastal provinces; Hebei, Hubei, Shanxi, and Henan the central and northern-central provinces; 
Sichuan and provincial-level city Chongqing the western region. 
Sources: China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (2010, 2012, 2013a, 2013b).204 
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Both the Chinese state and workers’ demand for higher disposable income have 
resulted in a continuous rise in minimum wages over the past decade. The World 
Bank reckons that China became an “upper middle income” country in 2011,205 
noting the per capita income gains of the large population. In 2012, the International 
Monetary Fund similarly noted that China’s per capita income was by no means 
among the world’s lowest, although it showed that its income remained a small 
fraction of that of the developed countries, including those of East Asia. China had 
per capita income of US$6,076 (ranked 87th), higher than Thailand at US$5,678 
(93rd), Indonesia at US$3,910 (105th), the Philippines at US$2,617 (125th), Vietnam 
at US$1,528 (138th), and India at US$1,492 (140th).206 It is nevertheless difficult to 
discern an upper middle income country when examining the average conditions of 
China’s farmers, rural migrant workers, laid-off urban workers, and social security 
recipients.207 China’s workers and farmers, still a very large population, lag far 
behind middle income standards. 
 
On the Move: From Farm to Factory 
 
Since the 1990s, internet technology and mobile communications have opened a 
window on the real and imagined city lifestyle for rural youth. Personal decisions to 
leave home are shaped by both socio-cultural and economic concerns. “Almost all 
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the young people of my age had gone off to work, and I was excited to see the world 
outside too,” Tian Yu explained in my interview.208  
 
Yu’s migratory experiences were shared by many Foxconn employees who comprise 
the new generation of Chinese rural migrant workers. She belonged to the generation 
of “left-behind children” in the 1990s as the rural-to-urban migration wave 
enveloped China’s countryside. She told me, “I was born into a farming family in 
February 1993 in a village,” which is now part of Laohekou (Old River Mouth) city. 
The city has a population of 530,000 in Hubei province, central China. Located on 
the Han River close to the Hunan provincial border, it would be liberated in the 
course of the anti-Japanese resistance of the 1940s. In recent decades, as in much of 
central and western China, its youth would depart en masse for the coastal cities and 
industrial jobs. 
 
Yu’s grandmother brought her up while her parents were far away from home 
supporting the family as factory workers. Not unlike the hundreds of thousands of 
children who were left behind, she spent her early childhood “playing with other kids 
in the neighborhood,” with very little parental guidance. Eventually, her parents 
returned home to resume farming with just enough money to renovate the house. Yu, 
the eldest child, has a sister and a brother.209 She hoped, in the future, to be able to 
help look after her 12-year-old brother who was born deaf. 
 
“At best my family could earn about 15,000 Yuan on the land in a year, hardly 
enough to sustain six people.” Growing corn and wheat on tiny parcels of land and 
keeping a few pigs and chickens, Yu said, “might not leave us hungry,” but making a 
better life is challenging if one seeks to eke out a living on the small family plot. 
 
At age 16, upon completing a course at the local vocational school, Yu decided to 
leave home to seek new opportunities. “My school friends had all gone to big cities 
to work and I felt I should do the same.” Yu’s father said, “Farming is not a way out. 
Planting rice seedlings in the muddy field under the hot sun is back-breaking labor.”  
 
                                                      
208 Worker interviewee 1 (Tian Yu is her real name; her identity has been publicly known). I am very 
thankful for the University Research Group’s introduction. I maintained contact with Yu through QQ. 
QQ is an instant messaging program. QQ.com hosts an online community of hundreds of millions of 
users, most of them Chinese. Facebook and Twitter are blocked by the Chinese government. 
209 The implementation of the “one-child policy” is stricter in large cities than in the countryside. 
Rural families commonly exceeded the state-imposed birth quota and have two to three children, 
although some of them were fined by the local authorities. Birth control has now been relaxed as 
China experiences the ageing problem in both the rural and urban regions. 
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Soon after the Spring Festival, the Chinese New Year, in early February 2010, Yu’s 
father gave her 500 Yuan to support her search for work in booming coastal 
Guangdong province and a second-hand cell phone so that she could call home. He 
asked her to stay safe. 
  
“My cousin brought me to the long-distance bus station. For the first time in my life 
I was far away from home, the place I was familiar with. Getting off the bus, my first 
impression of the industrial town was that Shenzhen was nothing like what I had 
seen on TV,” Yu recalled. 
 
On 8 February 2010, Yu was employed as an assembly-line worker. At the Foxconn 
Recruitment Center, “I queued up for the whole morning, filled out the job 
application form, pressed my fingertips onto the electronic reader, scanned my 
identity card, and took a blood test to complete the health check procedures. 
Foxconn assigned me staff number F9347140.” 
 
That same afternoon Yu received a company introduction about the working hours 
and rules and regulations at Foxconn’s smaller Guanlan factory. “Then, I and 
hundreds of other new workers were taken to the larger Longhua factory, about an 
hour’s ride on the company bus.” Yu recalled that the setting sun bathed the Foxconn 
facilities in golden light. 
 
“I obtained a pocket-sized, color-printed Foxconn Employee Handbook,” Yu said. 
The Handbook is replete with morale-boosting language for new workers: “Hurry 
toward your finest dreams, pursue a magnificent life.”210 Moreover, “at Foxconn, 
you can expand your knowledge and accumulate experience. Your dreams extend 
from here until tomorrow.”211 The instructor at employee orientation told stories of 
entrepreneurs like Apple chief Steve Jobs and Microsoft chairman Bill Gates to 
inspire new workers. Foxconn propagates this dream of riches through labor, the 
belief that success is possible through diligent work.  
 
  
                                                      
210 Chongci meihao mengxiang, zhuiqiu xuanli rensheng (衝刺美好夢想，追求絢麗人生). 
211 Zai zheli, nin jiang dedao zhishi de touzhan, jingyan de jilei he zhihui de chuilian, ninde menxiang 
jiiangcong zheli yanshen dao weilai (在這裡您將得到知識的拓展, 經驗的積累和智慧的錘鍊, 您
的夢想將從這裡延伸到未來). 
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Terry Gou’s Foxconn Empire 
 
Leadership is being decisive. Leadership is a righteous dictatorship. 
Leadership is a battle between experimenting and practicality. 
— Foxconn Founder and CEO Terry Gou212 
 
If Steve Jobs is the soul of Apple, Terry Gou is the Foxconn Empire’s self-righteous 
dictator. “Terry is the most aggressive business person I’ve met in my life,” 
remarked Michael Marks, former chief executive of Flextronics, the longtime 
competitor of Foxconn.213 Foxconn’s revenues are mainly derived from component 
processing and final assembly under contract with brand-name companies. The 
company is a leading contract manufacturer in the electronics industry. 
 
Terry Gou, born in Taipei in 1950, set up a small plastic and metal processing 
company based at the Tucheng Industrial Zone in Taipei in February 1974 with the 
support of US$7,500 from his mother. 214  He was acutely aware of the new 
opportunities created by Taiwan’s export-led industrialization policy and the growth 
in trading activities in the post-war geopolitical and economic order. Before running 
his own business, he worked as a shipping clerk after graduating from a technical 
school in 1971.215  
 
Over four decades, CEO Terry Gou headed Hon Hai Precision Industry Company, 
known by its trade name Foxconn, winning successive battles “between 
experimenting and practicality” to become the top electronics manufacturer in the 
world. The name Foxconn alludes to the corporation’s ability to produce connectors 
at “fox-like” speed. As of 2004, Taiwanese multinational Foxconn rose to become 
the industrial leader in electronics manufacturing, surpassed Flextronics before 
gaining a majority share of the world market.216 In the coming decade, it expanded 
rapidly with new orders of iPhones in 2007 and iPads in 2010, among others. 
Despite employee suicides and continuing labor crises, Fortune Global 500 ranked 
                                                      
212 Suowei lingdao, jiushi juece, jiushi ducai weigong, jiushi yichang shiyan he shijian de zhanzhen 
(所謂領導，就是決策，就是獨裁為公，就是一場實驗和實踐的戰爭). 
213 Quoted in Ryan Mac, 18 March 2013, “Foxconn CEO Terry Gou on His Company’s Growing 
Relationship with GoPro.” Forbes. 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2013/03/18/foxconn-ceo-terry-gou-on-his-companys-growing-r
elationship-with-gopro/ 
214 Foxconn Technology Group, 2014, “Group Profile.” 
http://www.foxconn.com/GroupProfile_En/GroupProfile.html   
215 Chen Run, 2010, Fushikang 2eimu (Foxconn Insider)《富士康內幕》, Changsha: Hunan Literature 
and Art Publishing House, p. 233. 
216 Adam Pick, 30 May 2006, “Foxconn Takes Number One Rank in EMS [Electronics 
Manufacturing Services], iSuppli. http://www.emsnow.com/npps/story.cfm?ID=19523 
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Foxconn 60th in 2011, 43rd in 2012, and 30th in 2013, demonstrating the company’s 
strong revenue growth. This is how Foxconn and millions of Chinese rural migrant 
workers have become deeply intertwined in global capitalism. 
 
In January 2012, CEO Terry Gou held a one-week corporate planning workshop in 
the Taipei headquarters. One of the tasks he assigned senior executives was to watch 
the new film Real Steel. Real Steel is an American science fiction sports drama 
directed by Shawn Levy and released by DreamWorks Studios through Disney’s 
Touchstone label. “In the past when I went to watch movies with my wife,” Terry 
Gou said, “we always saw films she liked and I would just fall asleep. But [Real 
Steel] was very innovative and I think there are lots of ideas about robots and 
automation in there that are worth referencing.”217 In the film, human boxers have 
been replaced by robots. Terry Gou was excited by this glimpse of the future. One 
Foxconn production manager, Mr. Chen, told me that Terry Gou envisages trumping 
his rivals by creating a workplace where “steel-like men and women execute 
commands with the accuracy and precision of robots.”218  
 
Later that month, noting that Foxconn has a workforce of over one million in China 
alone, Terry Gou exclaimed, “As human beings are also animals, managing one 
million animals gives me a headache.”219 He made this statement when he invited 
the director from the Taipei Zoo to lecture senior management on how to control 
different animals according to their individual temperaments. Foxconn workers and 
the public responded angrily. A 25-year-old worker Gu Chudanyang found Terry 
Gou’s comments insulting. He posted an article entitled “My bitter life in Foxconn” 
on his blog:  
 
Two days ago, [Terry] Gou said his employees are animals. I believe 
these are words from the bottom of his heart…He cares only about his 
profits, his customers, and his iPhones. He of course cannot feel the 
bitterness of our lives, the lives of the more than one million 
people.220  
                                                      
217 Quoted in Robin Kwong, 20 January 2012, “Terry Gou: Managing ‘1m Animals,’” Financial 
Times. 
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/01/20/terry-gou-managing-1-million-animals/#axzz24Gpqlfho 
218 Manager interviewee 2. 
219 Quoted in Henry Blodget, 19 January 2012, “’Managing One Million Animals Gives Me a 
Headache,” Business Insider. 
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-01-19/tech/30641922_1_foxconn-iphones-terry-gou  
220 The blog post dated 17 January 2012 was entitled “Wo zai Fushikang de kubi shenghuo” (My 
Bitter Life in Foxconn) 我在富士康的苦逼生活, accessed online on 5 February 2012, then removed 
from 2anfang Gongren Wang (Workers in the South Net) 南方工人網. 
56 
 
 
Eventually the corporate public relations department issued an apology: “Mr. Gou 
did say that, since all humans are members of the animal kingdom, it might be 
possible to learn from [zoo director] Mr. Chin’s experience as his team looks for 
lessons that can be applied to business. Mr. Gou’s comments were directed at all 
humans and not at any specific group.”221   
 
At age 64, Terry Gou has consolidated his power at the summit of Foxconn’s global 
electronics empire. A 2012 company statement reads, “Gou is a very active and 
successful chairman” and “has no plans to relinquish those responsibilities.”222  
 
The Rise of Foxconn’s Global Empire 
 
“In twenty years,” some business executives suggested in 2010, just two companies 
will dominate global markets — “everything will be made by Foxconn and sold by 
Walmart.”223 Certainly, this is a wild exaggeration that ignores the central fact of 
Foxconn’s dependence on Apple and other international electronics firms. But it 
underlies Foxconn’s startling rise in East Asia. Foxconn, in brief, is the “electronic 
workshop of the world.” 
 
The elevation of Foxconn from a processing factory to an industry leader followed 
its deepening integration into the regional and global economy, and its impressive 
technological advancement. In the 1970s, Foxconn made black and white television 
knobs and low-end plastic products for export to the United States. In the early 
1980s, the company received its first contracts from American buyers to assemble 
connectors for Atari-brand video game-consoles. 224  It purchased advanced 
machinery from the United States, Europe, and Japan to improve efficiency and 
manufacture electronic components on a large scale. Through reinvestment, 
improvement of customer services, research and development, acquisitions and 
mergers, and onshore as well as offshore relocation, Foxconn has ridden waves of 
                                                      
221 Foxconn Technology Group, 20 January 2012, “Response to ‘Terry Gou: Managing “1m 
Animals.’” 
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/01/20/terry-gou-managing-1-million-animals/#axzz24Gpqlfho 
222 Quoted in Lorraine Luk, 9 March 2012, “New Concern at Apple Supplier Hon Hai: Succession,” 
The Wall Street Journal. 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/03/09/new-concern-at-apple-supplier-hon-hai-succession/ 
223 Frederik Balfour and Tim Culpan, 10 September 2010, “Everything is Made by Foxconn in Future 
Evoked by Gou’s Empire,” Bloomberg. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-09/everything-is-made-by-foxconn-in-future-evoked-by-te
rry-gou-s-china-empire.html 
224 Kabir Chibber, 24 September 2012, “Foxconn: ‘Hidden Dragon’ Out in the Open,” BBC. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19699156 
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successive revolutions in information and communications technology. By 2012, 
Foxconn had obtained more than 2,000 U.S. patents, ranking 8th at the international 
level.225  
 
Foxconn was among the first overseas Chinese investors. As China opened up its 
economy to international trade, small and medium-sized Taiwan and Hong Kong 
enterprises brought in capital totaling US$107.4 billion between 1982 and 1994, 
more than 70 percent of the realized foreign direct investment during the period.226 
After the 1985 Plaza Accord,227 which caused Taiwan’s currency to appreciate 
relative to the US dollar (up about 40 percent at the peak),228  entrepreneurs 
accelerated their move to China and Southeast Asia to reduce operating costs and 
secure big international orders.229 Following the Taiwanese capital outflow, and the 
sustained appreciation of the East Asian currencies, Japanese and Korean 
multinationals also relocated their assembly lines, above all to China, but also to 
Southeast Asia and South America. In China, while the inflow of foreign direct 
investment was minuscule in the 1980s, it has accelerated since the early 1990s. 
 
CEO Terry Gou said, “My confidence comes from effort and experience. Even when 
prosperity turns bad, I still trust my ability.”230 Describing the historical, cultural, 
and linguistic bonds between Taiwanese and mainland Chinese, one Foxconn 
production manager I spoke to saw the entry into China as “a milestone for 
Foxconn’s international development.”231 In 1991, the company was listed on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange232 following its strategic move to Shenzhen in south China 
                                                      
225 Hon Hai Precision Industry Company, 2013, “Annual Report 2012,” p.1. 
http://www.foxconn.com/Files/annual_rpt_e/2012_annual_rpt_e.pdf  
226 You-tien Hsing, 1998, Making Capitalism in China: The Taiwan Connection, New York: Oxford 
University Press, p. 8. 
227 On 22 September 1985, the finance ministers and central bank governors from the United States, 
the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, and Japan signed an accord to control currency markets 
at the Plaza Hotel in New York City. The United States, then running enormous deficits, devalued its 
currency to make exports more competitive, while the Japanese yen and various East Asian 
industrializing economies’ currencies were strengthened. 
228 Gary G. Hamilton and Cheng-shu Kao, 2011, “The Asia Miracle and the Rise of 
Demand-Responsive Economies,” The Market Makers: How Retailers are Reshaping the Global 
Economy, edited by Gary G. Hamilton, Misha Petrovic and Benjamin Senauer, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 207. 
229 Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, I-Chun Kung and Hong-zen Wang, 2010, “Taishang: A Different 
Kind of Ethnic Chinese Business in Southeast Asia,” Chinese Capitalisms: Historical Emergence and 
Political Implications, edited by Yin-wah Chu, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 156-75. 
230 Wo de xinxin yuanzi yu nuli yu jingyan. Suowei xinxin shi: Wulun jingqi zai huai, dou yao 
xiangxin ziji you nengli (我的信心源自於努力與經驗。所謂信心是︰無論景氣再壞，都要相信自
己有能力). 
231 Manager interviewee 6. 
232 Foxconn Technology Group, 2014, “Company Milestones.” 
http://www.foxconn.com/GroupProfile_En/CompanyMilestones.html  
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in 1988. Today, the Taiwanese transnational corporation is the world’s largest 
electronics manufacturer in “3C” products, including computers (laptops, desk-tops, 
tablet personal computers such as iPads), communications equipment (smartphones 
such as iPhones) and consumer electronics (digital music players, e-book readers 
such as Kindle, cameras, game-consoles, high-definition TVs). All these devices are 
increasingly connected and integrated in our homes and offices. 
 
Foxconn began to report rapid growth since 1996 in its Social and Environmental 
Responsibility Annual Report and corporate website: as of 1996, according to the 
earliest publicly accessible company data, the company had 9,000 workers and staff 
worldwide, a figure that would quickly multiply. After reaching 100,000 employees 
in 2003, it grew to more than 700,000 in 2008 (see Figure 3.1). The resilience of 
Foxconn during the global economic downturn of 2008 is shown by the expansion of 
its labor force, which reached 1,000,000 in 2011, with fluctuations in seasonality of 
production and hiring of short-term employees such as student interns. In 2013, 
astonishingly, the company had more than 1.4 million employees, most of them in 
China. With new operations in northern, central, and western regions, Foxconn’s 
workers and staff have continued to increase, together with the steep rise in 
revenues. 
 
Foxconn generated a solid US$59 billion in sales in 2009, only a slight drop of 4 
percent from the previous year, when American and European demand for consumer 
electronics contracted during the 2008-09 financial recession (see Figure 3.1). 
Following Chinese government stimulus-led growth and economic recovery, in 2010, 
Foxconn registered a stunning 61 percent year-on-year increase in revenues to 
US$95 billion. The employee suicides at Foxconn’s China facilities that year, and the 
subsequent pay rise, did not seem to impact on revenues. 
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Figure 3.1 Foxconn Employees and Revenues, 1996-2013* 
 
*The earliest publicly accessible company data on employees and revenues was dated to 1996. 
Sources: Foxconn Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility Annual Reports (2009: 11; 
2010: 5; 2011: 4; 2012: 3; 2013: 4, 12). 
 
In 2012, even in the midst of European government austerity measures and 
international economic uncertainty, Foxconn attained far higher annual revenues 
(US$132 billion) than many of its corporate customers,233  with the important 
exception of Apple (US$156.5 billion).234 In 2013, Terry Gou maintained the 
company’s revenue growth target of 15 percent,235 hitting US$152 billion, thanks to 
the large orders of Apple and other clients.  
 
Foxconn’s Development in China 
 
Foxconn has attained steady growth at a time when China loosened its restrictions on 
rural-to-urban labor migration and encouraged exports in labor-intensive industries. 
In China’s transformation from central planning to a market-oriented economy, and 
                                                      
233 Manager interviewees 3 and 8. 
234 Apple, 2012, “Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended September 29, 2012,” p. 24. 
http://investor.apple.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1193125-12-444068&CIK=320193 
235 Manager interviewee 4. 
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from state-sector dominated industry to one in which state, foreign, and local private 
capital competed, local officials prioritized attracting new investments and 
construction projects, thus stimulating economic growth and creating new jobs.236 
From the late 1980s to early 2014, Foxconn built more than 30 manufacturing 
complexes in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, and in 15 provinces throughout 
China (see Map 3.1). Its new regional headquarters and high-tech research and 
development centers are based in Pudong, Shanghai. 
 
Map 3.1 Foxconn’s Locations in Greater China 
 
Note: Foxconn has more than 30 factories across the Chinese mainland. 
Sources: Foxconn Technology Group company websites. 
 
Haiyang (which literally means “the ocean”), one of the first wholly-owned Foxconn 
                                                      
236 Robert Weil, 1996, Red Cat, White Cat: China and the Contradictions of “Market Socialism,” 
New York: Monthly Review Press; Robert Weil, 2008, “City of Youth: Shenzhen, China,” Monthly 
Review, Vol. 60, Issue 2 (June). http://monthlyreview.org/2008/06/01/city-of-youth-shenzhen-china 
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subsidiaries, was located in Xixiang Town in Shenzhen.237 It began with a workforce 
of 150 migrants from rural Guangdong, including approximately 100 young 
women.238 Following the typical industrial model of a factory-cum-dormitory in 
China, the first floor of the all-in-one factory compound was a canteen, the second to 
fifth floors the production lines, and the sixth floor the dormitory for workers. This 
multi-functional architecture with workers living in close spatial proximity to the 
factory floor can help meet production deadlines by facilitating overtime work.239 
 
From the outset, Foxconn used the “dormitory labor system” to maximize control of 
the migrant labor force by bringing together the production site with workers’ living 
quarters within the company compound or immediately adjacent to it.240 This design 
of “living at work” is also geared to lowering production costs.241 Maintaining 
dormitories in which a dozen workers share a room costs the employer far less than 
the wages necessary for workers to find their own individual or family housing. In 
Foxconn and many neighboring workplaces, employers reduce costs even more by 
deducting dormitory housing fees from workers’ wages.242  
 
Foxconn strives to reduce the amount of stock warehoused at any time to reduce 
storage costs. In the 1990s the company diversified its production lines and locations 
in step with Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 call243 to prioritize the coastal regions to spearhead 
                                                      
237 Manager interviewee 12. 
238 Worker interviewees 5, 10, and 15. 
239 Substandard industrial structure and poor fire safety measures, however, can be life threatening. In 
early industrialization history under the market reform, it was widely believed that the Zhili toy 
factory disaster in Shenzhen claimed the greatest fire death toll in the first 13 years since the Open 
Door Policy in China. The tragedy was yet preventable. In January 1993, ten months before the 
disaster, the Shenzhen municipal fire prevention authority had found that the 
“warehouse-dormitory-shop floor” (three-in-one) factory had obstructed passageways and locked fire 
exits, and thus was an extremely dangerous workplace. As many as 13 modifications were 
recommended, and a deadline for correction was set. Nevertheless, to minimize the cost of renovation 
and the perceived disruption to production, the factory manager bribed the fire authority and obtained 
a certificate of safety. In November 1993, the fire “accident” took place and killed 87 rural migrant 
workers. 
240 Pun Ngai, 2007, “Gendering the Dormitory Labor System: Production, Reproduction, and Migrant 
Labor in South China,” Feminist Economics 13(3-4), July/August, pp. 239-58; Pun Ngai and Jenny 
Chan, 2013, “The Spatial Politics of Labor in China: Life, Labor, and a New Generation of Migrant 
Workers,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 112(1), pp. 179-90. 
241 Chris Smith, 2003, “Living at Work: Management Control and the Dormitory Labour System in 
China,” Asia Pacific Journal of Management 20(3), pp. 333-58. 
242 This is based on my interviews with workers from Foxconn and neighboring factories, as well as a 
review of the job ads and employment terms and conditions. See chapter 7 in this dissertation for 
further discussions. 
243 On Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 “Southern Tour” and the accelerated reforms that followed, see for 
example, Ezra F. Vogel, 2011, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Wang Hui, 2003, China’s 2ew Order: Society, Politics, 
and Economy in Transition, edited by Theodore Huters, translated by Theodore Hunters and Rebecca 
Karl, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
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export-oriented development. It began to assemble personal computer enclosures and 
servers, alongside connectors and cables. Major production clusters were established 
in two coastal regions: the Pearl River Delta in the south and the Greater Shanghai 
Delta in the east. Longhua (Shenzhen) and Kunshan (Jiangsu) “work together to 
respond quickly to the fast-growing computer market,” manager Chen remarked.244  
 
Since the early 2000s, Foxconn, benefiting from economies of scale, moved to new 
industrial parks to tap into low-cost labor, abundant land, and natural resources, such 
as metal for component processing. In 2001, Foxconn set up a cell phone assembly 
base in Beijing, the national capital. It also donated 300 million Yuan to co-found the 
Tsinghua-Foxconn Nanotechnology Research Center at Tsinghua University, China’s 
MIT.245 The joint center in Beijing, the heart of Foxconn’s technological innovation 
complex, emphasizes nanotechnology, heat transfer, wireless networks, optical plating 
techniques, new materials, new energy, biotechnology, advanced surface mount 
technology, network chips technology, and robot technology. More recently, the 
researchers have formed a team to connect different electronics devices under an 
integrated computing and storage “cloud service.” This is crucial to advance the 
company’s manufacturing capacity and engineering strategy.246 
 
In expanding to Beijing, Shanghai (in 2003), Tianjin (in 2005) and subsequently to 
other cities in northeast China, Foxconn negotiated with local governments to 
provide important subsidies that enable it to compete with large state firms and 
domestic private companies. Shanghai, for example, provided Foxconn with “a huge 
tract of land with roads and other infrastructure including optical cable as well as 
water, power and gas utilities” to facilitate the relocation of technology-intensive 
firms to the east.247 As Foxconn expands its investment to new localities, it enjoys 
favorable treatment and protection from local governments, in much the same way as 
strategic state-owned technology-intensive enterprises enjoy privileged access to 
scarce national resources and state subsidies.248 
                                                      
244 Manager interviewee 2. 
245 The Foxconn Bridgeworkers, 30 June 2011, “Tsinghua—Fushikang 2ami Jishu Yanjiu Zhongxin” 
(清華—富士康納米技術研究中心), Vol. 189, p. 24. Tsinghua-Foxconn Nanotechnology Research 
Center is a co-operation with Foxconn Technology Group, working toward the establishment of an 
international advanced nanotechnology research base, leveraging Tsinghua University’s sciences and 
talents and Foxconn’s industrialization. The Center conducts research on basic and applied 
nanotechnology to create new technology and push nanotechnology achievements for industrialization 
and promote new talents. 
246 Manager interviewee 8. 
247 Tse-Kang Leng, 2005, “State and Business in the Era of Globalization: The Case of Cross-Strait 
Linkages in the Computer Industry,” The China Journal 53 (January), p. 70. 
248 Dieter Ernst and Barry Naughton, 2008, “China’s Emerging Industrial Economy: Insights from the 
IT Industry,” China’s Emergent Political Economy: Capitalism in the Dragon’s Lair, edited by 
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In many provinces, Foxconn runs multiple manufacturing facilities. At CEO Terry 
Gou’s ancestral home province in north China’s Shanxi, for instance, Foxconn 
opened three large factories in Taiyuan, Jincheng, and Datong in 2004, 2006, and 
2012, respectively.249 From 2007 through the present, under a rustbelt revival 
program, Foxconn has invested in manufacturing car parts and digital machine tools 
in Shenyang and Yingkou cities of Liaoning province in China’s northeast. 
Traditionally a heavy industrial and military base, the regional economy (Liaoning, 
Jilin, and Heilongjiang) is being radically restructured with a diverse range of new 
industries and services forming clusters of large-scale supplier networks.  
 
Going West 
 
Different parts of China have vastly different living standards. There is a regionally 
differentiated minimum wage and benefits regime with prosperous eastern coastal 
areas highest and poverty-stricken inland areas lowest, especially in the far west. 
Many of the new subsidiaries of multinational corporations are now producing from 
inland China, alongside the traditional regions for export-oriented manufacturing on 
the eastern, southeastern, and northeastern coasts. Foxconn’s “going west” 
exemplifies this trend. Foxconn Chengdu and Chongqing are among the fastest 
growing enterprises in western China, respectively.250 Such phenomenal growth has 
been made possible in part by the close collaboration of Foxconn with local 
governments. 
 
In the 1990s, central government leaders, who were becoming concerned about 
widening income inequalities between and within regions and the political 
challenges these posed for regime stability, aimed to rebalance the economy by 
promoting growth in central and western provinces.251 Massive state investments in 
infrastructure, often debt financed, subsidize corporate relocations and “drive 
capitalist development westward,” in the words of Christopher McNally.252 The 
broad objectives of the West China development strategy, targeting Sichuan, 
Chongqing, Shaanxi, Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Yunnan, 
                                                                                                                                                      
Christopher A. McNally, London: Routledge, pp. 39-59. 
249 Manager interviewees 9 and 10. 
250 Li Changjiang and Jenny Chan, 2012, “Fushikang Zouchu Xibu” (Foxconn: Going West)〈富士康
走出西部〉, Wo zai Fushikang (Working in Foxconn)《我在富士康》, edited by Pun Ngai, Lu Huilin, 
Guo Yuhua, and Shen Yuan, Beijing: Intellectual Property Rights Press. 
251 Victor Shih, 2004, “Development, the Second Time Around: The Political Logic of Developing 
Western China,” Journal of East Asian Studies 4(3), pp. 427-51. 
252 Christopher A. McNally, 2004, “Sichuan: Driving Capitalist Development Westward,” The China 
Quarterly 178 (June), pp. 426-47. 
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Guizhou, Guangxi, and Tibet, also include preservation of forests and water 
resources, promotion of ethnic unity and social integration, and general improvement 
of education, health care, and economic conditions in a region that has lagged behind 
the coastal regions.253 
 
Since the mid 2000s, in sync with the Chinese government’s western development 
policy, Intel,254 HP,255 Dell,256 Foxconn, and other companies have looked to move 
their operations to substantially lower-wage regions. 257  A company recruitment 
slogan reads, “Work at Foxconn and swiftly move toward a prosperous life.”258 
Young people from the countryside as well as local college graduates compete for 
good jobs in the hope to “move toward a prosperous life.”  
 
Foxconn Chengdu 
 
The Foxconn Chengdu plant was opened in October 2010. I first traveled to Sichuan 
in March 2011, when the Foxconn factory, while still under construction, was 
making the first and second generations of iPads. CEO Terry Gou warmly praised 
the government, “I’m very much impressed by the efficiency of local government 
departments that led to the start of the project…Foxconn will add investment to 
make the [Chengdu] factory one of Foxconn’s key production bases in the world.”259 
Workers and staff at Foxconn Chengdu exclusively serve Apple. 
 
                                                      
253 Harry Hongyi Lai, 2002, “China’s Western Development Program: Its Rationale, Implementation, 
and Prospects,” Modern China 28 (October), pp. 432-66; Qunjian Tian, 2004, “China Develops its 
West: Motivation, Strategy and Prospect,” Journal of Contemporary China 13(41), pp. 611-36; David 
S. G. Goodman, 2004, “The Campaign to ‘Open Up the West’: National, Provincial-Level and Local 
Perspectives,” The China Quarterly 178 (June), pp. 317-34.  
254 In Chengdu, provincial capital of Sichuan, Intel set up a chipset assembly and testing facility in 
2005, and one year later a computer microprocessor plant. It also has manufacturing complexes in 
Shanghai, a wafer fabrication facility in Dalian (a port city in Liaoning), and sales and marketing 
offices in Beijing and Shenzhen. 
255 In 2008, HP announced plans to build a desktop and notebook computer manufacturing facility in 
Shapingba District, Chongqing, which was opened in 2010. The company also has assembly plants in 
Shanghai and sales support units in Shenzhen, Beijing, Tianjin, and Guangzhou. 
256 In 2013, Dell launched a manufacturing center in the Chengdu High-Tech Zone in Sichuan, 
expanding its existing production operations in Xiamen, located in coastal Fujian. 
257 Andrew Ross, 2006, Fast Boat to China: Corporate Flight and the Consequences of Free Trade 
— Lessons from Shanghai, New York: Pantheon Books. 
258 Jieye Fushikang, shenghuo ben xiaokang (就業富士康，生活奔小康). 
259 Quoted in Chengdu Weekly, 2 January 2011, “Chengdu Factory’s iPad Capacity to Reach 100 
Million Units in 2013.” http://www.chengduhitech.co.uk/Trends/News.asp 
 Local governments in Sichuan
Foxconn (Chengdu) in hiring workers
 
Foxconn’s local influence has become so great that CEO Terry
among the workers as the “Mayor of Foxconn City.” 
worker commented in 
crazy. Local officials grab people and ask if they’d be willing to work at Fox
The government has made it an official task
recruitment quota. Isn’t this crazy?”
 
At the government administrative bu
Chengdu, employment officers 
arrange interviews at Foxconn Chengdu. Such free administrative services lowered 
corporate recruitment costs. A 29
Ding explained to me
and local government officials regularly updated each other on the company’s 
recruitment schedules, thereby establishing a good working relationship.”
result was that in the first six months of Foxconn Chengdu’s operation, the original 
iPads and upgraded iPad 2s were assembled in the new plant, alongside iPad 
workshops in Foxconn Shenzhen, t
unprecedented level.  
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A government office of employment and social security service is transformed into a designated 
Foxconn recruitment station at Hongguang Town, Pi County (in Chengdu city, Sichuan). Photo 
credit: Jenny Chan. 
 
From the latter half of 2010, village, township, city, and provincial level 
governments all offered Foxconn — the largest investor to date,262 various kinds of 
support including the provision of a dormitory “comprehensive living zone”, 
factories, and transportation service. Mr. Zhan, a middle-aged township-level 
government official, informed me, “We pledged to collaborate with Foxconn 
[Chengdu] to create jobs. We arranged transportation service for Foxconn at a 
discounted rate.”263 In the years since the 7.9 magnitude earthquake struck Sichuan 
in May 2008, which killed at least 70,000 people and injured 375,000, the provincial 
government has made efforts to attract investments to fund reconstruction. Between 
2009 and 2010, Foxconn moved to set up massive assembly lines in the 
Chengdu-Chongqing Economic Zone.   
                                                      
262 Xinhua, 22 October 2010, “Foxconn Opens New US$2 Billion Plant in Southwest China.”  
http://www.china.org.cn/business/2010-10/22/content_21182867.htm 
263 Government official interviewee 4. 
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Besides underwriting Foxconn’s hiring, 264  local governments have provided 
subsidized transportation services for Foxconn Chengdu. Living in the factory 
dormitory located in Deyuan Town, Pi County, Foxconn workers commute to work 
by public bus, which has been efficiently converted into a private company bus.  
 
 
The banner reads, “Use the fighting spirit against earthquakes and natural disasters to provide 
transportation for Foxconn.” Local governments contract public transportation service for 
Foxconn. The public bus becomes a Foxconn company bus in Pi County, Chengdu city, Sichuan. 
Photo credit: Jenny Chan. 
 
The Sichuan provincial government, which already hosts 1,500 Taiwanese 
enterprises, bid to secure the construction of the gigantic Foxconn Chengdu 
production complex and high-rise dormitories, designating it as its “Number One 
Project.”265 Local governments waived a significant amount of rent and corporate 
tax for Foxconn and other investors, depending on specific locations (lowered from a 
                                                      
264 See for example, the People’s Government of Guangyuan (Sichuan), 9 November 2011, 
“Guangyuan Shi quanmian chao e wancheng Fushikang renli ziyuan zhaomu renwu” (The People’s 
Government of Guangyuan Far Achieves the Foxconn Human Resources Recruitment Quotas) 廣元
市全面超額完成富士康人力資源招募任務. http://www.cngy.gov.cn/ht/2011/11/123405.html 
265 Sichuan Provincial People’s Government, 5 May 2011, “Sichuan: Top Choice of Taiwan 
Enterprises.” http://www.sc.gov.cn/10462/10758/10760/10765/2011/5/5/10160504.shtml 
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standard 25 percent to 16-18 percent).266 Foxconn Chengdu had more than 120,000 
employees in December 2011, making it the largest employer in the city in its first 
year of operation, and it grew to nearly 180,000 in December 2012.267 The number 
of workers continues to grow. 
 
Foxconn’s Expansion Plan: “China Rooted, Global Footprint” 
 
Foxconn CEO Terry Gou proclaims that “China is not the only one globalizing.”268 
Indeed, the company well illustrates the ways in which this proposition extends 
across the former socialist societies and throughout the developing world and beyond. 
Foxconn currently has more than 200 subsidiaries in Asia, the Americas, Europe and 
other parts of the world,269 but the overseas Foxconn operations are dwarfed by the 
Chinese mega-factories.270 
 
Operations outside China for the most part provide quick turnaround on orders, 
reduce transportation costs, and avoid import taxes. As early as 1985, CEO Terry 
Gou successfully registered a small firm offshore in the United States, even before 
setting up the Shenzhen factories in south China adjacent to Hong Kong. Foxconn’s 
American branch office is located in California to serve its market.271 At the turn of 
this century, Foxconn further invested in European electronics industrial sectors. 
Between 2000 and 2013, at regional headquarters in the Czech Republic, the 
multinational labor force in the Pardubice and Kutna Hora plants grew to 5,500 
employees,272 including Czechs and immigrants from Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, 
Ukraine, Vietnam, Mongolia, and other countries. All three Foxconn factories in the 
Czech Republic and adjacent Slovakia had a combined labor force of less than 
10,000, with regular and temporary workers hired by recruitment agencies, the 
former earning wages of 600-700 Euros per month compared with 400-500 Euros for 
the latter.273 More recently, in Latin America, 6,000 Brazilian workers assemble 
                                                      
266 Government official interviewee 1. 
267 Manager interviewee 14. 
268 Dalu bushi quanqiuhua de weiyi (大陸不是全球化的唯一). 
269 Foxconn Technology Group, 2013, “Foxconn Social and Environmental Responsibility Annual 
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270 Manager interviewee 1. 
271 Manager interviewee 12. 
272 Foxconn Technology Group, 2013, “In Response to c’t Magazine 21/13.” 
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273 Rutvica Andrijasevic and Devi Sacchetto, 5 June 2013, “China May Be Far Away but Foxconn is 
on Our Doorstep,” Open Democracy. 
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iPhones and iPads for Apple and earn US$550 per month as of 2012.274  
 
China, however, remains crucial to Foxconn’s global profile. Foxconn aims to 
disperse and contain labor unrest to ensure high-speed production and high-volume 
outputs. One production manager explained in an hour-long interview:  
 
When work stoppages occur in one workshop or factory, we can shift 
orders to other facilities to minimize losses and reduce vulnerability 
to worker actions. We seek to build a total supply chain based in 
China — extending from raw material extraction, processing, to final 
assembly. We do this at high efficiency and low cost.275 
 
When Foxconn’s iPad-casing polishing workshop exploded in the Chengdu factory 
on 20 May 2011, managers quickly reorganized its routine and geared up for the iPad 
production at the Shenzhen facilities, thus minimizing disruption following the 
temporary shut down.276 More recently in late September and early October 2012, 
Foxconn immediately moved the iPhone 5 orders from rioting Taiyuan plant and 
striking Zhengzhou final-assembly workshops to Shenzhen and overseas facilities in 
Brazil, thereby maintaining its overall production flexibility despite delays in 
meeting the tight schedules. 277  This spatial integration and transferability of 
production tasks across geographical regions is a cutting edge of the Foxconn model.   
 
The company’s business strategy and expansion plan is aptly summarized in a slogan, 
“China rooted, global footprint.”278 Thus far Foxconn’s rise has been accompanied 
by a relentless global expansion, but China remains the heart of its corporate empire 
and the core of its profitability. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
By the mid-1990s, Beijing’s Zhongguancun Science Park and Shanghai’s Zhangjiang 
Hi-Tech Park became prominent technology powerhouses, building on foundations 
of technical and industrial development and local government support.279 As foreign 
                                                      
274 Lisa Wang, 20 September 2012, “Foxconn Invests More in Brazil,” Taipei Times. 
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275 Manager interviewee 7. 
276 See chapter 4 in this dissertation for further discussions. 
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direct investments have been increasing, export-led industries in the coastal areas 
have been shifting inland. At the turn of the millennium, the Chinese state intervened 
to rebalance the economy by initiating the “go west” project, through which financial 
and human resources were channeled to central and western provinces. Andrew Ross 
concludes from his research on global IT service outsourcing to China that “in 
Chengdu,” the gateway to consumer markets in southwestern regions, “it was 
impossible not to come across evidence of the state’s hand in the fostering of 
high-tech industry.”280  Indeed, preferential treatment by local governments has 
facilitated the growth of transnational corporations since the 1980s. In my empirical 
study, Foxconn’s expansion is intertwined with the Chinese state’s development 
through market reforms, and it has followed the national trajectory from coastal to 
inland locations in recent years. 
 
The Foxconn supply network now sprawls across China in a search for cheaper and 
more pliant labor and more favorable conditions from local governments. Exploiting 
wage differentials and uneven geographical development, Foxconn management 
shifts laborers from one site to another to fulfill production needs contingent on 
supplies of labor and raw material access. Foxconn’s competitive advantage, the 
basis for securing contracts with Apple and other brand-name multinationals, hinges 
on its ability to turn around production quickly and reliably, and to adapt to changes 
in demand, while maintaining low costs. To this end, Foxconn has built a mega 
production network featuring vertical integration and flexible coordination across 
different facilities and 24-hour continuous assembly.  
 
Foxconn and other large manufacturers succeed to bid contracts from gloal 
companies, which source components and finished products from China and other 
emergent economies. This international outsourcing and globalization of high-tech 
industrial production, together with little protective regulation and more market 
liberalization, has profound consequences on the hopes, dreams, and struggles of 
many young factory workers. In the next chapter we specifically look at Apple, 
Foxconn’s biggest single customer, and the relationship between the two 
mega-corporations. 
  
                                                      
280 Andrew Ross, 2006, Fast Boat to China: Corporate Flight and the Consequences of Free Trade – 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Foxconn-Apple Connection 
 
An Apple a day keeps the rivals away...Steve Jobs knew what the 
world would want before the world wanted it…[Apple] will continue 
to remain a market leader for many years to come. 
— Brand Finance, 2012281 
 
Apple282 leapfrogged Google in 2012, and Samsung in 2013, to become “the world’s 
most valuable brand.”283 The magnitude of Apple’s commercial success is paralleled 
by, and based upon, the scale of production in its supply chain factories, the most 
important of them located in Asia.284 As the principal manufacturer of products and 
components for Apple, Taiwanese company Foxconn has grown to become the 
largest private employer in China.285 Arguably, then, just as Apple has achieved a 
globally dominant position, so too have the fortunes of Foxconn been entwined with 
Apple’s success, facilitating Foxconn’s rise to become the world’s largest electronics 
contractor. 
 
Foxconn is the largest outsourced electronics manufacturer “by a factor of nearly 
four compared to its closest competitor,” so much so that the market growth of the 
entire industry is highly correlated to the growth of Foxconn, and to Foxconn’s 
largest customers.286 If Apple’s edge lies in technological innovation, design, and 
marketing, its success is inseparable from its network of efficient suppliers, and vice 
versa. “Approximately 40 percent of Foxconn revenues are from Apple,” a Foxconn 
production manager reported.287 Beginning from 2002, Foxconn has been serving as 
                                                      
281 Brand Finance, 2012, “An Apple a Day Keeps the Rivals Away,” pp. 31-32. 
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a component maker and final assembler for Apple for more than 12 years.288 In this 
chapter I focus on Apple as Foxconn’s largest and most important customer.  
 
The separation of manufacturing activities from the core business of branded 
merchandisers and retailers has evolved into complex supply chains on a global scale. 
When global firms utilize technological and logistic resources to create new, more 
profitable sales markets, they actively bring in manufacturers, service providers, and 
workers around the world to serve their profit-maximizing ends. Industry analyst 
Thomas Dinges summarizes that manufacturing operations in China were 
responsible for “more than 75 percent of aggregate [electronics manufacturing 
services] industry growth in 2010 [US$347 billion], and the country is expected to 
continue carrying the burden of driving worldwide growth.”289 Chinese labor gains 
through manufacturing and assembly in supplier factories, however, remain far lower 
than the profits accrued by high-end component suppliers and premier global 
buyers.290 From a labor perspective, Edna Bonacich and Gary Hamilton critically 
point out that “market-making is not a benign process.”291 At stake are not only new 
opportunities for market exchange through an international division of labor, but the 
reconfiguration of labor relations and value distribution in global capitalism. 
 
Apple: The World’s Most Valuable Brand 
 
On 29 June 2007, when Apple launched the long-awaited iPhone, a smartphone with 
touch controls and internet communications capability, consumers camped out for 
days in front of Apple stores in North America in the hope of becoming among the 
first to possess the “revolutionary mobile phone.”292 Fast forward to China. At about 
eight in the morning on 17 March 2010, a 17-year-old worker, Tian Yu, went to the 
window of her dorm room at the Foxconn factory in Shenzhen and threw herself 
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from the fourth floor. 293  Miraculously Yu survived, but suffered three spinal 
fractures, four hip fractures, and was left paralyzed from the waist down. Her job at 
the factory had been her first, and probably will be her last. Just a little over a month 
earlier, she had come to Shenzhen city, the fast-rising megalopolis adjacent to Hong 
Kong from a farming village in the central province of Hubei. She quickly landed a 
job at Foxconn. Working on an Apple product line of Foxconn’s iDPBG (integrated 
Digital Product Business Group), Yu was responsible for spot inspections of glass 
screens to see whether they were scratched. An ever shorter production cycle and 
finishing time placed intense pressures on Yu and her co-workers. Many more would 
follow Yu in attempting to end their lives, even as global consumers raced to 
consume new generation electronic products as if there was no tomorrow. 
 
The electronic communications innovations spearheaded by Apple, but with 
competitors such as Samsung in hot pursuit, have won numerous admirers, even 
worshippers. We can speak of a veritable cult of Apple, with millions tracking each 
corporate unveiling of a new design. Indeed, the iPhone would quickly transform the 
world of personal communications by bringing together many of the features of the 
computer, the internet, the telephone, the camera, the sound and video system and 
social media (such as Facebook and Twitter). Even as Apple faces fierce market 
competition, it remains a financial juggernaut and one of the world’s most admired 
companies. How did Apple become a legendary company in such a short time? 
 
Steve Jobs and Apple’s Rebirth 
 
Apple Computer, co-founded in 1976 by Steve Jobs (1955-2011) and Steve Wozniak, 
initially mounted a user-friendly challenge to IBM’s computer.294 The company was 
incorporated in 1977 with headquarters in Cupertino, California in the heart of 
Silicon Valley. In 2007, Apple Computer changed to Apple Inc. Elimination of the 
word “Computer” reflected the company’s redirection and burgeoning product lines 
as well as its penchant for simplification. 
 
Like IBM, the original Apple Macintosh computers were not only designed but 
produced in the United States. Although Macs set new design and software standards 
and carved out a small part of the burgeoning personal computer market during the 
                                                      
293 Worker interviewee 1. In the last chapter, I briefly introduced her to illustrate rural labor 
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new life in China’s burgeoning industrial centers. 
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1980s, IBM continued to dominate and Apple quickly faced financial problems. “In 
its darkest days, when Apple was dangerously close to being irrelevant,” Adam 
Lashinsky writes in Inside Apple, “its institutional psyche retained the pride of 
having pioneered the personal computer.”295 But in the mid-1990s, the company 
stood at the brink of bankruptcy. 
 
“Think Different” was the tagline of an Apple branding campaign in 1997. The ad, 
with characteristic Apple brashness, features Apple CEO Steve Jobs alongside Albert 
Einstein, Martin Luther King, Jr., Mahatma Gandhi, John Lennon, Maria Callas, Bob 
Dylan, and other iconic achievers of the 20th century. “While some may see them as 
the crazy ones, we see genius. Because the people who are crazy enough to think 
they can change the world are the ones who do.”296 After being exiled from Apple in 
the summer of 1985, Steve Jobs eventually regained control of the company. Alan 
Deutschman bookmarked the year 1997 as “the second coming of Steve Jobs.”297 
 
In 1998, Apple launched the iMac personal computer with an upgraded operating 
system that enabled it to compete with HP and Dell. The iMac, built on the 
foundations of the original Macintosh computers, was reinvented in a way that 
wedded contemporary industrial design and advanced technology. Many more 
i-labeled products would follow. But what was the meaning of i? Steve Jobs 
explained the lowercase letter i using a slide that read: “internet, individual, instruct, 
inform, inspire.” 298  He might have added imagine, impulse, illuminate, and 
indispensable. 
 
To promote sales of new Apple models and computing software, and to bypass 
middleman competitors to capture profits, in May 2001 Apple opened its first retail 
store in Tysons Corner Center, Virginia. Apple “turned the boring computer sales 
floor into a sleek playroom filled with gadgets,” gushed The 2ew York Times.299 By 
February 2014, 423 Apple Stores were operating in 15 countries, including the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Italy, Australia, China, 
Switzerland, Germany, France, Spain, Hong Kong, the Netherlands and Sweden.300 
Featuring a spiral glass staircase, the two-level Hong Kong Apple Store (the 100th 
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store outside the United States) attracted thousands of customers at the International 
Finance Center on the 24 September 2011 opening day. At the same time, Apple also 
pioneered online shopping. Building on the wide popularity of the iTunes Store, 
where consumers can buy their favorite music, videos and television shows online, 
Apple expanded their online presence with the creation of the App Store, the Mac 
App Store, and the iBooks Store. 
 
Apple’s Products 
 
Few brands are as loved in China as Apple. 
— The Economist, 2012301 
 
Apple’s products evoke a feeling of excitement and surprising joy such that writers 
and analysts rival Apple publicists in promoting the claims of the new products. “Try 
to imagine a Dell laptop evoking a feeling of any kind,” rhetorically asked Adam 
Lashinsky, “other than frustration.”302 Fortune magazine similarly asked, “What 
makes Apple golden?” and answered: “Apple has demonstrated how to create real, 
breathtaking growth by dreaming up products so new and ingenious that they have 
upended one industry after another: consumer electronics, the record industry, the 
movie industry, video, and music production.”303 Apple products are integrated 
systems in which hardware, mobile operating system and advanced applications are 
packaged in an elegant design. 
 
Apple’s market for new products continued to expand right through the recession. In 
2008, the global financial crisis hit almost all economic sectors and companies 
around the world in the wake of the Lehman Brothers collapse in the United States; 
but Apple barely felt the effects. Apple’s revenues increased from US$37.5 billion in 
2008 to US$42.9 billion in 2009, and then exploded to US$156.5 billion in 2012.304 
For fiscal year 2013, Apple’s revenues reached US$170.9 billion, up 9.2 percent 
from the previous year.305 Table 4.1 shows Apple’s revenues generated from sales of 
its branded products and services (listed in the order of 2013 sales revenues). The 
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signature Mac computer has now been far surpassed in value by the iPhone, with the 
iPad following in second place. 
 
Table 4.1 Apple’s Revenues by Product, 2011-2013  
 2011 
(Ended 24 September) 
2013 
(Ended 28 September) 
 Millions (US$) % Millions (US$) % 
iPhone 45,998 42.5 91,279 53.4 
iPad 19,168 17.7 31,980 18.7 
Mac 21,783 20.1 21,483 12.6 
iPod 7,453 6.9 4,411 2.6 
iTunes, Software, Services* 9,373 8.7 16,051 9.4 
Accessories 4,474 4.1 5,706 3.3 
Total 108,249 100 170,910 100 
* Includes revenue from sales on the iTunes Store, the App Store, the Mac App Store, and the iBooks 
Store, and revenue from sales of licensing and other services. 
Source: Adapted from Apple’s 2013 annual financial report, p. 27. 
 
Indeed, for the past decade Apple’s annual revenue grew from US$8 billion to 
US$171 billion, or more than twentyfold, and the company’s “global footprint 
expanded dramatically.” 306  Nevertheless, Apple is confronted by aggressive 
competition in all products and services as Samsung, Google, and other giants race 
to introduce newer models and upgrade technologies in the markets. In a strategic 
move, Apple is seeking to expand the China market for its high-end products at an 
ever more competitive price for the product and ancillary services.  
 
Greater China alone, which includes mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
currently comprises Apple’s third-largest market share after the United States and 
Europe, while revenues in the Asia Pacific surpassed those of Europe (see Table 4.2).  
 
  
                                                      
306 Apple, 4 March 2014, “Apple’s Peter Oppenheimer to Retire at the End of September.” 
https://www.apple.com/uk/pr/library/2014/03/04Apples-Peter-Oppenheimer-to-Retire-at-the-End-of-S
eptember.html  
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Table 4.2 Apple’s Revenues by Operating Segment, 2011-2013  
 2011 
(Ended 24 September)  
2013 
(Ended 28 September) 
 Millions (US$) % Millions (US$) % 
Americas 38,315 35.4 62,739 36.7 
Europe 27,778 25.7 37,883 22.2 
Greater China 12,690 11.7 25,417 14.9 
Japan 5,437 5.0 13,462 7.9 
Rest of Asia Pacific 9,902 9.1 11,181 6.5 
Retail* 14,127 13.1 20,228 11.8 
Total 108,249 100 170,910 100 
* The Retail segment operates Apple Stores worldwide. The results of the geographic segments do not 
include results of the Retail segment. The Americas segment includes both North and South Americas. 
The Europe segment includes European countries as well as the Middle East and Africa. The Rest of 
Asia Pacific segment includes Australia and Asian countries other than Greater China (includes 
mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) and Japan. 
Source: Adapted from Apple’s 2013 annual financial report, p. 27. 
 
Apple quickly moved to seek control of global markets for its products. In China, the 
company has customized its software to the usage patterns and the national language 
of the local customer base. Shoppers flock to visit Apple’s three-story emporium, the 
largest in Asia, on the Wangfujing shopping street in the heart of Beijing. In 
December 2012, an Apple Store opened in the city center of Chengdu in Sichuan, 
southwestern China, becoming the 9th directly-run Apple shop in mainland China, 
following store openings in Beijing (the first store opened in July 2008 in the run up 
to the Beijing Olympics), Shanghai, and Shenzhen. Apple CEO Tim Cook, who 
succeeded the late Steve Jobs in August 2011, said, “Customer response to our 
products in China has been off the charts.”307 
 
The iPhone 
 
From 2010 to early 2014, Apple has upgraded its smartphone to iPhone 4, 4s, 5, 5s, 
and 5c. In January 2012, the upgraded iPhone 4s was launched in China. Eight 
months later, in September, Apple introduced the iPhone 5 in the United States. The 
company statement trumpeted, “iPhone 5 is the most beautiful consumer device that 
we’ve ever created.”308 One year later, in September 2013, Apple announced the 
                                                      
307 Apple, 4 January 2012, “iPhone 4s Arrives in China on January 13.” 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2012/01/04iPhone-4S-Arrives-in-China-on-January-13.html  
308 Apple, 12 September 2012, “Apple Introduces iPhone 5.” 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2012/09/12Apple-Introduces-iPhone-5.html  
 “most forward-thinking smartphone in the world,” iPhone 5s, and the “most colorful 
smartphone,” iPhone 5c (in “five colors”
the latter an attempt to secure a foothold in a lower
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Figure 4.1 Distribution of Value for the iPhone, 2010
Source: Adapted from Kraemer, Linden and Dedrick (2011: 5).
 
Market forces constantly push the company to repeatedly redesign “the best iPhone 
yet,” with immediate consequences for Foxconn and other subcontractors
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global production network. While Apple and Foxconn together squeeze workers to 
meet demand, the costs of labor in processing and assembly are virtually invisible in 
Apple’s balance sheets.  
 
Apple does not disclose its contracts with Foxconn. Jacky Haynes, Senior Director 
of Apple’s Supplier Responsibility program, responded in the 18 February 2014 
email: “Over the years, we have increased the prices we pay to suppliers in order to 
support wage increases for workers. Confidentiality agreements prevent us from 
providing the data you’re requesting.”311  Martin Hsing, Executive Director of 
Foxconn Global Social and Environmental Responsibility Committee, also explained 
that “as Foxconn follows a strict company policy of not commenting on any current 
or potential customers or their products, we are not able to provide details relating to 
specific companies that you have inquired about…”312  But my field research 
(discussed in this and the following chapters) shows that Chinese workers who 
assemble much of the iPhone have received only a small share of the income it 
generates, while Apple enjoys extraordinary profit margins. 
 
The iPad 
 
Apple is also a major leader in the design and marketing of tablet computers. From 
its keyboards and mice to touch-based controls, Time magazine immediately 
recognized the iPad as one of the “50 best inventions” of 2010.313 Where profit 
margins are often in the single digits in the low-end computing market, in 2010, 
Apple retained 30 percent of the sales price of the US$499 iPad, even more if it was 
sold through Apple’s retail outlets or online store. In contrast, labor cost for the iPad 
in China was estimated at only 1.6 percent or US$8 (see Figure 4.2). 
 
  
                                                      
311 I have maintained copies of all the email communications with Apple’s Jacky Haynes between 
December 2013 and March 2014. 
312 Foxconn’s reply to research inquiry dated 31 December 2013. I keep the 7-page company 
statement. 
313 Harry McCracken, 11 November 2010, “The 50 Best Inventions of 2010,” Time. 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2029497_2030652,00.html 
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Figure 4.2 Distribution of Value for the iPad, 2010 
 
Source: Adapted from Kraemer, Linden and Dedrick (2011: 11).314 
 
Incredibly, Apple sold three million upgraded “new iPads” in the first three days of 
its release in March 2012 — that is, one million iPads a day in the American 
market — making it dominant in global tablets.315 For Christmas shoppers, in 
December 2012 Apple introduced the fourth generation iPad running on a new 
operating system, iOS 6 (competing with Google’s Android application system), and 
the lighter and thinner 7.9-inch iPad mini.316 In October 2013, Apple announced 
iPad Air, its fifth generation iPad, which was promoted as “dramatically thinner, 
lighter and more powerful (with iOS 7)” than any other comparable products.317 The 
sales of iPads continue to soar. No wonder in March 2014 the company boldly stated 
that “the iPad line sets the gold-standard in mobile computing.”318 
 
                                                      
314 Kenneth L. Kraemer, Greg Linden and Jason Dedrick, 2011, “Capturing Value in Global Networks: 
Apple’s iPad and iPhone,” p. 11. http://pcic.merage.uci.edu/papers/2011/Value_iPad_iPhone.pdf 
315 Apple, 19 March 2012, “New iPad Tops Three Million.” 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2012/03/19New-iPad-Tops-Three-Million.html  
316 Apple, 23 October 2012, “Apple Introduces iPad mini.” 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2012/10/23Apple-Introduces-iPad-mini.html  
317 Apple, 22 October 2013, “Apple Announces iPad Air — Dramatically Thinner, Lighter and More 
Powerful iPad.” 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2013/10/23Apple-Announces-iPad-Air-Dramatically-Thinner-Lighte
r-More-Powerful-iPad.html  
318 Apple, 18 March 2014, “Apple Updates Most Affordable 9.7-Inch iPad with Retina Display.” 
https://www.apple.com/pr/library/2014/03/18Apple-Updates-Most-Affordable-9-7-inch-iPad-with-Ret
ina-display-Improved-Cameras-Enhanced-Performance-Now-Available-Starting-at-399.html  
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In this era of the mobile technologies revolution, the production cycle and delivery 
schedules are shorter than ever, the pressures on workers higher. My interview with a 
senior Foxconn commodity manager reveals that, “Apple tightened the control over 
Foxconn by splitting iPhone and iPad orders with Taiwanese-owned Pegatron, a 
manufacturing unit spun off from Asustek, in the aftermath of the spate of worker 
suicides in 2010.”319 By pitting its suppliers against each other, and investing in 
research, design and marketing, the American giant reaps very high profits and 
commands a leading position in the consumer electronics market. But as we will see, 
the major Apple contracts remain with Foxconn, even after diversification. 
 
Apple’s Suppliers 
 
Apple, which once built its Macintosh computers in the United States, has contracted 
manufacturers outside the United States to produce and assemble its products as a 
way to cut costs and shed benefit burdens. In 1981, Apple started to contract offshore 
facilities in Singapore to ramp up upgraded Apple II personal computers. In 1982 
Apple Computer President Mike Scott commented: “Our business was designing, 
educating and marketing. I thought that Apple should do the least amount of work 
that it could and...let the subcontractors have the problems.”320 In the 1990s, Apple 
led the way as Lucent, Nortel, Alcatel, and Ericsson, among others, “sold off most, if 
not all, of their in-house manufacturing capacity — both at home and abroad — to a 
cadre of large and highly capable US-based contract manufacturers, including 
Solectron, Flextronics, Jabil Circuit, Celestica, and Sanmina-SCI.”321 Apple now 
retains its only Mac Pro desktop computer manufacturing complex in Cork, 
Ireland. 322  After the 2001 dot.com bubble, Apple and other technology 
multinationals all accelerated outsourcing of manufacturing to industrializing 
economies, fostering the growth of contractors in India, Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Mexico, Brazil, Hungary, Czech Republic, and above all in 
China.323  
 
Managing production by their suppliers is central to the competitiveness of Apple 
                                                      
319 Manager interviewee 12. 
320 Quoted in Dieter Ernst, 1997, “From Partial to Systemic Globalization: International Production 
Networks in the Electronics Industry,” Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy Working 
Paper 98, p. 49. http://brie.berkeley.edu/publications/WP%2098.pdf  
321 Timothy Sturgeon, John Humphrey and Gary Gereffi, 2011, “Making the Global Supply Base,” 
The Market Makers: How Retailers are Reshaping the Global Economy, edited by Gary G. Hamilton, 
Misha Petrovic and Benjamin Senauer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 236. 
322 Manager interviewee 9. 
323 Boy Lüthje, Stefanie Hürtgen, Peter Pawlicki and Martina Sproll, 2013, From Silicon Valley to 
Shenzhen: Global Production and Work in the IT Industry, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
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and other electronic behemoths. While Apple has announced that it is resuming 
manufacturing of some Macs in the United States, most of its products are 
outsourced. Apple’s 2013 annual report filed with the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission describes a challenge to its highly profitable business: 
 
Substantially all of the Company’s hardware products are currently 
manufactured by outsourcing partners that are located primarily in 
Asia. A significant concentration of this manufacturing is currently 
performed by a small number of outsourcing partners, often in single 
locations. Certain of these outsourcing partners are the sole-sourced 
suppliers of components and manufacturers for many of the 
Company’s products.324 
 
Due to severe competition from powerful rivals such as Samsung, and the need for 
high-speed production in huge volume, Apple has concentrated its manufacturing 
base “in single locations” and in the hands of “a small number of outsourcing 
partners,” despite the risk of dependency.  
 
The Apple-Foxconn Relationship 
 
Clearly, the relationship between Apple and Foxconn remains highly interdependent. 
The consolidation of technology firms, notably Apple and Samsung, has driven “the 
consolidation of their suppliers, while lead firms capture much more value than their 
contract manufacturers do.”325 Big buyers and big suppliers engage in strategic 
partnership to maximize profits, while the former enjoy far higher profits than the 
latter. Industry analysts observed that, “because of its volume” — and arguably its 
ruthlessness — “Apple gets big discounts on parts, manufacturing capacity, and air 
freight.”326  “During the 2008-09 global financial crisis,” a mid-level production 
manager recalled:  
 
Foxconn cut prices on components, such as connectors and printed 
                                                      
324 Apple, 2013, “Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended September 28, 2013,” p. 7. 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AAPL/2228807434x0x701402/a406ad58-6bde-4190-96a1-4c
c2d0d67986/AAPL_FY13_10K_10.30.13.pdf 
325 Joonkoo Lee and Gary Gereffi, 2013, “The Co-Evolution of Concentration in Mobile Phone 
Global Value Chains and Its Impact on Social Upgrading in Developing Countries,” Capturing the 
Gains: Economic and Social Upgrading in Global Production Networks, Working Paper 25, p. 1. 
http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/ctg-wp-2013-25.pdf    
326 Adam Satariano and Peter Burrows, 3 November 2011, “Apple’s Supply-Chain Secret? Hoard 
Lasers,” Bloomberg Businessweek. 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/apples-supplychain-secret-hoard-lasers-11032011.html 
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circuit boards, and assembly, to retain high-volume orders. Margins 
were cut. Still, the rock bottom line was kept, that is, Foxconn did not 
report a loss on the iPhone contract. How? By charging a premium on 
customized engineering service and quality assurance. The upgrading 
of the iPhones has in part relied on our senior product engineers’ 
research analyses and constructive suggestions.327 
 
Foxconn’s edge in technology and services served the company well in the crisis. At 
the same time, Foxconn accommodated Apple’s and other corporate buyers’ squeeze 
while reducing labor expenditures, including cuts in wages (overtime premiums) and 
benefits (productivity bonuses and quarterly prizes). Figure 4.3 shows that Foxconn’s 
operating margins — the proportion of revenues remaining after paying operating 
costs such as wages, raw materials, and administrative expenses — declined steadily 
from 3.7 percent in the first quarter of 2007 to a mere 1.5 percent in the third quarter 
of 2012. By contrast, Apple’s operating margins peaked at 39.3 percent in early 2012 
from initial levels of 18.7 percent in 2007. The changes indicate Apple’s ability to 
pressure Foxconn to accept lower margins as a result of acceding to Apple’s 
demands for technical changes and large orders, even as Foxconn’s revenues 
continued to rise.  
 
Foxconn’s margins are constantly squeezed by technology giants, especially but not 
only by Apple. Foxconn, Pegatron, and other large manufacturers seek to expand 
their market position as a producer of the iPhone and iPad. They are compelled to 
provide good shopping services for global brands at competitive prices and high 
efficiency. But it is widely noted that “speed, not just cost,” might be “the killer 
attribute” that gives Foxconn and other large manufacturers “the winning edge to 
remain competitive.”328  
  
                                                      
327 Manager interviewee 8. 
328 Thomas Dinges, 19 July 2012, “To Win, Focus on Speed, Not Just Cost,” EBN (The Premier 
Online Community for Global Supply Chain Professionals). 
http://www.ebnonline.com/author.asp?section_id=1096&doc_id=247738  
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Figure 4.3 Operating Margins: Apple and Foxconn Compared, 2007 – 2012* 
 
* Data from January 2007 to September 2012 were non-consolidated results for Foxconn. (Starting 
from Q4 2012, Foxconn announced consolidated results.) 
Sources: From Q1 2007 to Q3 2011, see Bloomberg (5 January 2012); From Q4 2011 to Q3 2012, see 
Wikinvest (2012) for Apple; From Q4 2011 to Q3 2012, see Foxconn Technology Group (27 March 
2012, 14 May 2012, 31 August 2012, 30 October 2012).
329
 
 
Foxconn must rapidly reorganize its production lines, staffing, and logistics if it is to 
continue to be demand-responsive. A production manager said, “Since 2007, Apple 
has dispatched engineering managers to work at Foxconn’s Longhua and newly 
opened Guanlan factories in Shenzhen to oversee our product development and 
assembly work.”330 The Guanlan factory, which began production in summer 2007, 
employed 130,000 workers in early 2010, and it has hired more short-term and 
                                                      
329 Bloomberg, 5 January 2012, “Apple Profit Margins Rise at Foxconn’s Expense.” 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-04/apple-profit-margins-rise-at-foxconn-s-expense.html  
Wikinvest, 2012, “Apple: Operating Margin.” 
http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Apple_%28AAPL%29/Data/Operating_Margin  
Foxconn, 27 March 2012, “Non-Consolidated Results for the Twelve Month Periods Ended 
December 31, 2011.” (Printed version). 
Foxconn, 14 May 2012, “Non-Consolidated Results for the Three Month Periods Ended March 31, 
2012.” (Printed version). 
Foxconn, 31 August 2012, “Non-Consolidated Results for the Six Month Periods Ended June 30, 
2012.” (Printed version). 
Foxconn, 30 October 2012, “Non-Consolidated Results for the Nine Month Periods Ended September 
30, 2012.” (Printed version). 
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long-term workers to raise productivity and production flexibility. In 2010, for 
example, 28,044 “student interns” from “more than 200 vocational schools” were 
assigned to assemble Apple products at the Foxconn iDPBG (integrated Digital 
Product Business Group).331 In the long run, automation and robotics could speed up 
manufacturing and assemblies, drive production costs down, and threaten jobs. At 
present, Foxconn’s workers, including teenage interns, who are not robots, are 
expected to submit to a company philosophy of absolute obedience. 
 
Under CEO Terry Gou’s central command, an enormous production system has been 
built to cope with the ever shorter product cycle and seasonal as well as unexpected 
fluctuations in global demand for consumer electronics. New workers are often 
reprimanded for working too slowly on the line, regardless of their efforts to keep up 
with the “standard” work pace.332 Emphasizing the company’s claim to produce the 
world’s best products for global customers — “You can find the best technology 
Foxconn goods and good product quality with reasonable price”333 — the maximum 
allowable rate of defective products is set low. Tian Yu said several times that she 
had “made no mistakes on the screens,” but the line leader blamed her anyway.334  
 
Yu felt that there was no way to say “no” to overtime. Foxconn workers had to swipe 
their staff ID cards at electronic readers at the beginning and end of each work shift. 
The assembly lines ran on a 24-hour non-stop basis, the well-lit factory floor was 
visible throughout the night from afar. “Checking the screens of the products made 
my eyes feel intense pain,” Yu told me. 
 
In fact, not only Foxconn managers, but also Apple’s representatives regularly 
monitor production quality processes and time to market. A Foxconn human 
resources manager at Shenzhen Longhua provided this vivid eye-witness account of 
Apple’s hands-on supervision of assembly: 
 
When Apple CEO Steve Jobs decided to revamp the screen to 
strengthen the glass on iPhone four weeks before it was scheduled to 
hit the shelves in stores in June 2007, it required an assembly 
overhaul and production speedup in the Longhua facility in Shenzhen. 
Naturally, Apple’s supplier code on worker safety and workplace 
                                                      
331 The Foxconn Bridgeworkers, 31 December 2010, “Hezuo, gongying” (Cooperation and Win-win) 
合作．共贏, Vol. 183, p. 23. 
332 Worker interviewee 1. 
333 Manager interviewee 10.  
334 Worker interviewee 1. 
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standards, above all China’s labor laws limiting overtime hours, were 
all put aside.335  
 
During my fieldwork, I learned that 15 business groups compete within Foxconn on 
speed, quality, efficiency, engineering service and added value to maximize profits. 
“Two ‘Apple business groups,’ iDPBG [integrated Digital Product Business Group] 
and iDSBG [innovation Digital System Business Group], are rising stars in these past 
few years,” a Foxconn commodity manager noted. 
 
iDPBG was established in 2002. At the beginning, it was only a small 
business group handling Apple’s contracts. We assembled Macs and 
shipped them to Apple retail stores in the United States and elsewhere. 
Later we had more orders of Macs and iPods from Apple. In 2007, we 
began to assemble the first-generation iPhone. From 2010, we also 
packed iPads at the Shenzhen and new Chengdu facilities.336  
 
To increase its competitiveness, Foxconn set up iDSBG in 2010 when the company 
won the iPad contracts. iDSBG now mainly makes Macs and iPads. In addition, the 
company fine tunes an internal supply network that extends from raw material 
extraction to parts processing to final assembly, helping to reduce market risks and 
accelerate time to market. 
 
Apple’s iPad City 
 
Foxconn Chengdu, legally registered as Hongfujin Precision Electronics (Chengdu) 
Company Limited and known as iPad City, began operation in October 2010. All 
workers at this new production site are responsible for making iPads, serving only 
Apple. The factory labor force grew to 50,000 employees in March 2011, making it 
one of the city’s biggest employers in its first half-year of operation in the provincial 
capital of Sichuan, southwestern China. As of December 2012, it expanded to 
165,000, and recruitment continued. Many Sichuanese workers 337  are taking 
advantage of job opportunities opening up in or near their native place, rather than 
moving to distant provinces. 
 
                                                      
335 Manager interviewee 1. 
336 Manager interviewee 6. 
337 In March 2012, of the 38,393 workers surveyed at the Foxconn Chengdu factory, only 14.2 
percent of them were Chinese migrants from outside of Sichuan. See Fair Labor Association, 
“Characteristics of the Workforce at Three Foxconn Facilities,” Table 1, p. 5. 
http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/foxconn_investigation_report.pdf  
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Foxconn management, facing stiff procurement orders and tight shipment deadlines, 
turns again and again to (illegal) overtime work. Apple and other buyers want their 
tablets fast to meet Chinese and global demand. Apple boasts that it obtains products 
and services “within tight timeframes” and “at a cost that represents the best possible 
value” to its customers and shareholders.338 Apple CEO Tim Cook puts it this way, 
“Nobody wants to buy sour milk.”339 And elsewhere, “Inventory…is fundamentally 
evil. You want to manage it like you’re in the dairy business: If it gets past its 
freshness date, you have a problem.”340 Tracking demand worldwide, Apple adjusts 
production forecasts daily.  
 
There are two major sources of production-time pressure highlighted by Apple in its 
annual financial report filed to the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission, pressure which is transferred to outsourced suppliers: 
 
The Company has historically experienced higher net sales in its first 
fiscal quarter [from September to December] compared to other 
quarters in its fiscal year due in part to holiday seasonal demand. 
Actual and anticipated timing of new product introductions by the 
Company can also significantly impact the level of net sales 
experienced by the Company in any particular quarter.341 
 
Apple, by introducing myriad changes in the design of its sophisticated devices, each 
with multiple variations to suit consumer tastes, relentlessly drives the pace of 
production with each new model and holiday season. It recognizes that it is involved 
in a “competition against time,” in which failure to keep up spells doom in a 
competitive industry with powerful challengers.342 Streamlining the global supply 
chain on the principle of market efficiency, low cost, and high speed is a must.  
 
In contracting to Foxconn and other suppliers, Apple tightly controls key 
decision-making power by deciding how and when its products are produced and 
marketed. In a rare reference to the production pressures that Apple or its 
competitors apply, Foxconn CEO’s Special Assistant Louis Woo explained his 
                                                      
338 Apple, 2014, “Apple and Procurement.” http://www.apple.com/procurement/ 
339 Quoted in Adam Satariano and Peter Burrows, 3 November 2011, “Apple’s Supply-Chain Secret? 
Hoard Lasers,” Bloomberg Businessweek. 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/apples-supplychain-secret-hoard-lasers-11032011.html 
340 Quoted in Adam Lashinsky, 2012, Inside Apple, p. 95. 
341 Apple, 2012, “Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended September 29, 2012,” p. 8. 
http://investor.apple.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1193125-12-444068&CIK=320193 
342 Manager interviewee 6. 
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company’s perspective on overtime in an April 2012 American media program:  
  
The overtime problem — when a company like Apple or Dell needs 
to ramp up production by 20 percent for a new product launch, 
Foxconn has two choices: hire more workers or give the workers you 
already have more hours. When demand is very high, it’s very 
difficult to suddenly hire 20 percent more people. Especially when 
you have a million workers — that would mean hiring 200,000 
people at once.343 
 
Foxconn continues to hire more workers, including interns (in the name of skills 
training and business-school cooperation 344 ), and at the same time imposes 
compulsory overtime on the labor force during the peak production months.  
 
Apple’s Subcontracting of Exploitation to China 
 
On 2 March 2011, soon after the Chinese New Year Holidays, I flew out from 
Shenzhen to Chengdu Shuangliu International Airport, and went straight to the 
Apple’s renowned iPad city based in Pi County before settling in a hostel. I carried 
my baggage, queued up outside the Foxconn Recruitment Center, and chatted with 
the job seekers. Many of them were surprised to find a Hong Kong student doing 
“social investigations”345 in a small county, instead of looking for a Foxconn job. 
 
During the spring of 2011, at the still-under-construction Foxconn Chengdu plant, 
shimmering aluminium dust often filled the air. The iPad’s casing is aluminium, and 
polishing creates a large amount of dust. All around the factory area, there was not 
only metallic dust but also piles of sand, stones, and soil, and the roads were uneven. 
The entrance to the factory had some crudely placed wooden boards creating a small 
path between two uneven sand piles for workers who daily passed through the 
makeshift pedestrian thoroughfare to enter the factory. Construction materials like 
steel bars and cement were stacked everywhere. Some factory floors in Zones B and 
C had already been put into production, even though auxiliary facilities such as 
toilets and canteens were not fully accessible. 
 
                                                      
343 Bob Schmitz, 12 April 2012, “The People Behind your iPad,” Marketplace. 
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/apple-economy/people-behind-your-ipad-bosses 
344 See chapter 6 in this dissertation for further discussions. 
345 Shehui diaocha (社會調查). 
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In a vast construction site of half-finished buildings, Foxconn Chengdu workers queue up to 
punch their time cards at 7 a.m. The polishing workers did not know that aluminium dust 
created by the polishing of an iPad could explode under certain conditions. Photo credit: Jenny 
Chan.   
 
In the entire month of March 2011, most production workers interviewed in Foxconn 
Chengdu logged long hours of overtime with only two rest days. Fan Chunyan,346 a 
22-year-old female worker, attended compulsory work meetings every day. She told 
me, “I reported to the line leaders 15 to 20 minutes earlier for roll call. Leaders 
exhorted us to maintain high productivity, reach daily output targets, and keep 
discipline.” On the factory floor, “Machinery was never left idle. Toilet breaks 
during the working hours are also restricted. Meal times were occasionally shortened 
or even cut to finish the production quotas of the day.” 
  
“When we have work,” Duan Dong,347 a 19-year-old male worker said, “half of our 
income is from doing overtime…I didn’t go home during the Spring Festival 
holidays in early February even though my village [in Qionglai city] was nearby. 
Instead I did 78 hours of overtime work that month, thereby earning an additional 
1,090 Yuan, which added to my base pay of 1,060 Yuan, gave me a total of 2,150 
                                                      
346 Worker interviewee 39. 
347 Worker interviewee 37. 
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Yuan.” This is more than double the 36-hour legal limit for monthly overtime under 
the Chinese Labor Law. 
 
Excessive overtime was the norm. Dong’s co-worker, Ouyang Zhong,348 married 
with a one-year-old daughter, had returned from home after a brief family reunion. 
That same month, he worked 44 overtime hours. Zhong emphasized that “without 
overtime, it’s hard to get by.” Many workers are eager to maximize overtime as the 
only way to send home money. Others, however, are hard pressed to survive the long 
hours and intense pace, have no choice but to accept overtime assignments. Day and 
night, they toil under dangerous conditions, risking health and safety. 
 
Workplace hazards monitoring, more specifically ductwork inspection and 
ventilation system review, had largely given way to meeting high iPad production 
targets. Foxconn’s polishing workers are responsible for transforming raw 
aluminium into shiny stainless iPad casings. Each polishing machine produces 
metallic dust as it processes and grinds with ever greater refinement. Microscopic 
aluminium dust clouds the air. It coats workers’ clothes. A young female polishing 
worker described the situation, “I’m breathing aluminium dust at Foxconn like a 
vacuum cleaner.”349 The polishing workshop windows were tightly shut so that 
workers “felt as if we were suffocating.”350 “Some tearing and pain also occur as the 
tiny solid aluminium particles are rinsed from my eyes by tears,” Ma Quan, a 
20-year-old worker, explained to me in Sichuan dialect.351 He added: “Everyone in 
the workshop is wearing a thin gauze mask, with a centre section of activated 
charcoal, but it doesn’t have an airtight seal and provides no protection. Some of us 
are suffering from shortness of breath.” 
 
If the masks are useless for preventing the aluminium dust’s toxic effects, they do 
help Foxconn pass factory inspections. Although workers were constantly coughing 
and complaining of a sore throat, Foxconn managers and Apple engineers and 
product development teams dispatched to the Chengdu factory apparently prioritized 
the hourly production figures. 
 
“Apple is committed to ensuring that working conditions in Apple’s supply chain are 
safe, that workers are treated with respect and dignity, and that manufacturing 
processes are environmentally responsible” — the very first commitment made by 
                                                      
348 Worker interviewee 32. 
349 Worker interviewee 13. 
350 Worker interviewees 13 and 14. 
351 Worker interviewee 30. 
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Apple in the opening line of its Supplier Code of Conduct352 rings hollow. Four 
colleagues of Quan had already quit their jobs long before their six-month probation 
was over.  
 
In the polishing workshop, workers put on cotton gloves, but the finest particles 
penetrate through the flimsy material to their hands. Workers simply wash their 
hands and bodies with soap and water, without knowing the exposure level of 
aluminium dust in their workshop. After work Quan took off his cotton gloves and 
looked helplessly at both his hands covered in aluminium dust. Encouraged by other 
workers, he relayed their shared health concerns to his line leader, only to hear words 
that left the workers feeling distraught: “The factory conditions are absolutely safe!” 
 
Speedup, Fire, and Explosion 
 
Repeated warnings from workers and labor activists 353  about the dangers of 
aluminium dust on the eyes, brains, lungs, kidneys, livers, and bone of human beings 
had fallen on deaf ears.354 Instead, a Foxconn media statement dated 7 May 2011 
reads: “We have made tremendous progress over the past year as we work to lead our 
industry in meeting the needs of the new generation of workers in China and that has 
been confirmed by the many customer representatives, outside experts, and reporters 
who have visited our facilities and openly met with our employees and our 
management team.”355 This public relations statement ignores the deep concerns of 
workers and makes no mention of pressing grievances, demonstrating Foxconn’s 
failure to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment of its workplace health and 
safety conditions, or even to recognize the need for such an assessment. On one point, 
the company statement is all too accurate: “customer representatives,” that is, Apple, 
visited the facilities and raised no significant issues concerning health and safety. 
 
Two weeks later, on 20 May 2011, an accumulation of aluminium dust in the air duct 
on the third floor at Foxconn Chengdu Building A5, Zone A, provided fuel for an 
                                                      
352 Apple, 2012, “Apple Supplier Code of Conduct,” p. 1. 
http://images.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdf/Apple_Supplier_Code_of_Conduct.pdf 
353 SACOM (Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior), 6 May 2011, “Foxconn and 
Apple Fail to Fulfill Promises: Predicaments of Workers after the Suicides.” 
http://sacom.hk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/2011-05-06_foxconn-and-apple-fail-to-fulfill-promises1.
pdf 
354 Mona Sobhi Siha, Laila Rashed, Dalia Abdel-Hamid Shaker and Mona Ramadan, 2014, “Effect of 
Occupational Exposure to Aluminum on Parathyroid Hormone and Calcium Metabolism,” British 
Journal of Medicine & Medical Research 4(11), pp. 2265-76. 
355 Quoted in IDG 2ews, 7 May 2011, “Watchdog Group Cites Continued Foxconn Abuses.” 
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/227306/watchdog_group_cites_continued_foxconn_a
buses.html 
92 
 
explosion. The metallic dust was ignited by a spark in an electric switch. Dense 
smoke filled the workshop. “We barely escaped with our lives. It’s terrifying,” the 
workers told me as they recalled the “black Friday evening.”356 Firemen arrived at 
the scene around 7:30 p.m. Ambulances and company vans brought male and female 
victims who were either seriously burned or who had lost consciousness to the 
emergency units at the Sichuan Chengdu People’s Hospital and other hospitals. In 
the midst of lightning and thunder that night, some workers could not hold back their 
tears in the rain. 
 
The hectic daily work schedule was only disrupted by the Foxconn Chengdu 
aluminium-dust explosion that killed four workers and severely injured at least 
eighteen others. Apple’s statement reads: “We are deeply saddened by the tragedy at 
Foxconn’s plant in Chengdu, and our hearts go out to the victims and their families. 
We are working closely with Foxconn to understand what caused this terrible 
event.”357 
 
But where, before or since, has Apple stepped in to assure that Foxconn take steps to 
protect the health and safety of workers, or accepted its own partial responsibility for 
death and injury? It was business as usual. On 17 December 2011, only seven 
months after the Foxconn Chengdu explosion, combustible aluminium dust fuelled 
another blast, this time at a Shanghai-based supplier to Apple, injuring 59 workers.358 
In the blast, young men and women suffered severe burns and shattered bones, 
leaving 25 workers permanently disabled.359  
 
How do the Chinese State and Companies Undermine Workers’ Rights? 
 
Immediately after the aluminium-dust explosion at Foxconn, government officials 
and the police took control of the hospital wards. China’s State Council Information 
Office moved swiftly to curb the media. “In regard to Foxconn’s Chengdu plant 
explosion [on 20 May 2011], all media and websites are to wait for an official report. 
No independent reports, re-posts, or recommendations will be allowed.”360 Similarly, 
                                                      
356 Workers interviewees 31, 32, and 37. 
357 Quoted in Tania Branigan, 20 May 2011, “Workers Killed in Blast at China Plant of iPad Maker 
Foxconn,” The Guardian. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/may/20/foxconn-apple-blast-china 
358 Taiwanese-invested Pegatron’s subsidiary, Riteng Computer Accessory (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., 
supplies computer components to Apple, among others. 
359 Frank Langfitt, 12 March 2012, iPad Workers: Plant Inspected Hours Before Blast, 2PR. 
http://www.npr.org/2012/03/12/148421415/apple-workers-plant-inspected-hours-before-blast 
360 Guoxinban jinji tongzhi: Chengdu Fushikang fasheng baozha, ge meiti wangzhan dengdai xinwen 
tonggao, bude zhangzi fabu, zhuanfa, zhiding (國新辦緊急通知︰成都富士康發生爆炸，各媒體網
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the Sichuan Provincial Propaganda Department announced: “With regard to 
Foxconn’s Chengdu iPad 2 plant explosion, no independent reporting can be 
conducted. Unauthorized reports will be immediately deleted.”361 The blackout on 
the Chinese press was complete. There could be no more graphic indication of the 
coordination between the party-state and the corporation at the expense of workers’ 
occupational health and lives.  
 
The clash between worker safety and high pressure production targets was evident at 
iPad production sites. Foxconn closed the polishing workshops for one week to 
“cooperate with the government investigation.”362 Under mounting social pressure, 
Apple eventually sent its Supplier Responsibility management team and “external 
experts” to check “all suppliers handling aluminium dust and put stronger 
precautionary measures in place before restarting production,” as publicly 
communicated in its January 2012 annual report.363 Fast-paced production of iPads 
resumed shortly. Despite the establishment of new safety guidelines, Apple’s 
ordering, pricing, and delivery demands directly conflict with their own supplier 
compliance programs and local legal requirements, while maximizing profits. 
 
Just three months after the deadly explosion, local government officials launched a 
large-scale recruitment campaign to support Foxconn in ramping up iPad exports. 
Between September 2011 and January 2012, Foxconn Chengdu recruited more than 
7,000 “student interns” to work on the assembly line, making up approximately 10 
percent of the company labor force.364 Contrary to my field research findings, the 
Fair Labor Association,365 which received funding from Apple for its investigation 
of Foxconn, “found no interns had been engaged at Chengdu since September 2011” 
(my emphasis).366  
                                                                                                                                                      
站等待新聞通稿，不得擅自發佈、轉發、置頂。). 
361 Sichuan shengwei xuanchuanbu: Chengdu Fushikang chanye jidi iPad2 shengchanxian baozha 
yishi, bude shanzi baodao. Weijing baopi de baodao liji shanchu (四川省委宣傳部︰成都富士康產
業基地 iPad 2 生產線爆炸一事，不得擅自報導。未經報批的報導立即刪除。). 
362 Manager interviewee 2. 
363 Apple, 2012, “Apple Supplier Responsibility: 2012 Progress Report,” p. 15. 
http://www.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdf/Apple_SR_2012_Progress_Report.pdf 
364 Manager interviewee 4. 
365 Fair Labor Association, 2013, “Second Foxconn Verification Status Report,” p. 5. 
http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/second_foxconn_verification_status_rep
ort_0.pdf#overlay-context= 
366 In the absence of financial independence from companies that support it, I raise questions about 
the Fair Labor Association’s (FLA) ability to fulfill its mission to protect workers in the global 
economy. In 2012, the FLA received from Apple membership dues of US$250,000, plus well into the 
six figures’ audit fees for conducting its investigation at Foxconn Chengdu (and two other Foxconn 
factories in Shenzhen). The FLA ostensibly scrutinized Apple’s corporate behavior, including its 
purchasing practices and supplier code enforcement. In practice, the systemic abuses of student 
workers at Foxconn factories in Chengdu and other cities were not mentioned, let alone ended. See 
94 
 
 
Apple claims to exercise its power of “private governance” to improve workers’ lives 
involved in outsourced electronics production,367 which is based on the asymmetric 
power structure in its global supply chain, either on its own or in partnership with the 
Fair Labor Association and other non-governmental organizations. “The same 
leverage [of large firms] that can be used to demand lower prices and better quality 
from suppliers,” in the analysis of Frederick Mayer and Gary Gereffi, “can also be 
used to press for better labor practices.”368 Foxconn workers and interns, however, 
testify that iPads are produced under unethical and unsafe conditions. The promises 
of corporate care and responsibility are broken again and again.  
 
Buyer-Driven Global Supply Chain 
 
Pressure from brands is immediately translated into increased pressure on workers, 
primarily in the form of speedups and longer working hours, at times resulting in 
tragic consequences such as workplace metal-dust accumulation and deadly 
explosions. We can now attempt to make the power structures within the 
buyer-driven global production chain transparent.  
 
Foxconn, in my analysis, is the head servant of Apple in the global supply chain; it 
remains subordinate to decisions made by its buyers. Its heavy dependence on Apple 
has been a source of its rise and profit. A buyer-driven production chain highlights 
the role of buyers as chain drivers, who organize the manufacturing of their 
commodities through multi-layered contractors and subcontractors in “a network of 
labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity.”369 Global 
brands and retailers often enjoy a commanding position in the hierarchical network. 
 
Amidst fierce global competition, big suppliers have taken advantage of a large pool 
of cheap labor in Asian countries (as well as in central and south Americas, Eastern 
Europe, and other places), which dominate electronics, apparel, and footwear 
manufacturing in global production. Some scholars have observed a shift of power 
from large buyers to large suppliers.370  The common assessment is that “the 
                                                                                                                                                      
chapter 6 in this dissertation for further discussions. 
367 Richard M. Locke, 2013, The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards 
in a Global Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 6-9. 
368 Frederick Mayer and Gary Gereffi, 2010, “Regulation and Economic Globalization: Prospects and 
Limits of Private Governance,” Business and Politics 12(3), p. 8. 
369 Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, 1986, “Commodity Chains in the World-Economy 
Prior to 1800,” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 10(1), p. 159. 
370 See, for example, Richard P. Appelbaum, 2009, “Big Suppliers in Greater China: A Growing 
Counterweight to the Power of Giant Retailers,” in China and the Transformation of Global 
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information and power asymmetries that characterized ‘buyer-driven’ chains have 
diminished.” 371  However, my multi-year research points to a more nuanced 
relationship between “big suppliers” and “big buyers.” 
 
Nowadays, the commodity or supply chain is no longer highly dispersed but 
concentrated in a few countries, notably China, but also India, Brazil, and South 
Africa.372 Foxconn’s bargaining power has been growing as it improves production 
technologies and acquires partners as well as competitors to race to move up the 
global production hierarchy. The Taiwanese transnational corporation has risen to 
become the largest, most powerful, and technically advanced of the enterprises 
engaged in electronics assembly in China and in the world.  
 
However, brand-name technology giants are still controlling key decisions over their 
suppliers. Not only do they capture a large share of profit in the industry, but they are 
also in a position to dictate the timing of product delivery, price, product quantity 
and quality in their supply chain. Their marketing and branding capability enables 
them to retain greater power while working with Foxconn. It is true that Foxconn has 
established a strong position as a maker of a full range of high-tech products, and in 
my assessment, Apple cannot afford to cut its ties with Foxconn. But Foxconn is 
heavily dependent on large orders from global brands to stay profitable. 
 
If Apple is the most successful electronics brand in history, it, as well as Samsung 
and other companies, faces fierce global competition. Karl Marx’s enduring insight 
underlies this point: “Under free competition, the immanent laws of capitalist 
production confront the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him.”373 
To maintain its leading position, Apple is compelled to streamline its supply chain 
management to enhance profits and diversify risks, transferring direct pressure to 
chief supplier Foxconn, and through it to frontline workers and staff.  
 
                                                                                                                                                      
Capitalism, edited by Ho-fung Hung, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 65-85; 
Richard P. Appelbaum, 2011, “Transnational Contractors in East Asia,” The Market Makers: How 
Retailers are Reshaping the Global Economy, edited by Gary G. Hamilton, Misha Petrovic and 
Benjamin Senauer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 255-68. 
371 Gary Gereffi, 21May 2013, “Response to Richard M. Locke: Can Global Brands Create Just 
Supply Chains,” Boston Review. 
http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/can-global-brands-create-just-supply-chains/host-countries-can-a
ct 
372 Edward Webster, Rob Lambert and Andries Bezuidenhout, 2008, Grounding Globalization: 
Labour in the Age of Insecurity, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing; Boy Lüthje, Stefanie Hürtgen, 
Peter Pawlicki and Martina Sproll, 2013, From Silicon Valley to Shenzhen: Global Production and 
Work in the IT Industry, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
373 Karl Marx, [1867] 1990, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One, translated by 
Ben Fowkes, London: Penguin Classics, p. 381. 
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Apple’s profit margins are far higher than Foxconn’s. Distribution of the value 
created in our iPhones and iPads, as discussed in this chapter, is highly uneven. 
Behind the “Made in China” label is a vast network of global brands, high-end 
component suppliers, and low value-added final-assemblers and subcontractors. 
Looking beyond the shiny iPads, I entered into the working lives of Apple’s 
outsourced workers in Chengdu, southwestern China. The young Sichuanese 
migrants from local villages and towns were struggling for fundamental rights to a 
work-life balance, decent wages, and a safe and healthy working environment. As 
production requirements tightened under intense market competition, and the speed 
of the line relentlessly increased, labor crises have also intensified 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
“Taiwan’s history of economic growth is also a history of technological 
catastrophes.”374 Thus Hsin-Hsing Chen highlights the suffering of 1,395 former 
workers of RCA (Radio Corporation of America), who were poisoned by 
trichloroethylene at the workplace and diagnosed with cancer. In response, RCA shut 
down the Taoyuan factory and migrated elsewhere, without compensating the 
terminally ill. This worker tragedy is not an isolated example. With Taiwanese and 
international capital entering China, workers are similarly subject to life-threatening 
risks of globalized electronics production. 
 
Apple, together with other firms, has created global consumers with its products, and 
through Foxconn and other subcontractors it has simultaneously contributed to the 
creation of a new Chinese working class. Foxconn, given its corporate power and 
intricate ties with the Chinese government at all levels (including state media 
agencies), has manufactured not only signature electronic goods for global brands, 
but also occupational injuries and deaths, while refusing to accept even minimal 
responsibility. The following lyrics convey the sense of the heavy human cost behind 
transnational manufacturing. 
 
A Worker’s Requiem 
 
My body stretches long  
lying within a bare building 
obstructing the cityscape,  
                                                      
374 Hsin-Hsing Chen, 2011, “Field Report: Professionals, Students, and Activists in Taiwan Mobilize 
for an Unprecedented Collective-Action Lawsuit against a Former Top American Electronics 
Company,” East Asian Science, Technology and Society 5(4), p. 563. 
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sealed tightly in cement  
burying my story 
 
With each mouthful of toxic dust inhaled  
profit is exhaled 
following prices’ rise and fall  
each annual fireworks squander 
burning my breath 
 
Back bent I furtively twitter  
computers nibble away life 
backpack heavy on shoulder  
muscles and bones strained to the limit 
concealing my hardship 
 
My body conveys a message:  
reject this false prosperity 
leave the corner of darkness— 
strained body and soul embrace each other 
still you and I will not yield 
 
Teardrops accumulate,  
collecting sediments of months and years of weight 
of course, dreams are repeatedly shattered  
but spirits always sing in the wind 
of a worker’s story. 
 
— Mininoise, Hong Kong grassroots folk band 
(Translated by Gregory Fay and Kyoko Selden375) 
 
In holding Foxconn and other suppliers responsible for the wide range of labor 
problems, Apple ignores its own purchasing practices, such as order specification 
and sales forecasting, and the direct impact of its production deadlines on suppliers’ 
capacity to schedule working hours and ensure worker safety. The next chapter 
unveils what it is like to work inside the Foxconn Empire, and to experience this 
pressure at firsthand. 
  
                                                      
375 Dedicated to the memory of Kyoko Iriye Selden (1936-2013). 
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Chapter 5 
 
Inside Foxconn 
 
Growth, thy name is suffering.376 
A harsh environment is a good thing.377  
Obey, obey, and absolutely obey!378  
Execution is the integration of speed, accuracy, and precision.379 
Outside the lab, there is no high-tech, only implementation of 
discipline.380 
—Foxconn CEO Terry Gou’s Quotations   
 
Gou’s Quotations is a collection of Foxconn CEO Terry Gou’s work philosophy, a 
project emulating Chairman Mao’s Little Red Book of an earlier era. Inside the 
Foxconn “Forbidden City,” as the workers call it, a collection of quotations adorns the 
factory walls, underlining the ethos that drives the workers and staff. 
 
Facing fierce competition, Foxconn strives to tighten labor processes, control costs, 
and expand engineering and manufacturing technologies to maintain its position as 
the most trusted name in contract manufacturing services. It recruits mostly teens 
and young adults to run the assembly lines. “Over 85 percent of Foxconn’s 
employees are rural migrant workers between 16 and 29 years old,” a human 
resources manager said.381 The latest company report stated that 93.3 percent of its 
labor force were younger than 32 years of age.382 Foxconn in this respect is 
emblematic of the national pattern. From the 1980s, rural migrants have moved from 
constituting a marginal part of the Chinese industrial labor force to dominating it in 
numerical terms, reversing the situation prior to market reform, in which their 
movement had been severely limited by state restrictions on rural-to-urban migration. 
They are the mainstay of new urban industrial labor. Official data in 2009 showed 
that of all rural migrants, 42 percent were between 16 and 25 years old and another 
                                                      
376 Chengzhang, ni de mingzi jiu jiao tongku (成長，你的名字就叫痛苦). 
377 Huanjing yanke shi jian haoshi (環境嚴苛是件好事). 
378 Fucong, fucong, juedui fucong (服從，服從，絕對服從)! 
379 Suowei zhixingli, jiushi sudu, zhundu, jingdu de quanmian guanche (所謂執行力，就是速度、準
度、精度的全面貫徹). 
380 Zouchu shiyanshi jiu meiyou gaokeji, zhiyou zhixing de jilü (走出實驗室就沒有高科技，只有執
行的紀律). 
381 Manager interviewee 5. 
382 Foxconn Technology Group, 2013, “2012 Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility 
Annual Report,” p. 12. http://ser.foxconn.com/ViewAnuReport.do?action=showAnnual 
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20 percent were between 26 and 30.383 A clear distinction, however, is this: the 
relative youthfulness of Foxconn’s labor force is indicative of the phenomenon that 
workers burn out young. 
 
Foxconn Factory “Campus” 
 
At nearly 7 a.m., hundreds of thousands of Foxconn workers pour in and out of the 
south main gate of the Longhua factory in Shenzhen. The human flow continues for 
more than an hour. Among the flow of people, most are young workers in their jeans 
and sports shoes. Male workers wear dark blue Foxconn t-shirts and female workers 
bright red. Night-shift workers head in one direction, cross the footbridge, and pour 
into the shopping malls and street markets that have grown up around the factory. 
Day-shift workers cross the same footbridge, in the opposite direction, heading 
toward the main factory gate to get start to work.  
 
Foxconn is a key node in the global production network, where the assembly and 
shipment of finished products to world consumers continues around the clock 24 
hours a day, 365 days a year. The Foxconn “campus,” as the managers like to call it, 
organizes production and daily labor reproduction activities in a densely populated, 
self-contained environment. The Longhua complex of 1.75 million square meters — 
larger than the entire new “University City” in Shenzhen — includes multi-story 
factories, warehouses, dormitories, banks, two hospitals, a post office, a fire brigade 
with two fire engines, an exclusive television network, an educational institute, a 
library, soccer fields, basketball courts, tennis courts, track and field areas, swimming 
pools, cyber theatres, shops, supermarkets, cafeterias and restaurants, an employee 
care and support service centre, and even a wedding dress shop. The complex is 
equipped with advanced production facilities since it is the model factory for 
customers, government officials, and visitors from media organizations and other 
inspection units. Container trucks and forklifts rumble nonstop, serving a grid of 
factories that churn out iPhones, iPads, Kindles, and other electronic products for 
Apple and other mega-corporations.  
 
Foxconn follows a strict policy of “not commenting on any current or potential 
customers or their products” when handling my research inquiries.384 I rely on 
workers’ and managers’ account of their daily lives and working environment behind 
                                                      
383 National Bureau of Statistics, 2010, “2009 2ian 2ongmingong Jiance Diaocha Baogao” 
(Monitoring and Investigation Report on the Rural Migrant Workers in 2009) 2009年農民工監測調
查報告. http://www.360doc.com/content/13/1016/14/7157405_321860376.shtml  
384 Foxconn’s 7-page statement dated 31 December 2013, p. 1. 
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the factory walls. Wherever appropriate, I also present company documents to 
validate my interview data. The Longhua factory floor plan shows that there are ten 
zones listed from A to H, J, and L, and they are further subdivided into A1, A2, A3, 
J20, L6, L7, and so on (see Figure 5.1). It takes almost an hour to walk from the 
south main gate to the north main gate, and another hour to walk from the east to the 
west gate.  
 
Figure 5.1 Foxconn Floor Plan (Shenzhen Longhua) 
 
Source: Foxconn company publication. 
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The spatial organization of modern factory production seems to show the 
significance of Foxconn’s “business groups” at the heart of its industrial empire. 
Each of the 15 business groups occupies a large space, organizes around specific 
customers and/or products, and clusters in designated places under 24-hour high 
security. Zone G, for example, is reserved for iDPBG (integrated Digital Product 
Business Group) — the Apple product group. Tian Yu told me, “I arrived late for my 
first day of work. The factory was so big, and I got lost.” Yu did not know what each 
building was, nor did she know the meaning of the English acronyms that could be 
seen written everywhere, such as FIH (Foxconn International Holdings) and JIT 
(just-in-time) Hub. She remarked, “I spent a long time looking for the [iDPBG] 
workshop.”385 When asked if she was scolded for being late, she answered so 
quietly that I could not hear her response. 
 
From the moment that Yu and her co-workers enter the factory gate, they are 
monitored by a security system unlike any found in nearby electronic components 
and plastics processing companies. Every building has security checkpoints with 
guards standing by 24 hours a day capable of initiating total lockdown. Workers pass 
through layers of electronic gates and Special Security Zones386 before arriving at 
the respective production workshop to start work. A male worker conveyed the 
feeling that “I’ve lost my freedom” in the tightly guarded factory. “Foxconn has its 
own force, just as a country has an army and police. The security system is a 
powerful instrument of rule for the Foxconn Empire.”387 
 
Foxconn justifies the company surveillance system by its contractual responsibility 
to secure its customers’ intellectual property. A female worker said, “We’re not 
allowed to bring cell phones, digital recording devices or any metallic objects into 
the workshop. If there’s a metal button on my clothes, it has to be removed, 
otherwise I wouldn’t be allowed in, or security officers would simply cut the metal 
button off.”388 
 
                                                      
385 Worker interviewee 1. 
386 Teji anbao qu (特級安保區)  
387 Worker interviewee 5. 
388 Worker interviewee 6. 
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Foxconn workers are required to wear non-metallic belts to pass through company 
metal-detector gates for security purpose. Photo credit: Jenny Chan. 
 
As workers prepare to begin a shift, managers call out: “How are you?” Workers 
must respond by shouting in unison, “Good! Very good! Very, very good!”389 This 
drill is said to train disciplined workers. A laser-soldering worker reported, “Before 
shift-time, a whistle sounds three times. At the first whistle we must rise, and put our 
stools in order. At the second whistle we must prepare to work, and put on special 
gloves or equipment. At the third whistle, we sit and work.”390  
 
A line leader explained that every worker is required to “present a good image to 
company clients.”391  Foxconn’s “8S” policy is built upon the “5S” Japanese 
management method to improve efficiency and organizational performance, which 
refers to Seiri (sort), Seiton (set in order), Seiso (clean), Seiketsu (standardize the 
first “3S” procedures) and Shitsuke (sustain the efforts of seiri, seiton, seiso and 
seiketsu), to which are added Safety, Saving, and Security to comprise the Chinese 
system.392 The posture of workers’ sitting or standing is monitored no less than the 
                                                      
389 Worker interviewees 8, 11 and 29. 
390 Worker interviewee 18. 
391 Worker interviewee 12. 
392 Foxconn Employee Handbook, September 2010, pp. 12-13. “8S,” in Chinese: 整理、整頓、清掃、
清潔、素養、安全、節約、保密。 
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work itself. “We cannot move past a yellow and black ‘zebra line’ on the floor,” a 
worker told me as she explained the position her stool must be placed while working 
on the assembly line.393  
 
“No talking, no laughing, no sleeping” is the number one factory rule. Any behavior 
that violates production discipline is penalized. “Going to the toilet for more than ten 
minutes incurs an oral warning, and chatting during work time incurs a written 
warning,” a worker explained. 394  Aside from these listed punishments, other 
disciplinary methods include cancellation of performance prizes, refusing promotion, 
and various methods not sanctioned in the Foxconn Employee Handbook such as 
verbal abuse and compulsory copying of Gou’s Quotations. A worker recounted a 
situation, “My friend was responsible for screwing screws onto cell phones. Once he 
missed a screw by mistake which QC [quality control] caught. When the line leader 
learned this, he yelled at him and forced him to copy the CEO’s quotations 300 
times!”395 
 
In a group interview several women employees discussed a ritualistic punishment 
that they had to endure. Their collective experience was articulated most clearly by 
one worker of this group. 
 
After work, all of us — more than 100 people — are sometimes made 
to stay behind. This happens whenever a worker is punished. A girl is 
forced to stand at attention to read aloud a statement of self-criticism. 
She must be loud enough to be heard. Our line leader would ask if the 
worker at the far end of the workshop could hear clearly the mistake 
she had made. Oftentimes girls feel they are losing face. It’s very 
embarrassing. She starts to cry. Her voice becomes very small…Then 
the line leader shouts: “If one worker loses only one minute [failing to 
keep up with the work pace], then, how much more time will be 
wasted by 100 people?396 
 
Foxconn maintains a policy of demerit points to drive workers to work harder. 
Another woman worker explained: “The policy penalizes workers for petty offences. 
I can lose points for having long nails, answering back, and sleeping on the floor 
during the work shift. There are so many things. Just one penalty means losing my 
                                                      
393 Worker interviewee 17. 
394 Worker interviewee 19. 
395 Worker interviewee 24. 
396 Worker interviewee 6. 
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monthly bonus.”397  
 
Foxconn prohibits conversation during work in the workshop. A worker recalled, 
“Friendly chit-chat among co-workers is not very common even during the break; 
everyone rushes to queue up for lunch and eat quickly.”398 A long work day of 
enforced silence, punctuated only by the noise of the machines, is the norm. 
 
“Our Sisters and Brothers,” or Strangers? 
 
“Hand in hand, heart to heart, Foxconn and I grow together,”399 reads a bright red 
Foxconn banner above the production line. It suggests that the workers and the 
company identify with each other. But, behind the image of “a warm family with a 
loving heart,” the life of a Foxconn worker is very isolating.  
 
Foxconn’s working hours are notoriously long, as Yu — the then new worker — 
soon experienced. “I woke up at 6:30 a.m., attended an unpaid morning meeting at 
7:20 a.m., started work at 7:40 a.m., went to lunch at 11, and then usually skipped 
the evening meal to work overtime until 7:40 p.m.”400 On top of the 12-hour shift, 
like all other workers, Yu attended compulsory work meetings every day.  
 
Yu worked on the production line for more than a month and made no friends. With 
only a single day off every second week, there was no spare time for Yu to use the 
facilities like swimming pools or tennis courts, or even to window shop for 
smartphones in the commercial districts within the enormous Longhua complex. 
 
“At Foxconn, when I felt lonely, I would sometimes chat on QQ online,” Yu told me. 
But those chatting on QQ remain far apart in time, space, and experience.  
 
“I was switched to the night shift in March.” The exhausting assembly line, harsh 
factory discipline, and friendless dormitory, together with the difficulty Yu faced 
contacting her friends and family, were compounded by the company’s apparent 
failure to pay her. She reached breaking point. Her testimony reveals just how 
overwhelmed she felt, “I was so desperate that my mind went blank.”  
 
                                                      
397 Worker interviewee 28. 
398 Worker interviewee 18. 
399 Shou qian shou, xin lian xin, Fushikang yu wo gong chengzhang (手牽手，心連心，富士康與我
共成長). 
400 Worker interviewee 1. 
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At about 8 a.m. on 17 March 2010, Yu jumped from the fourth floor of her dormitory 
building in despair. After 12 days in a coma, she awoke to find that her body had 
become half-paralyzed. She is now confined to bed or a wheelchair for the rest of her 
life. 
 
Would Yu have tried to commit suicide if the company had not failed to pay her 
wages, or if she happened to work at another factory, somewhere smaller and less 
pressurized than Foxconn? CEO Terry Gou distances the company from any 
responsibility for Yu’s and the other suicides. In a media interview on employee 
suicides, he highlighted the “emotional problems” of Chinese workers: “If a worker 
in Taiwan commits suicide because of emotional problems, his employer won’t be 
held responsible, but we are taken to task in China because they are living and 
sleeping in our dormitories.”401 With a media storm brewing, he felt compelled to 
take some remedial action. 
 
The company announced plans to raise workers’ wages beginning 1 June 2010. It 
also required all job applicants to complete a 36-question psychological test.402 
From the company’s perspective, those with weak capability to handle “personal 
problems” were the source of the troubles. The Foxconn corporate human resources 
director moved to require workers to sign a no-suicide pledge containing a 
disclaimer clause: 
 
Should any injury or death arise for which Foxconn cannot be held 
accountable (including suicide and self-mutilation), I hereby agree to 
hand over the case to the company’s legal and regulatory procedures. 
I myself and my family members will not seek extra compensation 
above that required by the law so that the company’s reputation would 
not be ruined and its operation remains stable.403 
 
The no-suicide “consent letter” sought not only to limit Foxconn’s liability but to 
place responsibility for all future suicides on the individual worker. Foxconn 
dropped this administrative requirement404 only after intense criticism by workers 
                                                      
401 Quoted in Peh Shing Huei, 11 June 2010, “It’s Time to Dismantle Factory Towns,” The Straits 
Times. 
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/special-to-the-china-post/2010/06/11/26024
8/p1/It%27s-time.htm 
402 Worker interviewee 26. 
403 China Central TV, 28 May 2010, “Letter of Consent Exposed at Foxconn.” 
http://english.cntv.cn/program/china24/20100528/100754.shtml 
404 Manager interviewee 5. 
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and from wider society. 
 
In damage-control mode, in May 2010, Foxconn quickly installed safety nets to 
prevent workers from leaping to their deaths. In the two mega factory complexes in 
Longhua and Guanlan towns in Shenzhen, and in all its manufacturing bases across 
China, nets have now been installed. A Foxconn employee reflected, “I feel really 
constrained since the suicides.” Her factory dormitory room is long and narrow with 
four metal double-bunk beds, two on each side. At the far end of the room is a 
cement balcony fenced in by metal bars to prevent workers from leaping from the 
window. “Now everywhere there are nets. They’ve placed the safety nets around the 
roofs, on both sides of corridors, and all the windows were covered with wire and 
locked tight. It gives you a really constricted feeling. I am depressed.”405 
 
“We’re Faster Than the Machines.” 
 
The electronics parts are assembled quickly as they move along the 24-hour non-stop 
conveyor belts. Posters on the Foxconn workshop walls intone: 
 
Value efficiency every minute, every second.406 
Achieve goals or the sun will no longer rise.407 
The devil is in the details.408 
 
Every second counts towards profit. “I take a motherboard from the line, scan the 
logo, put it in an anti-static bag, stick on a label, and place it on the line. Each of 
these tasks takes two seconds. Every ten seconds I finish five tasks,” a worker 
reported.409 After the suicide peak, in June 2010, managers ordered line leaders to 
limit workers’ overtime to stabilize conditions. “But quotas for our time at work have 
in fact gone up! It’s very simple, what once took six to seven days to complete must 
now be finished in five, since the company cannot fail to complete orders on time 
because of limits on workers’ overtime. That is to say, the orders haven’t changed but 
production time has decreased. As a result, we’re compelled to work even faster than 
the machines,” an iPad assembly-line worker explained.410  
 
                                                      
405 Worker interviewee 3. 
406 Zhongshi xiaolü, fenfen miaomiao (重視效率，分分秒秒). 
407 Mubiao dacheng, chufei taiyang buzai shengqi (目標達成，除非太陽不再升起). 
408 Mogui cangzai xijie li (魔鬼藏在細節裡). 
409 Worker interviewee 10. 
410 Worker interviewee 43. 
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After the basic wage increase in June 2010, Foxconn hiked production quotas, 
demanding greater labor intensity. A casing-assembly worker reported: “Production 
output of iPhone casings was previously set at 5,120 pieces per day; but in July, it was 
raised by 25 percent to 6,400 pieces per day. I’m completely exhausted.”411 Also, 
Foxconn engineers have already installed “Foxbots” at the manufacturing plants to 
raise productivity. Foxbots are robot arms that excel in spraying, welding, and 
high-precision printed circuit board assembly. In recent years, “the company stepped 
up technological research into robots in the face of rising wages and growing labor 
protest.”412 CEO Terry Gou told a journalist in July 2011 that the company’s then 
10,000 robots would be increased to 300,000 in 2012, and one million by 2014.413  
 
Industrial engineering is at the heart of Foxconn’s gigantic production operation. 
Management values its engineers, “but they are our enemies; we hate them,” a 
worker told me.414 The engineers are responsible for finding ways to speed up 
production and make it more efficient, based on principles of measuring the most 
minute worker operations. They study the entire industrial process in staggering 
detail, simplify procedures, formulate standards, and put them into practice to 
minimize costs and maximize efficiency.415 In September 2013, as Foxconn faced 
tight deadlines for shipment of two new models of iPhones, the 5s and 5c, it pushed 
workers to stay laser-focused “every minute, every second.”416 The division of labor 
is so detailed that workers see themselves as a mere “cog in the machine.”417 
 
Meal times and rest breaks are occasionally shortened or even cut to meet high 
production quotas. In the iPhone workshop, a female worker418 told me that “hourly 
production quotas are pasted on the big white boards. They’re displayed for auditors 
from Apple. Our actual quotas are set even higher than those publicly presented.”419  
                                                      
411 Worker interviewee 11. 
412 Manager interviewee 13. 
413 Quoted in Xinhua, 30 July 2011, “Foxconn to Replace Workers with 1 Million Robots in 3 Years.” 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-07/30/c_131018764.htm 
414 Worker interviewee 16. 
415 See also, Frederick Winslow Taylor, [1911] 1998, The Principles of Scientific Management, 
Mineola, New York: Dover Publications; William M. Tsutsui, 1998, Manufacturing Ideology: 
Scientific Management in Twentieth-Century Japan, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
416 Manager interviewee 14.  
417 See also, Robert Blauner, 1964, Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker and His Industry, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
418 Worker interviewee 42. 
419 Foxconn is not the only company which falsified data or covered up factory conditions from 
inspections. On supplier social audits, and their intended and unintended outcomes, see for example, 
Richard M. Locke, Ben A. Rissing and Timea Pal, 2013, “Complements or Substitutes? Private Codes, 
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Workers and line leaders are constantly pushed to reach ever higher outputs in 
response to quotas set by buyers such as Apple and other global electronic giants. “We 
know all too well that branded electronic products are expensive and there is no 
margin for mistakes,” a female worker told me, as she described her worries at work 
and fear of being punished.420  
 
The pressures to compete with each other to win the annual production bonus remain 
strong. A job evaluation system of Grades A, B, C, and D was jointly developed by 
industrial engineers and human resources managers to prompt workers to do 
overtime work, and not to take leave, otherwise the bonus would be withheld. “We 
can’t stand this demanding production assignment anymore and want to resign. We 
wait and wait but can’t get approval. Production is very busy. So we have no choice 
but to leave, losing our last month’s pay. This is money earned with sweat. We leave 
Foxconn in this way hating the company to the very marrow of our bones,” two 
former workers recalled, as they described their “voluntary resignation.”421 
 
Wages and Benefits 
 
Foxconn is not short of new applicants, despite the work pressures. Dissatisfied or 
worn out workers are easy to replace. In the wake of the string of suicides, 
Foxconn’s promise to increase pay, repeated through the media, attracted many 
newcomers. Posters and fliers are stuck on lamp posts, footbridges, and display 
boards around the factory area to entice people to work at Foxconn. During my 
fieldwork in February 2011, outside the four-story Foxconn Recruitment Center, 
“more than 4,000 workers were recruited per day on average soon after the Chinese 
Lunar New Year holidays,” according to the chief recruitment officer.422 Each job 
application form has a barcode on the upper right-hand corner. Foxconn 
administrative assistants scanned the completed forms and input the personal data 
into the computer system. Corporate public communications director Liu Kun said, 
“the sheer number of people applying to work there every day, roughly 8,000, proves 
Foxconn is not the ‘sweatshop’ some labor activists and media claim.”423 What Liu 
did not mention was the high turnover rate at Foxconn.  
 
                                                                                                                                                      
in Global Supply Chains,” Politics & Society 37(3), pp. 319-51. 
420 Worker interviewee 9. 
421 Worker interviewees 7 and 8. 
422 Manager interviewee 2. 
423 Quoted in Li Li, 12 June 2010, “Alleviating Workplace Stress,” Beijing Review. 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/nation/txt/2010-06/12/content_279009.htm 
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New workers at Foxconn receive a three-year contract, beginning with an extended 
probation period of three to six months. A colorful 2011 recruitment poster exults, 
“Pool the whole country’s talent, paint splendid prospects.”424 Males or females, 
who are aged 16 or above, have completed middle school, and who are in good 
physical and mental health, are invited to apply for work. 
 
 
“Pool the whole country’s talent, paint splendid prospects” — a Foxconn worker in Shenzhen 
will receive (A) the basic monthly wage of 1,550 Yuan; (B) after probation (six months), 1,650 
Yuan; after evaluation (three more months), 2,000 Yuan. Total income, with overtime: 
2,000-3,300 Yuan/Month. Photo credit: Jenny Chan. 
 
                                                      
424 Ju sihai jingying, hui jinxiu hongtu (聚四海菁英，繪錦繡鴻圖). 
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Foxconn’s young workforce provides great physical dexterity, and is able to work 
faster and longer hours. Indeed, age and physical flexibility are the key traits that 
determine whether an applicant is taken on at Foxconn. A 20-year-old job applicant 
described his experience of being hired: 
 
I came to Foxconn for a physical examination and job interview. The 
recruitment officer required us to put our things down, extend our 
arms and spread our five fingers, which they turned over and 
inspected. Some of us were asked to do simple stretches to see if 
we’re capable of smooth movement. During the physical examination, 
they checked our chests, abdomens, and backs for scars, then while 
measuring height everyone was made to say aloud our full names, to 
prove we’re not deaf or mute. At that time I had a feeling, like a 
person about to be sold, that the master was selecting those who were 
robust, healthy, and worth hiring, and discarding those who were not 
even qualified to be laborers.425 
 
Foxconn, in accordance with the Chinese law, adopts an occupation-based welfare 
system, that is, it is based on employer and employee contributions. Employers are 
legally required to provide five types of social insurance (including old age pensions, 
medical insurance, work injury insurance, unemployment benefits, and maternity 
insurance), plus a housing provident fund.426 Foxconn pays 10 percent of the 
employee’s basic wage for social insurance, and deposits it with the local 
government social insurance department, while employees pay 8 percent of their 
wages every month. For example, in Foxconn’s factory in Shenzhen, the minimum 
monthly insurance premium in total as of 2011 was: the employer paid 155 Yuan 
(10% of 1,550 Yuan) and the employee paid 124 Yuan (8% of 1,550 Yuan). Foxconn 
also stipulates the housing rate at the statutory minimum level, that is, 5 percent of 
workers’ basic wages (77.5 Yuan).  
 
Chen Ximei, 427  a new migrant from southwestern China’s Guizhou province, 
showed me her December 2011 Foxconn wage slip with the following deductions: 
social insurance, 124 Yuan/month; housing provident fund, 77.5 Yuan/month; factory 
dormitory rent, 110 Yuan/month; for a total of 311.5 Yuan. She said, “My biggest 
expenditures are food, sundry items, clothes and accessories, and cell phone charges, 
                                                      
425 Worker interviewee 18. 
426 Wuxian yijin (五險一金). 
427 Worker interviewee 42. 
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adding up to some 800 Yuan.” “If it were not for overtime,” she emphasized, “I’d 
certainly feel the pressure.” Even though she has a surplus of about 400 Yuan per 
month without working overtime, in the event of critical illnesses or injuries, she 
would face a heavy financial burden. At Foxconn, only 70 percent of the medical 
fees would be reimbursed for “the qualified staff.”428 
 
Grievances about pay, work stress, and unreasonable production demands sometimes 
culminated in open conflicts.429 If a target is not fulfilled, Foxconn workers have to 
stay on the production line to finish it. Workers frequently report that “overtime is 
not fully documented, with the result that overtime wages are unpaid or 
under-paid.”430 This happened when line leaders under-reported extreme (and illegal) 
overtime hours, fearing punishment by higher-ups. In my interviews, workers 
repeatedly spoke of “exhaustion to the point of tears.”431 They were often required to 
work on Saturdays and Sundays during the production peak season. While they 
should be paid double in accordance with the law, they were instead given rest days 
during low season to offset the overtime premiums.432  
 
“My Brain Rusts.” 
 
With the meager income of assembly-line workers, coupled with their repetitive and 
mind-numbing jobs, many workers interviewed feel anxious about their future. 
Protracted 12-hour work breaks the endurance and health of even the strongest. A 
young female worker described herself as “a part” on the production line: 
 
I serve as a part in the visual inspection work station, which is part of 
the static electricity assembly-line. While the adjacent soldering oven 
delivers smartphone motherboards, both my hands extend to take the 
motherboard, then my head starts shifting from left to right, my eyes 
move from the left side of the motherboard to the right side, then stare 
from the top to the bottom, without interruption, and when something 
is off, I call out, and another human part similar to myself will run over, 
ask about the cause of the error, and fix it. I repeat the same task 
thousands of times a day. My brain rusts.433 
 
                                                      
428 Foxconn Emplyee Handbook, 2010, “Medical Benefits,” p. 9. 
429 See chapter 9 in this dissertation for further discussions. 
430 Worker interviewees 31 and 40. 
431 Worker interviewees 4, 5 and 13. 
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Harry Braverman argued in his classic book on the labor process that control of the 
workforce is rooted in the process of deskilling, which requires a separation between 
the planning and execution of work.434 Foxconn exemplifies the deskilling and 
routinization principle relentlessly applied to increase productivity and lower 
production costs. Each worker specializes in one specific task and performs repetitive 
motions at high speed, hourly, daily for months on end. In turn, the production system 
removes any possibility of feelings of freshness or accomplishment. 
 
A 16-year-old worker expressed her frustration: “I find it very difficult to identify my 
own contributions to the products assembled through numerous repetitions of a few 
operations.”435 Her friend’s comment is also often heard, “I don’t learn anything 
here. I install Wi-Fi components in iPads each day. I never master any skills.”436 On 
the iPad line, each of the five workers at the same work station files the aluminum 
burrs off the Apple-logo hole 6,000 times a day.437 A male worker bitterly remarked, 
“After work, if your eyes are glazed over, your head and face are filthy with grime, 
and there is a lifeless look in your eyes, you are a Foxconn worker!”438  
 
“Foxconn believes that employees are its most valuable intangible asset and the 
lifeblood of its business,” the company annual report declared immediately after the 
2010 suicides, as it touted high corporate ideals framed in terms of a 
“people-oriented leadership style.” It continues to read, “Foxconn…promotes 
sustainability, stability, development, technology, internationality, and responsibility 
for the advancement of social welfare and the human good.” 439  In practice, 
commanding more than 1.4 million workers all over China, Foxconn has devised a 
militaristic management system that prioritizes the control of labor.  
 
  
                                                      
434 Harry Braverman, [1974] 1998, Labour and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the 
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435 Worker interviewee 23. 
436 Worker interviewee 14. 
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439 Foxconn Technology Group, 2011, “2010 Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility 
Annual Report,” p. 6. http://ser.foxconn.com/ViewAnuReport.do?action=showAnnual 
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Militaristic Management System 
 
Management organizes labor through a centralized system in which production lines 
are administered by departments, which are directly responsible to their business 
units, business divisions, and ultimately business groups. The 13-level hierarchy is 
organized with clear lines of command. Senior leaders formulate the corporate 
development strategy and set annual revenue and profit goals. Middle management 
devises implementation plans and delegates responsibility. Production workers are 
subject to supervision to complete assigned tasks. Within the workshop, production 
operators and student interns face multiple layers of management from assistant line 
leaders, line leaders, team leaders, and supervisors (see Figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.2 Foxconn Management Hierarchy 
 
Source: Foxconn company information. 
 
On a bright clear day, I met a 22-year-old male worker, Li Jun,440 at a basketball 
court next to the factory dormitory. Jun is an only child born into a rural family in 
Xi’an, the ancient capital in northwest China’s Shaanxi province. His parents relied 
on income from a plot of low-yielding farmland to support the family. They 
scrimped to provide for his primary, middle and high school education, hoping that 
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he could climb the ladder of success. Jun raised their hopes when he tested into 
Xi’an Foreign Affairs College. “I soon found a job at Foxconn,” he said, “only to learn 
that what Foxconn valued most highly was discipline and obedience, not the 
leadership and interpersonal communication skills I had acquired in college.”  
 
From 2008 to 2012, Foxconn statistics reveal that male employees increased from 53 
to 65 percent.441 The company has adapted to labor market changes by employing 
more male than female workers as fewer young women442  become available, 
reversing the historical pattern of a feminized workforce in electronics. Young 
migrants — men and women — aspire to pursue their dreams in Foxconn, a global 
company, but find themselves lost in a regimented and impersonal mega factory 
system. Each worker who enters Foxconn must remember this “iron law”: “lower 
grades must obey higher grades absolutely.”443 A 19-year-old worker complained, 
“If my supervisor passes down an order, such as a working technique, even if I know 
that it is incorrect, I must still follow it. Later, after a problem arises, I can submit a 
request for clarification, but I can’t make a change myself.”444 The hierarchical 
system is so rigid that workers are denied the possibility of taking any initiative. 
  
“Fate is not in our own hands but in our superior’s,” a worker responded to my 
question about the company’s promotion policy. For him “a fair promotion” is a 
myth; in his words, “what matters is who you know, and how you’re able to present 
yourself, not necessarily whether the quality of your work is high or you have been 
trained at a good technical school or university.”445  
 
Production workers are generally looked down on as people who lack culture and earn 
little. “I am a production line worker. The supervisors and managers [Terry] Gou 
promotes are terrible,” a 19-year-old young male worker commented. He added, 
“They are particularly fierce towards new employees. Most of us endure humiliation 
while working at Foxconn,” referring to the repeated shaming of those at the bottom 
of the corporate pyramid who fail to fulfill the quotas.446 During work, line leaders 
                                                      
441 Foxconn Technology Group, 2011, “2010 Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility 
Annual Report,” p. 14; Foxconn Technology Group, 2013, “2012 Corporate Social and Environmental 
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often remind assembly-line workers of their lowly status. Some typical insults I was 
told of included, “You are just an ordinary worker.447 If you are capable, you can sit in 
the office and use a computer. But you lack a degree and capability, so just behave 
yourself and work well.”448 Another example: “Who can you blame? You can only 
blame yourself for your bad school performance…It doesn’t matter if you leave or 
stay [in Foxconn]. There are plenty of people lining up outside. If you leave now, 
someone else will come to work here right away.”449 
 
Many workers interviewed see their dreams of rising through hard work crushed. An 
18-year-old female worker recalled, “The line leader often says he doesn’t care if there 
is one person more or less on our line. We workers count for nothing.”450 As a result, 
many shared a sense of low self-worth: “I am just a speck of dust in the workshop.”451 
In the production process, “Workers come second to and are worn out by the 
machines.”452 Workers occupy the lowest position, even below the machinery. 
 
A common saying among Foxconn workers is: “We wake up before the roosters, eat 
worse than the pigs, and go to sleep after the dogs.”453 This is one of the ways the 
workers’ feeling of oppression and their implied accusation of managerial inhumane 
treatment is expressed. 454  Several workers mocked one of Foxconn’s Chinese 
slogans and twisted “humane management” into “human subordination.”455 A male 
worker concluded: “If someone makes a mistake at Foxconn, the person below them 
must take responsibility. If something bad happens, I get screwed, one level screws 
another…Higher-level people vent their anger at those below them, but who can 
workers vent to? That’s why frontline workers jumped from those buildings.”456 
 
Line Leaders’ ightmares 
 
Having completed their shift, Foxconn employees in small groups of two to three 
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450 Worker interviewee 11. 
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walked out to get some snacks. I talked to Wang Fenghui,457 an experienced 
23-year-old line leader, over a beer. In contrast to the noise of the surrounding crowd, 
our table was quiet. Fenghui was frustrated and exhausted. He shared with me his 
ambivalence about being a line leader. 
 
In the Shenzhen Longhua complex, as of February 2011, there were some 20,000 
lower to middle level leaders, including line, team, and group leaders. Each was 
responsible for supervising a few dozen to more than one hundred assembly-line 
workers. In daily management, arguments often erupt at the lowest level. 
“Sometimes managers visit the workshop, and if they find workers performing 
poorly, rather than communicate directly with the workers, they will have the line 
leader scold them, and afterwards hold the line leader accountable,” Fenghui said. 
 
“If we listen too much to our superiors, we have to mistreat workers below us. If we 
take care of the workers’ feelings too much, maybe we won’t complete our tasks. 
When work is busy, it’s easy to get angry,” Fenghui shared with me. 
 
After the 2010 suicide cluster, Foxconn directed line leaders to change the 
scolding-focused and punishment-oriented management style. “Foxconn renewed its 
commitment to ‘respect employees, ensure continuous improvement, contribute to 
the well-being of society, and achieve sustainability,’” the company trumpeted in its 
new labor policy.458 But production requirements did not change, and the speed of 
the line has actually increased, with the result that line leaders face even greater 
pressure as they increase pressure on workers.  
 
After the company releases production quotas, we must rely on the 
workers to carry them out, but some workers are idle, and refuse to 
accept supervision, which poses a major problem. On the one hand, 
pressure applied by senior management requires you to complete a 
large number of assignments, and on the other hand you must 
maintain good employee relations and not yell at workers. It is not 
easy to be a frontline manager. 
 
Fenghui continued: “Line leaders never have a good day…Before the workers arrive, 
we have to prepare the assembly lines, lay out the tools, and put all reporting forms in 
order. If an order must go out at 3 p.m. today, our managers will come over to the lines 
                                                      
457 Worker interviewee 34. 
458 Foxconn Technology Group, 2011, “2010 Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility 
Annual Report,” p. 1. http://ser.foxconn.com/ViewAnuReport.do?action=showAnnual 
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and urge us to speed up.” 
 
Line leaders are sandwiched between management and the workers. Recently, 
Fenghui ran into trouble. “Several batches of student interns were dispatched to the 
workshop, with more than one hundred interns in one batch. There were only four 
hundred people in the entire workshop. Having so many students come in at one time 
put enormous pressure on the rate of defective products.” Before that, there were just 
3-4 defective products per day, but after they arrived, sometimes it was 20 items in 
an hour. He elaborated: “Each day, we have a discard quota, a standard not to be 
surpassed. There’s no way to give the higher ups these high defect rates.” 
Guaranteeing both the quality and quantity of work was difficult as he had to instruct 
the student interns, who are as young as 16, to work properly and fast enough to 
meet the demand. “Some workers and student interns don’t listen when I explain 
things, and don’t follow instructions for completing assignments,” Fenghui sighed 
again. 
 
Often, line leaders vent their frustrations at workers and students interns. “Higher up 
managers ask why your production quota was not fulfilled, and you must explain the 
reason. Then they ask you how to correct it, and how to avoid these situations in the 
future.” After each day’s work, the high production requirements become the focus of 
Fenghui’s nightmares. 
 
The Foxconn Trade Union 
 
Harsh discipline and strict factory order notwithstanding, Foxconn management now 
faces a younger cohort with greater mobility and has to take a softer approach to 
motivate its workers, while imposing ever more demanding quotas. The enterprise 
union committee, for example, attempts to present a caring image through various 
kinds of employee activities, which have increased notably in the last four years since 
the string of suicides.459 At the Longhua facility in Shenzhen, the Foxconn union 
organizes public speaking contests to promote itself and the company. With 
monumental insensitivity in the wake of suicides and labor conflicts, in August 2010, 
the theme was set as “The company loves me, I love the company.”460 At Foxconn 
Chengdu, Sichuan (where the trade union was established in March 2011) and 
Foxconn Wuhan, Hubei (where the trade union was set up in September 2011), 
similar competitions were organized on the theme of company love and care. 
                                                      
459 Worker interviewees 22 and 26. 
460 Qiye ai yuangong, yuangong ai quiye (企業愛員工，員工愛企業). 
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Foxconn’s union mission statement tells workers, “when there’s trouble, seek the 
trade union.”461 However, most workers interviewed see little point in doing so.  
 
The struggles of Foxconn employees in defending their rights and dignity are 
illustrative of the experience of many Chinese workers. The Foxconn union 
organization mirrors the company hierarchy, from the assembly lines, business units, 
and business groups, to the corporate administrative level. At Shenzhen Longhua 
facility, as of August 2010, 249 union committee members were chosen from more 
than 400,000 workers. All union representatives are salaried Foxconn administrators 
appointed by management to union committees.462 Each member of the Foxconn 
union staff wears a red badge with the ACFTU (All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions) logo during office hours. A team of female and male union staff reports for 
duty at the Employee Care Center during three work shifts a day, seven days a week. 
Workers repeatedly informed me that “the human resources department is the trade 
union.”463 Their response conveyed a profound truth about the subordination of the 
union to the company. 
 
From 1988 (when Foxconn set up its offshore factory in Shenzhen on the north 
border of Hong Kong in southeastern coastal China) through 2006, Foxconn, like 
many other foreign-invested enterprises, had evaded its basic responsibilities under 
Chinese law by failing to set up a trade union. It was only after a June 2006 report in 
a British newspaper exposed “iPod sweatshop” conditions in the Foxconn Longhua 
factory that produced the Apple iPod music player that the Chinese press took up 
issues of abusive labor treatment and extremely long working hours.464 Foxconn 
countered by establishing union representation throughout the company on the last 
day of 2006.465 Taking immediate control of the newly formed union, Foxconn CEO 
Terry Gou appointed his special personal assistant, Chen Peng, to become the union 
chairwoman. As of 2014, she had held this position for eight years and the union has 
performed well on behalf of the company despite repeated conflicts with workers.466 
 
                                                      
461 You kunnan, zhao gonghui (有困難，找工會). 
462 Manager interviewees 1 and 5. 
463 Worker interviewees 10, 20, 21, and 27. 
464 Reporters without Borders, 4 September 2006, “Foxconn Drops Lawsuit Against Two China 
Business 2ews Journalists.” 
http://en.rsf.org/china-foxconn-drops-lawsuit-against-two-04-09-2006,18691.html   
465 IHLO (International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)/Global Union Federation (GUC) Hong 
Kong Liaison Office), 2 January 2007, “ACFTU (All-China Federation of Trade Unions) Established 
a Union at Foxconn on the Very Last Day of 2006.” http://www.ihlo.org/LRC/ACFTU/030107.html 
466 Foxconn Weekly, 25 November 2010, “Duihua Chen Peng” (Dialogue with Chen Peng) 對話陳
鵬, pp.1-2.  
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By December 2009, “unions had been set up in 92 percent of the Fortune 500 
companies operating in China,” including the million-worker strong Foxconn, and 
this trend has continued since.467 The only officially recognized Chinese trade union 
organization, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), whose strength 
had been centered in state-owned enterprises,468 lost at least 17 million members in 
the three years from 1997 to 2000 alone, through privatization and lay offs.469 The 
fragmentation of labor and the diversification of ownership in the hands of Chinese 
and international capital have profoundly challenged both workers and trade unions. 
The state-run union bureaucracy then targeted foreign-invested companies to 
unionize. By January 2012, the Chinese trade union federation had a total 
membership of 258 million470 (the numbers surpass the International Trade Union 
Confederation global membership of 168 million workers in 155 countries and 
territories excluding China), of whom 36 percent (94 million) were rural migrant 
workers, the fastest growing segment of the union since the early 2000s.471 My 
discussion of the Foxconn union further reveals how dependence on management 
severely undermines the capacity of enterprise unions to represent the workers.  
 
Li Xiaoxiang472 a 17-year-old worker said, “The union often organizes day trips, 
picnics, hiking, fishing, singing contests, pop concerts, dance shows, basketball 
tournaments, and annual partner matching parties on Valentine’s Day. These could 
help workers relax to some extent. However, we’re exhausted from work.” The most 
frequent union activities were the box-sealing competitions. Xiaoxiang explained 
that “box-sealing is what happens after products are stuffed into boxes; the box is 
sealed. This is one operation on the production line. The competition is to see who 
can seal the boxes fastest.” The thinly disguised productivity-raising game is framed 
                                                      
467 Mingwei Liu, 2011, “‘Where There are Workers, There should be Trade Unions’: Union 
Organizing in the Era of Growing Informal Employment,” From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalization: 
Markets, Workers, and the State in a Changing China, edited by Sarosh Kuruvilla, Ching Kwan Lee 
and Mary E. Gallagher, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 157. 
468 Jackie Sheehan, 1998, Chinese Workers: A 2ew History, London: Routledge; Tim Pringle, 2011, 
Trade Unions in China: The Challenge of Labour Unrest, Abingdon, UK: Routledge; Feng Chen, 
2009, “Union Power in China: Source, Operation, and Constraints,” Modern China 35(6), pp. 662-89. 
469 Rudolf Traub-Merz, 2012, “All-China Federation of Trade Unions: Structure, Functions and the 
Challenge of Collective Bargaining,” Industrial Democracy in China: With Additional Studies on 
Germany, South-Korea and Vietnam, edited by Rudolf Traub-Merz and Kinglun Ngok, Beijing: China 
Social Sciences Press, p. 28. 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/china/09128/09128-english%20version.pdf  
470 China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2012, 2013, “Trade Union Members in Grassroots Trade Union 
by Region,” Beijing: China Statistics Press, pp. 405-6. 
471 This stands in sharp contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and many other 
countries, where private-sector labor unions have shrunk to a small percentage of the industrial and 
service workforce, due to corporate restructuring and job export. See Xinhua, 7 January 2012, “20% 
of Chinese Join Trade Unions.” 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-01/07/content_14400312.htm  
472 Worker interviewee 22. 
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as a team-building activity. He added, “I’d say the union doesn’t act according to 
workers’ needs; rather the activities are based on company needs.” 
 
In spring 2010, at the peak of the suicides, Foxconn set up a “care and love 
hotline,”473 first at the Shenzhen plants and then at all company factories across 
China. Workers can call 78585 — the hotline’s phonetic equivalent in Mandarin is 
“please help me, help me.” During the pilot phase in May 2010, “the company 
reported handling 710 calls, including 16 who claimed they planned to commit 
suicide.”474 The company-run hotline and counseling service at the Employee Care 
Center is still in place.  
 
 
A Foxconn poster entitled Employee Care Center. The “care and love hotline” 78585 is 
phonetically equivalent in Mandarin to “please help me, help me.” The company staff promises 
to “listen to your heart, solve your problems — anytime, anywhere.” Photo credit: Jenny Chan. 
 
When some workers lodged complaints, their caller identities were reported to 
                                                      
473 Guanai rexian (關愛熱線). 
474 Manager interviewee 1. 
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management. Since learning of this breach of privacy, workers have hesitated to use 
the hotline or walk-in counseling services. They mock the company “care center,” 
dubbing it the “supervision center” and the internal hotline the “management 
hotline.”475 
 
If the hotline was of little use to workers seeking help, it did help Foxconn create an 
impression that it cares, while tightening the grip of management over workers. Most 
workers interviewed perceived the union as either “untrustworthy” or “useless” when 
it comes to negotiations over wages and benefits, work injury compensation, 
employment contract terms, and labor dispute settlements.476 If workers are in 
distress, they seek assistance from friends and families, and other supporters 
whenever possible. The Foxconn union is a union in name only. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
“An army of a thousand is easy to get, one general is tough to find.”477 Under the 
leadership of CEO Terry Gou, Foxconn has ridden the waves of successive 
revolutions in information and communications technology to vastly expand its 
Empire. In all of the branded products, Foxconn has achieved state of the art 
technologies while simplifying production processes to reduce workers to repetition 
of simple motions throughout 10-12 hour days. The length of the working day 
fluctuates across the world, but the legal restriction to a normal working day of eight 
hours is widely recognized as a major achievement of the international labor 
movements. Foxconn’s “advanced” management system produces high levels of 
alienation and labor conflicts between workers and line leaders, despite the rhetoric 
of a people-centered philosophy and company love. 
 
Over the course of my research, I chronicled the many hardships and frustrations that 
Foxconn workers (including production-line operators and leaders), nearly all of 
them young rural migrants, have confronted. Unfulfilled expectations of gaining 
skills and rising through the company system have fueled in some a sense of loss, 
powerlessness, and helplessness. Many workers still confront managerial despotism 
at the point of production, as shown in this chapter through extensive workers’ 
quotes. Eli Friedman and Ching Kwan Lee sum up that “the fundamental power 
imbalance” between labor and capital is “at the heart of poor working conditions.”478 
                                                      
475 Worker interviewees 13 and 24. 
476 Worker interviewees 3, 4, 20, 21, and 25.  
477 Qianjun yide, yijiang nanqiu (千軍易得，一將難求). 
478 Eli Friedman and Ching Kwan Lee, 2010, “Remaking the World of Chinese Labour: A 30-Year 
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Not unlike their peers in the foreign-invested enterprises, and perhaps in an extreme 
form, over 1.4 million Foxconn workers are not institutionally or collectively 
represented in a meaningful way. Anita Chan has rightly described enterprise unions 
as “worse than weak” and “an integral part of factory management.”479  
 
Forced overtime and harsh labor discipline at Foxconn have drawn public criticisms. 
Under mounting social pressure, Apple reported that its Supplier Responsibility team 
has “recently reviewed and strengthened” its standards regarding “freedom of 
association.”480 In February 2013, Foxconn proclaimed that workers would hold 
genuine elections for worker representation. In a matter of months, the 
Apple-sponsored Fair Labor Association trumpeted the fact that at three large 
Foxconn factories (Longhua, Guanlan, and Chengdu), “the percentage of worker 
representatives in the main union committees increased significantly.”481 Echoing 
the report, Foxconn officially stated that its union “has expanded from four 
representatives [in 2007] to 23,000 representatives… Membership now reached 
92.94 percent” of its total workforce in China.482 One year on, as of March 2014, 
neither the union election methods nor the worker representatives’ rights and 
responsibilities were disclosed. Inside the Foxconn Empire, I explain in the next 
chapter how the teenaged student interns face even greater challenges.  
                                                                                                                                                      
Retrospective,” British Journal of Industrial Relations 48(3), p. 514.  
479 Anita Chan, 2011, “Strikes in China’s Export Industries in Comparative Perspective,” The China 
Journal 65 (January), p. 42. 
480 Apple’s email reply dated 18 February 2014. 
481 Fair Labor Association, 2013, “Second Foxconn Verification Status Report,” p. 4. 
http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/second_foxconn_verification_status_rep
ort_0.pdf 
482 Foxconn Technology Group, 2013, “2012 Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility 
Annual Report,” p. 14. http://ser.foxconn.com/ViewAnuReport.do?action=showAnnual 
123 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Students Interns or Workers? 
 
Come on, what do you think we’d have learned standing for more 
than ten hours a day manning the machines on the line? What’s an 
internship? There’s no relation to what we study in school. Every day is 
just a repetition of one or two simple motions, like a robot. 
— Zhang Lintong, a 16-year-old student intern studying arts483 
 
On 3 March 2011, 60 students of the Sichuan Zhongjiang Vocational School484 
arrived at the factory gate of Foxconn Chengdu to begin what were described as 
internships. Some of them had only a few articles of clothing in coarse rice-bags, 
having responded to the school announcement of the internship at short notice. One 
of the students explained what happened: “Our teacher announced that all vocational 
schools in the [Sichuan] province had to cooperate with the local government and 
send students to Foxconn to take up internships.”485 He added, “Unless we could 
present a medical report certified by the city hospital that we were very ill, we had to 
depart immediately.” Brought in on two coaches, the students stood outside the 
electronic gate for half an hour listening to instructions from a Foxconn staff 
member before entering the factory. 
 
Cao Wang,486 16, who was studying textiles and clothing, was expected to do nothing 
but tighten screws during her internship; Chen Hui,487 16, a construction student, 
processed iPad casings; Yu Yanying,488 17, studying petro-chemistry, stuck labels on 
iPad boxes; Huang Ling,489 17, taking a course in business management, was assigned 
quality inspection work on the production line; Zhang Lintong,490 16, who loved his 
studies in the arts, assembled printed circuit boards.  
 
                                                      
483 Intern interviewee 1. 
484 In this chapter, the vocational schools researched are specified. The Foxconn internship programs 
organized by these schools were publicly reported in local news and/or school websites. However, to 
protect my interviewees from company or government censorship, I did not reveal any of my 
interviewees’ school affiliations in the List of Interviewees (see Appendix 2). All the teachers’ and 
student interns’ names, along those of workers, managers, and government officials, are changed. 
485 Intern interviewee 2. 
486 Intern interviewee 11. 
487 Intern interviewee 12. 
488 Intern interviewee 37. 
489 Intern interviewee 14. 
490 Intern interviewee 1. 
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Sichuan Zhongjiang Vocational School students, many of them 16 years of age, arrived at 
Foxconn Chengdu (Zone A) in the morning on 3 March 2011 to begin “internships.” Photo 
credit: Jenny Chan. 
 
The 60 students I encountered at Foxconn’s new iPad factory were not the first group 
recruited by the company as interns. More than half a year earlier, Foxconn had 
temporarily halted recruitment at its two large Shenzhen facilities after the spate of 
suicides. A human resources manager based at Longhua dismissively commented, 
“This was to prevent the entry of those who would jump to their death for company 
compensation.”491 But the company’s labor needs remained strong. The leaders 
adjusted corporate strategy in two ways. First, Foxconn accelerated the construction 
of new factories in lower wage areas of central and western China in sync with the 
central government’s emphasis on developing poorer regions (as discussed in the 
previous three chapters of 3, 4 and 5). Second, it recruited student interns from 
vocational schools all over the country, with the help of both government officials 
                                                      
491 Manager interviewee 1. 
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and school teachers. In this way, Foxconn enlarged its labor recruitment networks, 
particularly through joint partnerships with target schools. The company draws on 
the assistance of teachers to bring in students, rather than hiring new workers.492 
 
Foxconn Student Internship Program 
 
In the summer of 2010, Foxconn utilized the labor of 150,000 student interns from 
vocational schools all over China — 15 percent of its one million strong 
workforce.493 This means that Foxconn dwarfs Disney’s College Program, one of 
the world’s largest internship programs, which received more than 50,000 interns 
cumulatively over 30 years from college partners in the United States and abroad.494 
Still, there are other key features that distinguish the Foxconn internships from 
quality internships in electronics and other sectors both in China and internationally. 
 
Foxconn describes its internship program as an example of creative business-school 
partnership. A July 2011 company statement reads, “Foxconn cooperates with 
vocational schools” to provide their students with “practical skills training that will 
enable them to find employment after they graduate from these programs.”495 In 
another statement dated 31 December 2013, the company reported that it carried out 
internship programs — whether in the “short” or “long” term — in full compliance 
with Chinese law and “our own Code of Conduct496 and those of our customers.” 
Moreover, the programs “have enabled interns to gain practical work experience while 
earning the same wage as our full-time entry-level employees.”497 The workplace 
training contents, skills evaluation methods, and study program results are, however, 
not reported. Based on my interviews with 14 teachers and 38 student interns, I 
found that the interns at Foxconn worked alongside workers (including overtime and 
night shifts) in programs that range in length from three months to one year.498 
                                                      
492 It seems strange that young students would be seen as less susceptible to suicide. Asked about this, 
the manager told me: “If a student is found emotionally unstable or seriously ill, we can ask the 
responsible teacher to take back the student. In this way we avert the risk of suicide and monitor labor 
conditions with the assistance of teachers.” 
493 Foxconn Technology Group, 11 October 2010, “Foxconn is Committed to a Safe and Positive 
Working Environment.” http://regmedia.co.uk/2010/10/12/foxconn_media_statement.pdf  
494 Ross Perlin, 2012, Intern 2ation: How to Earn 2othing and Learn Little in the Brave 2ew 
Economy, London: Verso, p. 6. 
495 Foxconn Technology Group, 29 July 2011, “Foxconn Response to Business and Human Rights 
Resource Center: Report Alleging Abuses in Internship Program.” 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Search/SearchResults?SearchableText=foxconn&sort_on=publi
cation&batch_size=10&batch_start=12 
496 Foxconn Technology Group, 2012, “Foxconn Global Code of Conduct Policy.” 
http://ser.foxconn.com/GroupCocShow.do 
497 Foxconn’s 7-page statement dated 31 December 2013, p. 4. 
498 This estimate of the duration of Foxconn internship programs is based on my field research data. 
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Wearing the same uniforms and living in the same factory dormitories as regular 
workers, interning students at Foxconn were until recently hidden from public 
scrutiny. 
 
Teachers’ Roles 
 
All 14 teachers from eight different vocational schools I interviewed (including 
Sichuan Zhongjiang Vocational School) were keenly aware that the Foxconn 
program violates the concept of internships, which are mandated to “provide an 
integral part of students’ education and skills training,”499 and to “protect young 
students aged between 16 and 18 from overtime and night work.”500 The teachers, 
subject to school and local government pressure, accompanied students to the 
Foxconn factories and were responsible for supervising them in the worker 
dormitories and on the factory floor throughout their internship program.  
 
Foxconn houses all teachers and student interns in the same dormitory zone; the 
students say “it’s to keep a close eye on them,” even during the leisure hours.501 In 
this, schooling and work are integrated through the internship program, arguably in 
the service of the company, not the students or their education.502 
 
At Foxconn, the teacher-student ratio is maintained at 1: 50.503 In the eyes of interns, 
the teachers were “part of factory management.”504 The structure of deference or 
subordination to the authority of teachers is transposed to the workplace as teachers 
are assigned to monitor their own students in the factories. As a result, “student 
workers” are subject to double pressure of “two bosses,” teachers and managers.  
 
Wang Meiyi,505 16, had problems with her menstrual cycle during the internship. 
She recalled, “I used to have relatively regular menstrual periods, but this time my 
period was delayed until the first week in October. I was frightened. I had cramps so 
severe that I was covered with sweat on the line, where it’s air-conditioned.” In 
November and December, Meiyi’s irregularity and pain persisted. Her line leader 
                                                                                                                                                      
In company’s public statements, the length of internship is either unspecified, or vaguely described as 
short or long-term programs. 
499 Teacher interviewee 12. 
500 Teacher interviewee 2. 
501 Intern interviewees 17, 27, and 33. 
502 Su Yihui, 2011, “Student Workers in the Foxconn Empire: The Commodification of Education and 
Labor in China,” Journal of Workplace Rights 15(3-4), pp. 341-62. 
503 Manager interviewee 4; Teacher interviewees 3, 6, and 7. 
504 Intern interviewees 19, 20, and 31. 
505 Intern interviewee 15. 
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was a young man with whom she did not feel comfortable talking about “girl’s 
things.” She thought it might be related to night work and stress. “At school, we only 
have six classes a day, and I got good rest. But here at Foxconn it’s different: we 
don’t have breaks whenever we’re behind on the production targets. And it’s no use 
complaining to my teacher.” 
 
“My teacher will evaluate all aspects of the internship performance, including full 
attendance at work and obedience to management, which will be input into my 
educational grade. This is very stressful,” Meiyi told me. The teachers had access to 
student attendance records via the company intranet, which lists the students’ 
punch-in time at the start of the work shift, punch-in time after meals, punch-in time 
for overtime work, and punch-out time at the end of the shift. 506  In some 
circumstances, the teachers went so far as to check the student’s sick leave 
application and decide whether to approve it.507 
 
Foxconn management randomly assigns students and workers to dormitories and 
production lines, weakening their friendships and social ties. This seems to also 
weaken their ability to complain about their treatment in a collectivity. Teacher 
Cai508 told me of some students who were reluctant to go to work during the first 
week they arrived at the company. 
 
I asked my students to manage their emotions. Calm down. Think 
carefully if you want to leave — won’t your parents be disappointed? 
I visited my students in the dorm to see if they felt okay on Tuesday 
night. They answered “not too bad.” I met them again on Friday night. 
They said “fine.” They’ve gradually gotten used to the work rhythm. 
Finally I asked if they want to go. They replied “no.”  
 
To incorporate school teachers into its supervisory system for interns, Foxconn paid 
them 2,000 Yuan per month in the school calendar year of 2011-2012.509 The 
teachers accompanying their students signed attendance sheets at Foxconn offices. In 
addition to the teachers’ own paycheck from schools, the Foxconn salary is provided 
through the debit card system for normal work time from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. weekdays, 
although their monitoring duties during the entire internship period were 24/7. 
 
                                                      
506 Teacher interviewees 1, 10, and 11. 
507 Teacher interviewees 9 and 14. 
508 Teacher interviewee 13. 
509 Manager interviewee 3; Government official interviewee 2; Teacher interviewees 4, 5, and 8. 
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One vocational school proclaims its educational mission this way: “Unification of 
school and business, unification of theory and practice, unification of teacher and 
technician, and unification of student and employee.”510 From the experience of Li 
Wei,511 a 17-year-old student in auto mechanics from the Zhengzhou College of 
Traffic Technicians in Henan province, only the first goal was attained, that is, the 
combination of school and business through the “sale of students” under the guise of 
internship. In a very low tone, he explained how he and his classmates “were tricked 
into interning at Foxconn immediately after the first year exam.” 
 
Before we departed for the Foxconn plant, our teacher pledged that 
after the internship at Foxconn was completed, he’d make up any 
remaining specialized classes. In January 2011, we finally completed 
our internship and returned to school. After the Chinese New Year, in 
the new semester in February, the school started teaching a class on 
motors. But then in April, the school began to arrange internships at 
auto plants for graduates. The school had still not finished teaching our 
specialized courses. We have neither learned the basic skills of 
automotive repair, nor completed the core classes of our specialization. 
How are we going to work in auto companies? 
 
“A valuable seven months were completely wasted at Foxconn,” sighed Wei. In 2010, 
28,044 student interns like Wei, who were recruited from more than 200 schools 
throughout the country, were assigned to the iDPBG (integrated Digital Products 
Business Group) to assemble Apple products at Foxconn’s factories in Shenzhen. On 
3 December 2010, Foxconn iDPBG and Zhengzhou Human Resources and Social 
Security Department (Henan) convened the “win-win” closing ceremony of the 
Foxconn student internship program at the Shenzhen Guanlan facility, celebrating 
the “cooperation between school and company.”512   
 
With dozens of his fellow classmates, Wei mustered courage to talk to their teacher, 
but to no avail. “We sought out the senior school administrator who told us that we’d 
have to extend our studies by paying one more year’s fee for a higher diploma before 
studying the remaining specialized curriculum.” He continued:  
 
                                                      
510 Xuexiao qiye yitihua, lilun shijian yitihua, jiaoshi shifu yitihua, xuesheng yungong yitihua (學校
企業一體化，理論實踐一體化，教師師傅一體化，學生員工一體化). 
511 Intern interviewee 3. 
512 The Foxconn Bridgeworkers, 31 December 2010, “Hezuo, gongying” (Cooperation and Win-win) 
合作．共贏, Vol. 183, p. 23. 
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We’re depressed. We’ve paid for three years of tuition, but we haven’t 
completed professional training. The school violated the most basic 
agreement, contradicted the student recruitment brochure, arbitrarily 
changed the students’ curriculum, treated its students’ future like a 
plaything, and failed in its responsibility to students. We students 
didn’t attain sufficient knowledge in our education, and come time for 
employment, we’ll have no competitive advantage. 
 
Wei’s feeling of betrayal is strong. “All the fine words in the school catalogue have 
become empty words and broken promises,” he emphasized. 
 
Disappointment and frustration in workplace training is widely shared. Those who 
were studying electronics and mechanics — perhaps especially these students — had 
very different expectations from what they encountered on the Foxconn assembly line. 
Liu Siying,513 18, was intent on advancing her career goals. Coming from Sichuan’s 
Mianyang city, she told me how she became an intern at the Shenzhen Longhua 
factory in the 2011 fall semester. 
 
This is my final year in electronics and mechanical engineering. I 
really enjoy my studies and have been studying very hard. I even 
review coursework in the school library during summer vacation. My 
plan was to seek an internship at Huawei Technologies514 but our 
teacher persuaded my whole class of forty-two students to intern at 
Foxconn. He emphasized that Foxconn has a worldwide customer 
base including Huawei and that the company is investing billions in 
high-tech research. He stressed that we’d learn a lot through the 
internship. 
 
Virtually from day one, however, Siying was “tied to the printed circuit board line 
attaching components to the iPad back-casing.” In her words, it “requires no skills or 
prior knowledge.” Although there is no evidence that the internship program offered 
by Huawei Technologies would have been any better than that of Foxconn, she 
regretted her choice. “During the night shift, whenever I look out in that direction 
[pointing to the west], I see the big fluorescent sign of Huawei shining bright red, 
and at that moment I feel a pain in my heart.” 
                                                      
513 Intern interviewee 8. 
514 Huawei Technologies, an information and communications technology solutions provider, was 
founded in Shenzhen as a private-sector firm in 1988. 
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Student Interns’ Educational and Labor Rights 
 
China’s contemporary educational priorities, following the drive to expand and 
upgrade university education, presently emphasize the expansion of vocational 
training in the service of social and economic development. Student internship has 
become an indispensable component of this program. 515  Building on earlier 
industrial training and elementary schooling foundations, the government has 
expanded access to education with the goal of advancing the “four modernizations,” 
that is, agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology. Upon completing 
nine years of compulsory education, students can compete to continue their studies 
in general track high schools or enroll in vocational institutions. The admission age 
for standard three-year vocational education is often 14 to 15. The ten-year outline of 
China’s national plan for educational development projects an increase in vocational 
school enrollment from 21.8 million in 2009 to 23.5 million in 2020. A comparable 
decline in the number of students in high schools is planned.516  
 
At present more than 21 million full-time students are enrolled in vocational 
secondary schools (millions more enroll in vocational colleges at the higher level). 
While students in high schools are prepared for university entrance, those in 
vocational schools are trained for skilled work or higher vocational education. 
Vocational schools offer employment-oriented courses for first-year and second-year 
students. During their third year, when they are about 18 years old, students are to 
intern at enterprises that are directly relevant to their studies.517 But under the dual 
pressure from local government and school, I found that student interns were assigned 
to a one-size-fits-all Foxconn internship that involved factory work completely 
divorced from their studies and interests. Whereas the vocational law specifies that 
students should intern during the final year of studies,518 Foxconn not only recruits 
                                                      
515 Malgorzata Kuczera and Simon Field, 2010, “Learning for Jobs: OECD Reviews of Vocational 
Education and Training — Options for China,” OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development). http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/36/45486493.pdf 
516 Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2010, “Guojia Zhongchangqi 
Jiaoyu Gaige he Fazhan Guihua Gangyao (2010-2020),” [Outline of China’s National Plan for 
Medium and Long-Term Education Reform and Development (2010-2020)] 國家中長期教育改革和
發展規劃綱要 (2010-2020 年),” Table 1. http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-07/29/content_1667143.htm 
517 T. E. Woronov, 2011, “Learning to Serve: Urban Youth, Vocational Schools and New Class 
Formations in China,” The China Journal 66, pp. 77-99. 
518 The 2007 Regulations on the Management of Secondary Vocational School Student Internship, 
jointly issued by the Ministries of Education and Finance, govern the implementation of student 
internships under the framework of China’s Education Law (effective 1 September 1995), Vocational 
Education Law (effective 1 September 1996) and Labor Law (effective 1 January 1995). Ministries of 
Education and Finance of the People’s Republic of China, 2007, Zhongdeng Zhiye Xuexiao Xuesheng 
Shixi Guanli Banfa (Regulations on the Management of Secondary Vocational School Student 
Internship) 中等職業學校學生實習管理辦法.  
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students regardless of field of study, but also often much earlier than is legally allowed 
(that is, in their first and second years). In short, the rhythm is determined not by 
student educational priorities but by the demand for products dictated by Apple and 
other electronics giants. 
 
Foxconn uses the students as a cheap and flexible labor force, ignoring the training 
functions of internship programs, and the health and welfare of the youths. With 
reference to the 2007 Regulations on internship management (Article 5, “Interns 
shall not work more than eight hours a day”) and the 2010 Education Circular 
(Clause 4, “Interns shall not work overtime beyond the eight-hour workday”519), the 
common understanding is that the maximum eight-hour internship training should 
take place during daytime to ensure the interning students’ safety and physical and 
mental health. At work, in practice, Foxconn interns are subject to the same 
treatment as regular workers, including alternating day and night shifts monthly and 
extensive overtime, defying the letter and the spirit of the education law.  
 
Differences in the wage package are among the key factors that make interns highly 
attractive. Student interns are not working for free at Foxconn. They are paid, but as 
cheap labor. Unlike employees who may qualify for a skill subsidy of 400 
Yuan/month, interns are not entitled to skill assessment or wage increases throughout 
the entire internship, even though interns and entry-level workers in the Chengdu 
iPad factory had the same starting wage of 950 Yuan/month as of January 2011.520 
Moreover, interns are not eligible for productivity bonuses, quarterly prizes, or 
end-of-year bonuses, regardless of how well they do their jobs.521 Interns, unlike 
employees, enjoy none of the insurance protections provided by local government.  
 
Foxconn justifies the wage and benefit differentiation by the fact that students are 
legally defined as interns during the internship, that is, they are students, not laborers. 
Just a quick look at the math reveals that, for a total of 150,000 student interns 
working in various Foxconn factories during one month in the summer season, the 
savings from not providing them with social security alone is roughly 150,000 
                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.chinabaike.com/law/zy/bw/gw/jtb/1341463.html 
519 China’s Ministry of Education, 2010, “Guanyu Yingdui Qiye Jigonghuang Jinyibu Zuohao 
Zhongdeng Zhiye Xuexiao Xuesheng Shixi Gongzuo de Tongzhi” (The Circular on Further Improving 
the Work of Secondary Vocational School Student Internship Regarding Skilled Labor Shortage of 
Enterprises) 關於應對企業技工荒進一步做好中等職業學校學生實習工作的通知. 
http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/school/2010-03/25/c_1230849.htm 
520 The 2011 Foxconn (Chengdu) recruitment advertisement. 
521 Intern interviewees 23, 25, and 38. 
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persons x 100 Yuan522 = 15 million Yuan. While this is a simplified exercise, it 
conveys a good sense of employer savings; and this is for only one month’s 
insurance expenditure, while many interns work for a year.523 
 
Meals are not provided free; they are deducted from the interns’ monthly wage, 
based on what they have eaten.524 I met three student interns on a Sunday morning 
in early December 2011. Waiting at the bus stop, they were half an hour late for my 
appointment. “Sorry, we overslept.” One of the boys, Xiao Li,525 made a face that 
made me burst out laughing. I suggested having spicy hot pot in a nearby restaurant 
to wake us all up. The boys nodded and gave a big smile. “The food served in our 
factory canteen is very expensive. A bowl of noodles costs 8 Yuan. At school, it’s 
only five.” Nor does Foxconn provide free housing (a deduction of 150 Yuan per 
month in Shenzhen’s company dormitories), contrary to its claim.526 
 
Xiao Li said the only good thing is that “I don’t have to ask my parents to send me 
money.” The trio felt bored and exhausted at work, but still felt that they had to work 
overtime to earn enough money for a little personal enjoyment. Although they had 
learned little or nothing from their internships, they loved the new found freedoms of 
the fast-moving city. In Shenzhen, they dreamed of buying new cell phones, singing 
in karaoke bars, and having fun with new friends. None of the three interns had been 
able to save money, let alone send any back home.527  
 
Cheap and Disposable Student Labor 
 
Interns at Foxconn are not only low-cost, they are also disposable, deployed to 
seamlessly respond to corporate demands for rush orders. In the ramp-up for the 
iPhone 5 in September 2012, for example, students in Huai’an city in coastal Jiangsu 
                                                      
522 As economic conditions and statutory minimum wages vary substantially across China, I use the 
lower end of 100 Yuan/month per person for illustration. 
523 According to Foxconn’s self-reported or unverified data, in 2013, “short-term interns” were 
about 2 percent of the company’s workforce, that is, approximately 30,000 persons. In its 31 
December 2013 statement, Foxconn is silent about the number of its “long-term interns,” or 
the duration of their internships. 
524 This is same for all workers. Meals consumed in the factory canteens are deducted from the basic 
wage. 
525 Intern interviewee 23. 
526 The 2011 statement reads, “Foxconn provides a full package of compensation and benefits, 
including housing, meals, and medical coverage, throughout the period of the internships.” See 
Foxconn Technology Group, 29 July 2011, “Foxconn Response to Business and Human Rights 
Resource Center: Report Alleging Abuses in Internship Program.” 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Search/SearchResults?SearchableText=foxconn&sort_on=publi
cation&batch_size=10&batch_start=12 
527 Intern interviewees 23, 25 and 26. 
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province were made to work at Foxconn as interns on data-lines assembly, including 
overtime and night shifts.528  Unlike regular employees, interns can be laid off 
without any compensation or 30 days’ prior notice, which drives down costs and 
maximizes company flexibility to respond to the ebb and flow of orders. Last but not 
least, interns are barred from trade union membership and protection, as they are not 
legally defined as laborers. 
 
Some students told me that they phoned their parents after the first week to ask them 
to pressure the teachers and Foxconn managers to immediately “release the interns.” 
They rarely succeeded.529 On 1 November 2011, a conflict erupted between Han 
Chinese and Tibetan student interns in a production workshop at the Foxconn 
Chengdu factory. Nearly two dozen interns from a number of schools got into a 
fistfight during working hours. All were laid off, while some others, fearing 
retaliation, left on grounds of personal security. The mass incident sounded an alarm, 
so that a vice principal from the Pujiang Vocational School (in Pujiang County, 
southwestern Sichuan) arrived on the scene the next day to “look after his students,” 
recalled teacher Jiang.530 In fact, Foxconn demanded that “the school immediately 
take back the bad students.” 531  The dual control over the interning students 
exercised by school and enterprise became transparent in the course of the labor 
crisis, pulling aside the curtain on practices that had been presented as 
self-development and training. Breaking factory rules, the students resorted to 
violent means as the last resort to set themselves free. Despite student resistance, 
Foxconn has strengthened its relationship with schools, in collaboration with local 
governments, to secure student labor.  
 
The Alliance of Politics and Business in Student Internship 
 
Foxconn presses local governments and vocational schools to ensure an abundant 
supply of cheap student labor to cope with the seasonality of global production 
demand. On 12 June 2010, the Zhengzhou City Education Bureau (Henan) directed 
all vocational schools under its jurisdiction to dispatch students to Foxconn 
Shenzhen for employment and/or internships. This was a step taken to shorten the 
training time to prepare for the August opening of the iPhone manufacturing base in 
Zhengzhou. The government notification to all education units reads: 
                                                      
528 China Daily, 7 September 2012, “Students Made to Work at Foxconn as Interns.” 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-09/07/content_15741204.htm 
529 Intern interviewees 4, 6 and 7. 
530 Teacher interviewee 12. 
531 Manager interviewee 4. 
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To promote the city’s vocational education, accelerate the pace of 
educational development, deepen school-business cooperation, 
strengthen customized training, and promote industry, it has decided 
to launch an employment (internship) partnership with Foxconn 
Technology Group, and arrange for all vocational school students to 
work (intern) at Foxconn Shenzhen.532 
 
From this moment, student internships were transformed into a 
government-organized activity in the service of a private employer. 
 
In August 2010, just one month after signing the business contract, Foxconn’s 
iPhone production commenced in Zhengzhou, provincial capital of central China’s 
Henan. Provincial governor Guo Gengmao said, “Introducing labor-intensive 
industries is the best way to promote employment in Henan, a province with a 
surplus labor force of more than 22 million.”533  A company spokesperson of 
Foxconn Zhengzhou echoed the call and declared that “we will strive to make the 
[company] town peaceful and prosperous.”534 
 
Through direct deals with senior government leaders, Foxconn shifted hiring costs to 
provincial and lower governments, and outsourced recruitment to vocational schools 
backed by the state power. In the summer of 2010, the Henan provincial government 
established an inter-departmental committee to coordinate student recruitment at 
Foxconn: chaired by the provincial governor, and the heads of Education Department 
and Human Resources and Social Security Department served as vice-chairs. 
Government leaders delegated specific tasks to lower-level offices and set a goal of 
recruiting 20,000 people in two months (August to September 2010) for Foxconn. 
Each city government was assigned specific recruitment targets with quotas in each 
county and district subdivided down to villages, towns, and work units (see Table 
6.1). 
                                                      
532 Zhengzhou City Education Bureau (Henan), 12 June 2010, “Guanyu Dongyuan Zhongdeng Zhiye 
Xuexiao Xuesheng Dao Shenzhen Fushikang Keji Jituan Jiuye (Shixi) de Tongzhi” (Notification to 
Mobilize Secondary Vocational School Students for Employment (Internship) at Foxconn Shenzhen) 
關於動員中等職業學校學生到深圳富士康科技集團就業(實習)的通知. 
http://zhongkao.sace.cn/2010/0615/article_7820.html 
533 Quoted in Xinhua, 30 June 2010, “Foxconn’s Inland Moving a Win-win Solution.” 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-06/30/c_13377628.htm 
534 Quoted in Xinhua, 2 August 2010, “New Foxconn Factory in Central China Begins Production 
with Hope of Peace, Prosperity.” 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-08/02/c_13426617.htm  
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Table 6.1 Government Recruitment Assignment, 2010 
 
Prefecture-level city, 
county-level city and county 
Targets for 
August 2010 
(persons) 
Targets for 
September 2010 
(persons) 
Total 
(persons) 
1 Xinyang 1,000  1,000  2,000  
2 Zhoukou 940  940  1,880  
3 Luoyang 850  900  1,750  
4 Nanyang 850  850  1,700  
5 Shangqiu 850  850  1,700  
6 Zhumadian 850  850  1,700  
7 Puyang 750  700  1,450  
8 Xinxiang 680  680  1,360  
9 Anyang 650  650  1,300  
10 Pingdingshan 550  550  1,100  
11 Kaifeng 500  500  1,000  
12 Zhengzhou 200  200  400  
13 Hebi 200  200  400  
14 Jiaozuo 200  200  400  
15 Xuchang 200  200  400  
16 Luohe 200  200  400  
17 Sanmenxia 200  200  400  
18 Gushi County, Xinxiang 100  100  200  
19 Jiyuan 50  50  100  
20 Dengzhou City, Nanyang 50  50  100  
21 Yongcheng City, Shangqiu 50  50  100  
22 Xiangcheng City, Zhoukou 50  50  100  
23 Gongyi City, Zhengzhou 30  30  60  
 Total 10,000  10,000  20,000  
Note: The 20,000 new recruits include full-time students and non-student job seekers. 
Source: Henan Provincial Poverty Alleviation Office, 14 July 2010.535 
                                                      
535 Henan Provincial Poverty Alleviation Office, 14 July 2010, “Guanyu Fushikang Keji Jituan zai 
Wosheng Pikun Diqu Zhaopin Peixun Yuangong Gongzuo de Tongzhi” (Announcement Regarding 
Foxconn Technology Group Worker Recruitment and Training in Impoverished Areas). Printed Version, 
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The Henan provincial government subsidized the Foxconn recruitment project by 
paying recruiters as well as new workers (including student interns) with taxpayers’ 
money. Specifics of the preferential policies, administered jointly by the 
Departments of Finance and Human Resources and Social Security, include the 
following: 
 
1. Implement a policy of subsidies for job introductions at the standard rate of 200 
Yuan per person from the designated employment fund. 
2. Give every successful worker or intern a 600 Yuan employment or living subsidy 
from the designated employment fund. 
3. The provincial government should provide appropriate incentives to work units 
or schools that arrange for employment and/or internships at Foxconn, with 
expenses assumed by the provincial financial administration. 
 
Considering only the first and second items, for the targeted recruitment of 20,000 
persons, the government bill would be 16 million Yuan (20,000 persons x 800 
Yuan).536 Moreover, the Henan government gave monetary rewards to schools and 
labor agencies that fulfilled or exceeded recruitment targets.  
 
The Foxconn recruitment drive involved officials from the provincial government, 
and the recruitment directives were cross-posted online at the All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions website. The core message was that even if internships for 
final-year students had already been arranged in the fall semester of 2010, “the 
schools should redirect them to intern at Foxconn, to ensure that after Foxconn has 
started operations in Henan, when it fully engages in high-volume production, there 
will be an abundant and high quality workforce.”537 
 
In this mass mobilization, student interns and workers face foreign giants Apple and 
Foxconn that enjoy the full backing of the local state. With governments providing 
“special training funds”538  for schools that meet Foxconn labor quotas, the ties 
between government and the corporation are strong. In this way, Foxconn draws on 
                                                                                                                                                      
Appendix 1. 關於富士康科技集團在我省貧困地區招聘培訓員工工作的通知. 
536 Henan Provincial Poverty Alleviation Office, 14 July 2010, Section 4.  
537 Henan Provincial Education Department, 4 September 2010, “Guanyu Zuzhi Zhongdeng Zhiye 
Xuexiao Xuesheng fu Fushikang Keji Jituan Dinggang Shixi Youguan Shiyi de Jinji Tongzhi” 
(Emergency Announcement on Organizing Secondary Vocational School Students for Internships at 
Foxconn Technology Group) 關於組織中等職業學校學生赴富士康科技集團頂崗實習有關事宜
的緊急通知. http://acftu.people.com.cn/GB/197470/12932391.html 
538 Tebie peixun fei (特別培訓費). 
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government support to expand its industrial empire from the coast to central and 
western China at high speed.  
 
Describing a process similar to the top-down student labor mobilization pattern in 
Henan Province, in December 2011, Foxconn Chengdu human resources manager 
Zhu Xi,539 a 31-year-old college graduate with seven years of work experience in a 
small state-owned factory, explained:  
 
Over the past year, I’ve had monthly meetings with local government 
leaders responsible for the “Number One Project” [tailored for 
Foxconn Chengdu]. Indeed, the fulfillment of student internship 
targets has become a government priority. We’ve been discussing the 
detailed timetable and the scale of the Foxconn internship program, 
alongside the second-phase construction projects of factory 
dormitories. 
 
Manager Zhu, a calm, square-faced Sichuanese with a military flattop, joined the 
Chengdu iPad plant from its opening in October 2010 and has been chiefly responsible 
for liaising between government and schools.540 He coordinated with the officials of 
Chengdu City Education Bureau, who were responsible for compiling a list of 
participating vocational schools through which they were linked to the Foxconn 
internship program. He elaborated: 
 
From September 2011 to January 2012, two senior officials from the 
Chengdu City Education Bureau are assisting us to implement the 
school-business cooperative project. We eventually worked out a 
comprehensive action plan to line up dozens of vocational schools for 
some 7,000 student interns in this semester. They agreed to hold 
meetings with teachers who’re with us here to monitor the progress of 
student interns. We pay them on a monthly basis. We also pay the 
hundreds of teachers for their support to our internship program. 
 
Figure 6.1 shows that Foxconn draws up its plans for student labor recruitment, then 
top-level government officials lead work teams across different administrative levels 
(city, county, district, township and village) to meet the deadlines, with the full 
cooperation of vocational schools under their jurisdiction.  
                                                      
539 Manager interviewee 3. 
540 Government official interviewees 1, 2 and 5; Teacher interviewees 6 and 10. 
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Figure 6.1: Foxconn Internship through Government and School Mobilization 
 
Note: This is a simplified illustration to show the recruitment of student interns through the triple 
alliance of Foxconn, local governments, and vocational schools.  
Source: Field data collected in Pi County and Chengdu City, Sichuan (2011). 
 
My interviews with local officials in Chengdu 541  reveal that the higher-level 
government implemented a rigorous system of supervision, through the collaboration 
with various departments that focuses on timely completion of labor recruitment 
assignments for Foxconn (including workers and interns): 
 
1. The Human Resources and Social Security Department makes recruitment a top 
priority. 
2. The Education Department arranges school-business cooperation, ensures that 
the number of graduates and interns meets the assigned goal, and that they are 
transported on schedule and properly supervised by teachers.  
3. The Finance Department ensures that recruitment is adequately funded.  
                                                      
541 Government official interviewees 1, 2, 4 and 5. 
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4. The Public Security Department completes work on job applicants’ background 
investigations. 
5. The Transportation Department assures appropriate transport capacity and safety.  
6. The Health Department provides pre-employment physical examinations.  
7. Other relevant departments ensure that recruitment work progresses smoothly. 
 
In fact, the municipal government has developed special inspections for any county 
or district which “does not complete 50 percent of monthly tasks, or fails to complete 
human resources assignments for two consecutive months.”542 In Pitong Town, a 
government official Mrs. Zheng told me that “we were tasked by the upper level 
governments to eliminate negative social attitudes toward Foxconn after the [2010] 
suicide wave.”543 The government team deploys the internet, radio, television, 
posters, blogposts, leaflets, telephone calls, door-to-door visits and the mail to 
“publicize Foxconn’s culture, and guide recruitment targets in the correct thinking 
and understanding.” The main contents are “Foxconn’s growth and development, its 
economic and technological strength, and its expansion prospects.” The goal is to 
saturate villages and towns and districts, communities, and schools with propaganda, 
to assure that Foxconn achieves the status of a household name.544 
 
Sichuan provincial and lower level governments directed vocational school students 
under their jurisdiction to perform “internships” at labor-hungry Foxconn Chengdu 
factory complex. iPad student workers, in their first-person experience, reported 
suffering eye pains, headache, stomachache, weight loss, poor appetite and muscle 
stiffness.545 Teenage female students expressed their fears: “When we work, night 
and day shifts rotate every month, which leads to an endocrine imbalance, and 
menstrual cycles are often irregular.”546 Obviously overtime work at high labor 
intensity was driven by strong global demand for iPads. The interns have become a 
huge source of precarious labor in China’s industries. 
                                                      
542 The People’s Government of Guangyuan (Sichuan), 25 January 2011, “Changwu fushizhang Zhao 
Yong: Zai quanshi Fushikang Chengdu xiangmu renli ziyuan zhaomu gongzuo huiyi shang de 
jianghua” (Foxconn Chengdu Project Human Resources Recruitment Conference: Speech by Zhao 
Yong, Deputy Mayor of Guangyan City) (常務副市長趙勇︰在全市富士康成都項目人力資源招募
工作會議上的講話). http://www.cngy.gov.cn/ht/2011/8/116560.html 
543 Government official interviewee 5. 
544 The People’s Government of Guangyuan (Sichuan), 25 January 2011, “Shi Laodong he Shehui 
Baozhang Ju juzhang Li Zaiyang: Zai quanshi Fushikang Chengdu xiangmu renli ziyuan zhaomu 
gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua” (Foxconn Chengdu Project Human Resources Recruitment 
Conference: Presentation by Li Zaiyang, Guangyuan Labor and Social Security Bureau Chief) (市勞
動和社會保障局局長李在揚︰在全市富士康成都項目人力資源招募工作會議上的發言) . 
http://www.cngy.gov.cn/ht/2011/8/116560.html 
545 Intern interviewees 19, 25, 28, 29, 32 and 33. 
546 Intern interviewees 4, 7, 15, 30 and 31. 
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At Age 14: The Youngest Interns 
 
The hidden issue of child labor was made public when an intern, born in December 
1997, approached the state-run “Voice of China” radio program547 to call for help. In 
October 2012, “we assemble video gamepads on the line, work overtime and do the 
same as adults. We’re exhausted. We punch in at 7:40 p.m., and only when the work 
is actually finished do we get off our shift,” the student reported. The 14-year-old 
interns were racing against time to meet the precise production targets of Nintendo’s 
Wii U consoles at Foxconn Yantai in coastal Shandong province, which were to be 
launched in November for the Christmas markets. 
 
The local government officials of the Yantai Economic and Technological 
Development Zone had been coordinating with vocational schools to fill a large 
quota of 19,000 laborers at Foxconn Yantai since the summer of 2012. Foxconn 
urgently needed students and workers to run 32 newly installed production lines. In 
September, at the beginning of a new school semester, the company recruited 
thousands of student interns, 56 of them below the legal minimum of 16 years of age, 
to meet the production needs at its 80,000-strong Yantai plant. By 16 October, the 
interns “had worked in the Yantai factory for approximately three weeks,” according 
to the Foxconn public statement, made in response to media pressure to acknowledge 
the fact that it was using child laborers.548 
 
Foxconn apologized to the students’ parents and sent the interns in question back to 
school to quell public anger. It was also a response made to keep its business 
relationships with major Japanese clients. A week following the child labor scandal, 
on 23 October, Nintendo released a statement saying: “Nintendo was concerned to 
learn that underage individuals had been working at a Foxconn facility in China 
where components for some Nintendo products are produced.”549 But Nintendo did 
not review its ordering practices and the consequences for the workforce at its 
supplier. 
 
                                                      
547 China National Radio (中國人民廣播電台)’s “The Voice of China” (中國之聲) broadcasts main 
news and commentaries 24 hours a day.  
548 Quoted in Reuters, 16 October 2012, “Foxconn Says Underage Workers Used in China Plant.” 
http://wtaq.com/news/articles/2012/oct/16/apple-manufacturer-foxconn-says-underage-workers-used-i
n-china/ 
549 Quoted in Richard George, 23 October 212, “iPhone, Wii U Manufacturer Admits to Employing 
Children: Foxconn Violates Chinese Employment Laws,” IG2. 
http://uk.ign.com/articles/2012/10/18/iphone-wii-u-manufacturer-admits-to-employing-children  
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One year later, in October 2013, more than 1,000 student interns were recruited to 
pack Sony PlayStation 4 game-consoles on night shifts at the same Yantai plant, 
again violating Chinese internship regulations. Under public pressure, Foxconn said 
in a public statement, “Immediate actions have been taken to bring the campus 
[Foxconn Yantai] into full compliance with our code and policies...no night shifts for 
student interns, even though such work is voluntary.”550 Sony reiterated its supplier 
code of conduct, while failing to investigate how its own production requirements 
were putting pressure directly onto frontline workers at Foxconn.551 Global brands’ 
concerns with supplier labor standards apparently become an issue only when 
embarrassing revelations force them to express concerns. 
 
Forced Student Labor 
 
Following public pressure, in 2012 and 2013, Apple commissioned the Fair Labor 
Association to oversee the employment of student interns, among other labor 
practices, at major suppliers.552 The external assessors believed that “Foxconn will 
build upon its existing internship program to ensure that interns enjoy the protections 
necessary for a productive, healthy and safe educational experience.”553 In its 2012 
remedial action plan, Foxconn agreed that first, student interns were not required to 
work overtime; second, their job was connected to their field of study; third, they 
were free to terminate the internship whenever appropriate.554 
 
In January 2013, facing new media criticism, Apple was compelled to reiterate its 
standards for suppliers’ hiring of students: “Student working hours must comply with 
legal restrictions...We’ve begun to partner with industry consultants to help our 
suppliers improve their policies, procedures, and management of internship 
programs to go beyond what the law requires.555 In a follow-up assemssment, the 
                                                      
550 Quoted in Adam Pasick, 10 October 2013, “Your Playstation 4 May be Built by Chinese Students 
in the Worst Internship Ever,” Quartz. 
http://qz.com/133950/your-playstation-4-may-be-built-by-chinese-students-in-the-worst-internship-ev
er/  
551 Sony spokesman Dan Race said, “Sony expects its suppliers, including Foxconn, to fully 
comprehend and comply with our Supplier Code of Conduct.” Quoted in Massoud Hayoun, 10 
October 2013, “Chinese Students Pressured to Produce PlayStation 4: Reports,” Al Jazeera America. 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/10/chinese-studentsforcedtomanufactureplaystation4rep
ort.html 
552 Apple, 2013, “Apple Supplier Responsibility: 2013 Progress Report,” pp. 6 and 8. 
http://images.apple.com/supplier-responsibility/pdf/Apple_SR_2013_Progress_Report.pdf 
553 Fair Labor Association, March 2012, “Foxconn Investigative Report,” Appendix 5. 
http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/appendix_5_internships.pdf 
554 Fair Labor Association, August 2012, “Foxconn Verification Status Report,” p. 3. 
http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/foxconn_verification_report_final.pdf 
555 Apple, 2013, “Apple Supplier Responsibility: 2013 Progress Report,” p. 19. 
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Fair Labor Association team issued a positive report stating that they “found no 
interns had been engaged at [Foxconn] Chengdu since September 2011” (my 
emphasis).556 In effect, the assessors cleared Apple of any allegations of student 
labor exploitation at its iPad supplier factory. I have clear evidence to the contrary. 
Foxconn Chengdu human resources manager Zhu Xi informed me that “from 
September 2011 to January 2012, more than 7,000 student interns from within the 
province — approximately 10 percent of the labor force at the factory — were 
interning in Foxconn Chengdu.”557 One of the participating schools was Pujiang 
Vocational School, which sent 162 students on 22 September 2011 to undertake “a 
three-month internship.”558 Large schools such as Pengzhou Technical School had 
up to 309 students, accompanied by six teachers, to take part in the Foxconn 
Chengdu internship program beginning in the September 2011 semester, subject to 
extension in accordance with iPad production needs.559 
 
Apple and its partner Fair Labor Association have failed to curb flagrant corporate 
abuses. The interns told me that they “risked not being able to graduate” if they 
refused to do internships at Foxconn.560 Instead of admitting its complicity with 
Foxconn over “unfree” student labor use, in February 2014, Apple pointed an 
accusing finger at vocational schools and teachers: “Schools often fail to perform the 
necessary due diligence to match students with appropriate internship opportunities 
or provide them with adequate support.”561 Scott Rozelle, co-director of the Rural 
Education Action Program at Stanford University, has been collaborating with Apple 
since 2013 to implement a monitoring and evaluation program of student internships 
in Apple’s China suppliers, while the findings are not yet publicly available.562 
Interns seem to have become a captive part of a new industrial working class. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The partnership between vocational schools and Foxconn (as well as other 
                                                                                                                                                      
http://images.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdf/Apple_SR_2013_Progress_Report.pdf 
556 Fair Labor Association, May 2013, “Second Foxconn Verification Status Report,” p. 5. 
http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/second_foxconn_verification_status_rep
ort_0.pdf#overlay-context= 
557 Manager interviewee 3. 
558 Teacher interviewee 12.  
559 Teacher interviewees 13 and 14. 
560 Intern interviewees 5, 9, 10, 24 and 38. 
561 Apple, 2014, “Apple Supplier Responsibility: 2014 Progress Report,” p. 13. 
http://images.apple.com/supplier-responsibility/pdf/Apple_SR_2014_Progress_Report.pdf 
562 Rural Education Action Program (REAP), Stanford University, 13 February 2014, “Apple and 
REAP Partnering to Protect Student Workers in China from Exploitation.” 
http://reap.stanford.edu/news/apple_and_reap_partnering_to_protect_student_workers_in_china_from
_exploitation_20140213/   
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electronics companies563), in the name of student internship and on-the-job training, 
is not one-off. At Foxconn, managerial responsibilities to assure student acquisition 
of skills and knowledge are hallowed out. Among the consequences of the massive 
employment of interns is the dragging down of wages and benefits of regular 
employees by providing a reliable supply of cheap internship labor, thus furthering 
the erosion of economic rights and job quality. 
 
Ross Perlin in his book on American and European internship practices, Intern 
2ation, comments, “The very significance of the word intern lies in its 
ambiguity…unpaid internships, once rolling, tended to crowd the paid ones off the 
road.”564 The incorporation of students in the workplace through abusive practices 
in the guise of internships has inevitably generated pent-up grievances and anger 
over unfair treatment, and conflicts have erupted periodically, such as the fistfight 
among the student workers. Facing a situation of multiplying grievances, employers 
manipulate and reinforce internal divisions among workers along differential 
employment status (workers/interns), educational and skill levels, and so on.565 
Social injustice is deepened when young, vulnerable student interns are forced to 
work. 
 
Image-conscious companies such as Apple, Nintendo, and Sony have pledged that 
they would ensure their suppliers to comply with international and national labor 
standards. The critical reality, however, is the corporate search for ever cheaper and 
more pliable labor in the global market. Production, distribution, and consumption 
must continue in perpetuity if profits are to be made and capital accumulated. At the 
same time, labor and educational laws regarding student internships are flexibly bent 
to facilitate corporate growth. In China’s rise along the global value chain, the 
extensive use of student labor is underwritten by local governments and schools. As 
a result, student workers’ fundamental rights are sacrificed at the corporate altar in 
transnational production.  
                                                      
563 My interviewed teachers admitted that they had also arranged internships at smaller electronics 
factories in Wistron (a spun-off manufacturing arm of Taiwanese-owned Acer) and Compal 
Electronics (a Taiwanese-owned laptop and electronic equipments maker), without reference to 
students’ interests and areas of expertise. 
564 Ross Perlin, 2012, Intern 2ation: How to Earn 2othing and Learn Little in the Brave 2ew 
Economy, London: Verso, pp. 23, 28. 
565 Besides electronics, researchers found that “student apprentices” or “trainees,” along regular 
workers, were widely used in auto factories. See for example, Lu Zhang, 2008, “Lean Production and 
Labor Controls in the Chinese Automobile Industry in an Age of Globalization,” International Labor 
and Working-Class History 73 (Spring), pp. 24–44. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Living in the City 
 
“Birds, don’t be silly, no one cares whether you’re tired from flying, 
people only care how high you fly!” 
— Ou Yang, 19, a female Foxconn worker566 
 
Consumers across the globe face a dizzying array of choices in the latest electronics 
gadgets. China’s teenage workers who produce these goods are just as eager to buy 
them as Western consumers. Ou Yang, a 19-year-old Foxconn worker, talked about 
her future. “Someday,” she mused, “I want to drive a brand new Honda and return 
home in style!” For the time being, she dreamed of buying an iPhone, and she would 
work as hard as necessary to do so.  
 
Yang was born in a “traditional village” in Hekou Town, Dawu County, Hubei. The 
most important event for every household was the birth of a son. After giving birth to 
a son, a family could hold its heads high; those who did not have a son were mocked 
or even bullied. When Yang’s mother was pregnant yet again, the entire family was 
brimming with expectations. But alas…another girl! Her father was so disappointed 
he sulked all day. Her grandmother, anxiously awaiting a grandson to embrace, 
refused to give a name to the new child. Later, the family’s hopes were shattered as 
Yang’s mother gave birth to two more baby girls in desperately trying to produce a 
male heir.  
 
“When mother was young she was very beautiful, which is why my father married 
her. Not long after they married, father always listened to her. But after she gave 
birth to four girls in a row, mother no longer had status in the family. So then he took 
control of the family, and in our household my father’s word is final. Now he treats 
mother badly, even beating her.” 
 
To neighbors and family members, Yang’s mother had become a woman to be 
bullied or pitied. From the time Yang was young, sensing her mother’s pain, she felt 
a special love for her. When others, even her elders, criticized her mother for no 
reason, Yang boldly stood up in her defense, raising her spirits and attempting to beat 
back the attacks and protect her. This earned her a nasty reputation for being badly 
                                                      
566 My thankfulness to the University Research Group’s interview with Foxconn woman worker Ou 
Yang (not her real name). Here I open the chapter by mainly reporting her story, with additional data 
drawn from my own interviews. 
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brought up.  
 
Yang cultivated a strong, rebellious personality. She said: “I want the whole village 
to know, the girls in our family are extraordinary!” She wanted to seem different, not 
like other girls. Her desire for independence and freedom fused in her dream to own 
an iPhone. Working for Foxconn seemed one step closer to making her dream a 
reality. 
 
Aspiring for a ew Life 
 
This new generation of rural migrants is profoundly aspirational and it is this that 
makes the reality of work on the assembly line at Foxconn and other factories so 
challenging, and so frustrating. After graduating from middle school in her 
hometown, Yang hoped to enter a vocational school in Wuhan, the provincial capital 
of Hubei, to study photography, but her parents refused. Money was tight. At that 
time, her father had a business selling building materials, but he did not earn much. 
Having three sisters in school at the same time seemed too great a burden. Whenever 
Yang thought about asking her parents for money, she felt ashamed. “I felt as if I was 
one of my parents’ debts.” 
 
In a fit of anger, Yang left home to work, determined to become independent. With 
her still childish face and a bookbag on her back, Yang showed up at a garment 
factory in Shanghai where her cousin worked. Taking on an apprenticeship, she 
received only 400 Yuan per month as living expenses for the first three months. It 
was the summer of 2008. 
 
Yang worked in the small garment factory for a year, “each day consisting of one 
assembly line and three points — dormitory, factory and cafeteria — life was pure 
and simple.” Finally one day, she grew weary. In this kind of life, “aside from the 
weather changing outside the window, nothing changes,” she thought.  
 
But as if a restless spirit had crept into her body, Yang began to look forward to 
changing her life. She left the garment factory and went to work at Foxconn. In this, 
Yang was fairly typical of the other young people I met.  
 
Most workers interviewed told me of their efforts to improve their incomes and skills 
by moving between jobs. Others took up part-time jobs. Yang had joined a “Perfect 
Beauty” direct sales training course, through the introduction of someone she 
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affectionately called “big sister,” hoping to earn more money by selling cosmetics.567 
She asked rhetorically, “Why should I aspire to have less than others? I like to go 
shopping, I like to wear make up…My relationship with my line manager is good 
because I often treat him to meals. When the other workers on the factory line have 
to do a lot of overtime, I can take off and run my own business.” 
 
Yang was dressed more fashionably than most other workers, wearing a dropped 
waist, knee-length skirt. She had the air of a mature and experienced young woman 
who knew how to make friends and how to protect herself from hardship. In the 
future, Yang plans to return to Wuhan to settle, thinking above all of helping her 
mother. “We can get up at 6 every morning hand in hand and walk in the park, come 
back at 7 or 8 and have breakfast, then sit on rocking chairs holding a fan, 
chitchatting, at night eat some watermelons, watch some television. Mother said that 
if she is able to live like this for just a while she will be satisfied. She has had only 
two hopes in life, one is to live a life of ease like this; the other is to visit Tiananmen 
Square in Beijing to see the flag raising ceremony. I don’t think it’s hard! I can help 
her make it happen.” 
 
Production and consumption are intertwined in the lives of young working people.568 
Yang and her peers aim to provide a comfortable home and a better future for their 
parents and loved ones. This chapter looks into the social and living conditions of 
workers, including married couples, in typical factory towns in today’s urban China. 
 
Living in the Dormitory 
 
The factory dormitory complex incorporates a massive internal migrant labor force 
without the support of family networks. 569  Foxconn houses its employees in 
dormitories at or close to the factory, in which the workplace and living space are 
compressed to facilitate high-speed production. In recent years, Foxconn is not only 
facing challenges from workers for better pay and benefits. It also has to work out 
where its workers should live — its more than one million workers are primarily 
new migrants to the urban areas where they work.  
 
                                                      
567 Yang’s co-workers also joined another direct sales company Mary Kay, Inc. as part-time “beauty 
consultants” because “earnings at Foxconn are too small.” Worker interviewees 6, 9 and 11. 
568 Cara Wallis, 2013, Technomobility in China: Young Migrant Women and Mobile Phones, New 
York: New York University Press. 
569 Stefan Al, ed., 2012, Factory Towns of South China: An Illustrated Guidebook, Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press. 
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A Foxconn dorm room houses six to 12 workers in double-bunk beds. ight-shift workers sleep 
during the day, while day-shift workers are at work. Photo credit: Eric Tsang. 
 
From the interviewed workers’ perspective, the dormitories provide inexpensive 
housing close to their employment.570 In Shenzhen, as the workforce began to 
expand rapidly in the 1990s through the early 2000s, Foxconn’s planned housing 
facilities within the gated Longhua factory were unable to cope with the rising need. 
In 2006, Foxconn bought an entire block of four-story factory buildings in the 
                                                      
570 Worker interviewees 13, 15 and 19. 
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adjacent industrial park and filled them with bunk beds, accommodating as many as 
two hundred people on a single floor. The toilets and shower rooms were “a big 
mess,” a worker recalled.571 Group fighting, thefts, and other personal security 
problems arose in this pressure-cooker atmosphere, and they constantly drew the 
attention of company security officers, but most of the cases went unresolved. 
Foxconn began to negotiate with local government officials to seek other solutions to 
the overcrowded conditions. “In just six months, the Guanlan factory completed 
construction and opened in July 2007, providing high-rise dormitories to meet 
corporate growth,” another worker reported.572 
 
Newly built dormitories have better facilities than the older ones, and are equipped 
with shared television rooms and cafeterias. Nevertheless, the basic conditions 
remain unchanged: a Foxconn dormitory room typically houses six to 12 workers. 
The company practice of rotating day and night shifts not only affects workers’ rest 
but also hinders their ability to make friends and set up networks of social support. 
With dormitory roommates assigned to different departments and often working 
different shifts, it is difficult to rest or to socialize. When speaking of her roommates, 
Tian Yu recalled, “We were not close.”573 She showed me the management record of 
her dormitory as follow: 
 
 Staff o. Business 
Groups* 
Production 
Departments# 
Dormitory 
Registration 
1. F9341932 NWInG FKD 29 January 2010 
2. F9450222 SHZBG Mac BU (II) 18 March 2010 
3. F9422526 CMMSG AP (V) 10 March 2010 
4. F9447733 CCPBG TAMG TEAM 27 July 2009 
5. F9425127 CMMSG IPPD LX (I) 10 March 2010 
6. F9347140 
(Tian Yu) 
iDPBG DSPG DSD LCM 8 February 2010 
7. F9341960 NWInG FKD 29 January 2010 
8. F9295026 PCEBG ABD (II) 21 December 2009 
* NWInG (Net-Work Inter-Connection Business Group);  
SHZBG (Super Hong Zhun, also known as Super Precision Mechanical Business Group);  
CMMSG (Component Module Move Service Group);  
CCPBG (Consumer and Computer Products Business Group);  
iDPBG (integrated Digital Product Business Group);  
PCEBG (Personal Computing Electronics Business Group). 
# Workers receive no explanation of the English acronyms of production departments. 
                                                      
571 Worker interviewee 8. 
572 Worker interviewee 5. 
573 Worker interviewee 1. 
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Yu’s roommates all came from other provinces and their jobs were in seven different 
production departments (out of the eight departments in the above list). Random 
dormitory reassignments break up friendships and localistic networks. Although 
eight girls were housed in the same room, Yu said, “We were strangers to each other. 
Some of us had just moved in as others moved out. None of the roommates was from 
Hubei.” Yu’s father explained the significance of this: “When she first came to 
Shenzhen, sometimes when others spoke, she couldn’t understand much.”  
 
Dormitory Rules 
 
Living in the Foxconn dormitories, even the workers’ leisure time is tightly 
monitored. The concept is one of total control — not only are workers barred from 
cooking (in the name of fire safety), washing clothes (to save water and energy 
through the factory cleaning service), and subject to a curfew, but even visits by 
family members are heavily restricted. The main aim is to integrate labor and living 
arrangements into a seamless whole of service to the company. The company 
dormitory system is cost-efficient, ensuring workers spend their off-hours preparing 
for the next shift.574 
 
The same set of rules applies in all Foxconn dormitories regardless of location. 
Every Foxconn worker is required to swipe the electronics staff card and to wait for 
the green light before walking up the staircase. Security officers monitor the 
dormitory gate around the clock and in some cases they inspect every floor. Male 
and female workers are forbidden to visit one another’s rooms. Sex is forbidden. 
(Foxconn is silent about homosexual activities). Managers talk about the importance 
of morality, co-operation and obedience — all are essential to maintaining the 
discipline of the workforce. 
 
                                                      
574 Daniel You-Ren Yang, 2013, “A Tale of Foxconn City: Urban Village, Migrant Workers and 
Alienated Urbanism,” Rural Migrants in Urban China: Enclaves and Transient Urbanism, edited by 
Fulong Wu, Fangzhu Zhang and Chris Webster, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 147-63. 
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Foxconn dormitory management rules. For example: “It is strictly prohibited to use 
high-powered electrical appliances (200W or higher); “It is strictly prohibited to bring outsiders 
in or put up outsiders as guests (including workers who are not from this dormitory); “It is 
strictly forbidden for male and female workers to drop in on one another.” Photo credit: Jenny 
Chan. 
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Chen Ximei575 lives in the Foxconn Youfu Dormitory in Shenzhen, sharing a room 
with eleven other girls. She is hoping to move out soon. “The factory dormitory is 
not my home; this is only temporary… In my home town, the Maling River Gorge is 
a famous tourist spot,” situated six kilometers from Xinyi Town in southwest 
Guizhou province. “Now when I close my eyes, I’m listening to the melody of the 
waterfall. It’s so beautiful.”  
 
Ximei is not married and is in the enviable position of being able to spend what she 
earns without having to provide financial support to her parents. She was excited to 
learn that Foxconn “is bidding for a big contract to produce Apple iTVs 
[internet-connected televisions]” as she loves movies and TV dramas, downloadable 
to her cell phone at discounted membership fees. She likes Shenzhen, even though 
the working hours at Foxconn “are very long and wages really not as high as people 
think.” She adds, “the dorm conditions are also not good… there’s not much 
freedom.” She hopes to save enough to open a boutique or beauty shop in the city 
before marrying. Foxconn pays on the 12th every month. On payday, “cash from the 
ATMs in our neighborhood will be withdrawn, and restaurants and shopping malls 
will be flooded with Foxconn people,” she cheerfully describes. 
 
City Life 
 
With housing values soaring in cities and large towns, the dream of owning an 
apartment is a pipedream for low-wage workers. In July 2012, 
government-subsidized housing prices at a sub-district in Shenzhen were between 
6,400 and 7,900 Yuan per square meter, but just 2,888 units were provided for needy 
individuals or families.576 In the private market, in Qinghu Village (near Foxconn 
Longhua’s North Gate), the selling price for an “economical apartment” was between 
10,000 and 12,000 Yuan per square meter. In view of average Foxconn worker’s 
income of around 2,000-2,500 Yuan per month (including overtime premiums) in 
2013, most of them would never be able to afford to buy flats in the city where 
apartment prices have been rising. 
 
New construction projects for luxurious residential apartments and international 
hotels have been approved one after another, transforming the urban landscape 
overnight. With the opening of the 20-kilometer Shenzhen Longhua Metro Line in 
June 2011, the transportation network was extended from the Futian checkpoint on 
                                                      
575 Worker interviewee 42. 
576 Shenzhen Government, 25 July 2012, “Low-Income Housing Project to Start Sales.” 
http://english.sz.gov.cn/ln/201207/t20120725_1953503.htm  
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the Hong Kong border to the redeveloped Longhua New Town, reaching Foxconn’s 
flagship factory complex. In metropolitan cities such as Shenzhen, cost of living has 
risen steadily. Food, housing, transportation, education, medical care and other social 
services have all become commodities in the market economy. Without a long-term 
public housing policy to subsidize or provide housing for low-income people, the 
majority of workers have little choice besides factory dormitories. But some do 
manage to find alternatives. 
 
 
Disco, boutiques, supermarkets and branded stores targeting young consumers are among the 
popular places frequented by workers living in the Foxconn Youfu dormitory zone, Shenzhen. 
Photo credit: Jenny Chan. 
 
Housing in Shenzhen accounts for a large share of monthly expenditures for 
Foxconn workers who choose to live on their own. In 2012, the monthly rent for one 
room in an industrial town ranged from 350 to 550 Yuan, approximately three to four 
times the standard Foxconn dormitory rate. Bathrooms are shared by residents of the 
same floor in the least expensive rooms. Inexpensive rooms have no windows. But a 
worker remarked, “Some have a narrow window set very high, near the ceiling, 
which overlooks nothing but at least is a link to the outside world, the noise of the 
road, sunlight and wind.” 577  Some complexes are infested with rats and 
cockroaches.  
                                                      
577 Worker interviewee 28. 
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For a two-room unit, the monthly rent at Wayaopai Village near the West Gate of 
Foxconn Longhua ranged between 750 and 950 Yuan, depending on the size of the 
rooms and provision of basic facilities, such as a television set and a water heater for 
hot showers. Utilities and property management fees vary widely. A 24-year-old 
woman worker578 who shared a unit with her partner, explained: “The price has been 
soaring, up twenty percent from last year. Our landlord mistakenly believed that 
Foxconn had raised our wages to two thousand yuan per month! It’s not true. Far 
from it!” She added, “They don’t realize that it’s only after we work overtime that 
we have a bit more money to pay the rent. Over these past two years, our earnings 
have been eaten up by the landlords and shop owners.” 
 
Among my interviewees, the Liang family is better off than most other junior 
workers. Liang Zejun579  has been working at Foxconn Longhua as an office 
assistant since 2005. Her college-graduate husband is an engineer in the company. As 
of October 2011, their combined monthly income was nearly 8,000 Yuan, more than 
four times that of an entry-level worker. After giving birth in 2007, Zejun left her son 
at her Hunan hometown when he was only two months old. “I had to rush back to 
work after maternity leave. There was no alternative.” Eventually, Zejun convinced 
her mother-in-law to bring the baby to Shenzhen. “We understand that separation is 
not good for our son’s development. Last year we only got to see him once during 
the Spring Festival. So we decided to make a change. It took a while for my 
mother-in-law to adapt to the hectic city life. She’s in her late fifties; it’s really not 
easy,” she explained. The Liangs, however, could arrange family affairs in ways not 
available to most workers, who earn a fraction of their income. The three generations 
reunited in Shenzhen; a happy family photo is framed in the center of their living 
room. 
 
Zejun was pregnant again in the summer of 2010. As she and her husband are both 
only children born in the early 1980s, they are eligible to have a second child. When 
I arrived at their home one evening, Zejun was carrying her six-month-old baby 
daughter, while the grandmother was taking care of the five-year-old boy. Mr. Liang 
cooked for us. He said, “We’re pleased to have one son and one daughter. We want 
to give our children a really fun childhood with lots of company from their friends.” 
The boy is now in a kindergarten in the residential community. 
 
“The private kindergarten on the street corner has one hundred and fifty children; all 
                                                      
578 Worker interviewee 15. 
579 Worker interviewee 35. 
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are children of migrant workers. It is a migrant kindergarten. This autumn semester, 
the tuition fees total 5,000 Yuan. There is a cheaper one, but it’s quite far away. 
Travelling costs and travel time are additional costs,” Zejun explained.  
 
In the long run, the Liangs plan to save money to buy a flat in a town in Changsha, 
the provincial capital of Hunan, where their household registration is and where their 
children will be eligible to attend public high schools and universities. While they 
express concern about raising young children and their future, many others are 
struggling to make ends meet under much less favorable conditions.  
 
Cui Yuanyuan,580 20, started working in Foxconn Longhua as an assembly-line 
worker in 2009. Soon after she got married, Yuanyuan gave birth to a baby daughter 
in her home village in Jiangxi province. “I left my parents and my daughter when she 
was only one month old. It’s very hard,” Yuanyuan told me. On a Sunday morning I 
visited the family in their 30-square-meter rental room. Yuanyuan was humming a 
local pop song and knitting a colorful dress for her baby. Yu Xiatian, 26, a strong tall 
man in a black v-neck sweatshirt, was self-employed. He disliked working for the 
boss at Foxconn and resigned in March 2011. “You feel like you are losing all your 
freedom on the line. Day after day, my hope for a better life seemed to get further 
away.”  
 
Later, Xiatian rented a van and began selling bananas. “I work seven days a week. I 
buy bananas directly from farmers at half-past five in the morning. Then I drive to 
the main footbridge opposite Foxconn Longhua Zone D, where workers pass through 
the electronics factory gate to and from work. Several dozen hawkers sell oranges 
and other kinds of fruit at these hot spots.” Xiatian’s voice rose as he talked about a 
good sale that morning. 
 
“If city management officials don’t show up to demand licenses or to extort money, 
it’s great. I sell cheap and in large quantities.” Xiatian is now exploring different 
markets, selling bananas at Foxconn’s offsite dormitory areas, targeting workers as 
his main customers and providing bananas to nearby shops. Time and again, however, 
four- to five-member gangs attacked Xiatian and other hawkers, demanding 
“protection fees.” He told me, “It’s pointless calling the police. We’re not authorized 
to sell on the street. We don’t have business licenses.” Xiatian remains insecure as he 
seeks to sustain his one-man business in the face of pressures from the government 
authorities and the gangs, and the fierce street market competition. 
                                                      
580 Worker interviewee 36. 
155 
 
 
 
Street hawkers at the West Gate of the Zone D at Foxconn Longhua factory, Shenzhen. Photo 
credit: Jenny Chan. 
 
Yuanyuan and Xiatian’s home is clean and modest. The living room has a 
second-hand television set and a folded table. There is a small kitchen and a 
bathroom. I sit on a stool to enjoy the bananas. “Economic conditions in our village 
in Jiangxi are not good. For our daughter’s future, we want to bring her to Shenzhen, 
no matter how hard it may be,” Yuanyuan said. “I think it’s very important that my 
only daughter receive a good education. I don’t want her to grow up in the same 
traditional way like us.” 
 
In confidence, Xiatian asked if I knew of any part-time job opportunities. Banana 
sales have been erratic. “Sometimes business is good, but at other times it’s bad, 
especially when I get fined for obstructing public space.” He had thought of renting a 
food stall and joining friends in a partnership, but he had no start-up funds. 
Meanwhile, Yuanyuan and Xiatian were cutting back on food consumption and 
transportation costs to try to save. “Commodity prices have surged everywhere. If we 
get sick, we’ll be in debt.” Obviously, making a home for a family in Shenzhen will 
be a big challenge. 
 
156 
 
Marriage and Family 
 
At a noodle stand in the night market next to the Foxconn Chengdu dormitory, I met 
Duan Dong,581 a 19-year-old school drop-out from Qionglai city, a county-level city 
in western Sichuan. One night Dong brought his girlfriend to join me for a drink. 
They wore commitment rings, and it seemed very romantic. But when I asked about 
the rings, Dong said, “We wear them for play.” When I further inquired about 
marriage, he looked very serious and said “marriage isn’t just about feelings, it also 
takes a lot of money.” In the mainstream society, the man must provide the money, 
the house, the furniture and so on. “This is no small responsibility.”  
 
Dong introduced me to his colleague, Ouyang Zhong,582 who is married with a baby 
daughter. Like many other low-income workers, Zhong is unable to bring his family 
under the same roof in Chengdu city. He said, “The Foxconn wage is not enough for 
a family of three. My wife is working in a township restaurant, not too far from my 
father’s home, so she can go back once a week to look after our child, while my 
parents are the main care providers.” Zhong is alone in the city, working hard to 
make money to support his family. 
 
Zhong regularly sends home an average of 500 Yuan a month. On special occasions, 
such as his parents’ birthdays and the Spring Festival, he sends “a thousand or so to 
the family for celebration.” Once, he passed me his Nokia cell phone and asked, “Is 
the kid on the screen cute?” Before I could reply, he said, “So cute, I really want to 
go back home soon. She’s really naughty!”  
 
Zhong told me, “I love my daughter. I miss her so much.” While doing overtime 
work, occasionally up to 80 hours a month, he tried to keep personal living expenses 
to a minimum. He earned a personal record 2,501 Yuan in August 2011, during the 
peak production month. “For migrant workers like us, there is a lot of pressure, and 
the future is uncertain. We’re afraid to set up a household outside [of the factory 
compound].” His average wage is low, and he also fears that Foxconn could transfer 
workers any time they wish. “If you cannot go along with the move, you lose your 
job. If you’re transferred, there is no choice but to move to another place.” His sense 
of insecurity is profound. 
 
Household savings as a share of disposable income sharply increased from 16 
                                                      
581 Worker interviewee 37. 
582 Worker interviewee 32. 
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percent in 1990 to 30 percent in 2007, according to a household survey covering 122 
rural counties and 77 cities across major Chinese provinces.583 This constitutes a 
barrier to expanded consumption, suggesting precautionary behavior in view of 
uncertainty and a “competitive saving motive” for improving prospects for young 
workers in the marriage market. High savings are essential for workers who lack 
adequate health insurance and pensions. In addition, male workers (and their parents) 
need to save money to enhance their attractiveness as husbands — the gender 
imbalance amongst the current generation of young people means that there is a 
shortage of brides. 
 
Zhu Weili,584 Dong’s cousin, was wearing blue jeans with Nike sneakers and a 
dark-blue Foxconn jacket when we met. Although he affected a sporty, sunny look, 
he too expressed anxiety about his future, especially about having a family. At 25 
years old,  
 
I’m no longer able to muddle along at my job. Every month I make 
only a little over a thousand yuan. If I marry, I will have to provide 
for kids, and it’s really not enough for that…Most people in my dorm 
are unmarried. Married people generally won’t come here. The wages 
are too low. 
 
China’s economic reform has spurred high-speed growth, rapid urbanization, and 
rising incomes for many, but it has also widened social inequality and placed many 
workers, who lack marketable skills and start-up capital, under intense pressure. The 
relocation of new plants inland brings many workers closer to their jobs, but for the 
great majority, the problem of divided families remains unresolved. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Yang, who we met at the beginning of this chapter, is young, hopeful, and 
determined. Perhaps one day she will fulfill her dream of returning home in a brand 
new Honda, an iPhone in her back pocket. Despite her exceptional drive to succeed, 
her future, like that of other low-wage migrants, is highly uncertain. In my 
interviews, young workers’ expectations of gaining skills and rising through the 
bureaucratic factory system are frequently unfulfilled.  
 
                                                      
583 Shangjin Wei and Xiaobo Zhang, 2011, “The Competitive Saving Motive: Evidence from Rising 
Sex Ratios and Savings Rates in China,” Journal of Political Economy 119(3), pp. 511-64. 
584 Worker interviewee 38. 
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For the young cohorts of workers, the higher their aspirations for embracing “the 
Chinese dream,” the sharper is the contrast to their grim prospects. Their working 
and social lives follow a monotonous pattern — sleep, work, eat, and then sleep. 
Well aware of high burnout rates among factory workers and limited prospects for 
advance, some attempt to save from their meager salaries to start small businesses in 
the city or elsewhere. Most such businesses, however, quickly fail, the years of 
scrimping and saving coming to naught.  
 
Interestingly, the story of China’s rural migrants — no longer just about tolerance of 
hardships and passiveness of self — is entering a new phase. Discontent that has 
been pent up within the Foxconn Empire periodically explodes, as we will see in the 
following two chapters. Conflicts over wages and benefits, working and living 
conditions, and (forced) frequent transfer of workers and staff within the giant 
industrial complexes, have been surging. Labor resistance, in collective protests and 
lawsuits, has been closely observed.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Legal Activisms: Taking Foxconn to Court 
 
On 13 October 2011, a heavy rain was pouring down on Shenzhen Municipal 
Intermediate People’s Court, Guangdong. I underwent an identity check and handed 
my smartphone to the guard before entering the courtroom on the third floor. It was 4 
p.m. Foxconn’s lawyer and a company manager sat on the right, while a female 
worker Chen Chunhua585 and her lawyer Mr. Long were seated on the left. In the 
center was a high chair reserved for the judge, with a lower chair in front for the 
administrator. The court setting was familiar to Chunhua. She put aside her umbrella, 
opened a white folder and prepared to present her statement. For the past year she 
had been negotiating with Foxconn over employment rights and compensation. 
 
The labor dispute arose a year ago in September 2010 when Chunhua, a 29-year-old 
office worker, was ordered to move from Longhua, the economic hub in southeast 
Guangdong, to the Foxconn Yantai plant in northeast Shandong, 1,200 miles away. 
“As the assembly lines in our business group were moved, we were simply told to 
go,” Chunhua told me. Since 2004 Foxconn has expanded its investment in the 
Yantai Economic and Technological Development Zone, an economic zone 
established by the Shandong provincial government under the coastal development 
strategy in 1984. Foxconn Yantai builds video game-consoles under contract for 
Japanese and American buyers. As of June 2010, the local minimum wage in Yantai 
city was only 920 Yuan per month, compared to Foxconn Longhua’s basic pay of 
1,200 Yuan per month in Shenzhen.  
 
Chunhua insisted that she would not leave Shenzhen. “I was hired at Shenzhen 
Longhua, not Yantai, right? I have been working and living in Shenzhen for a decade, 
even though my official household registration is in a village in Puyang City, Henan.” 
In August 2000, at 19, she had left home to work in the big city, hoping to support 
her parents and younger brother, then a middle school student.  
 
At the time of labor dispute Chunhua had been employed at Foxconn for four years. 
“In 2006, I was still working at a French-owned company, Thomson Okmco, a 
Shenzhen-based subsidiary of Thomson Multimedia. One day our director 
announced that Foxconn had signed a merger agreement with our company. He 
assured us that most of us would be given new employment contracts at the 
                                                      
585 Worker interviewee 3. 
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Shenzhen Longhua plant.” Foxconn hired Chunhua as a junior staffer in the 
Consumer and Computer Products Business Group (CCPBG). “My major 
responsibility was to fill out product information sheets on video game-consoles and 
prepare meeting minutes for the team leader. I worked the day shift in the office at 
Block D5. When there was a lot of work, I was also required to work overtime at 
night and on the weekends.” As of September 2010, Chunhua’s base wage was 1,360 
Yuan per month, that is, 160 Yuan above the entry-level worker wage. 
 
In a residential community of Shangmeilin in Shenzhen, Chunhua shared a rented 
room with her partner, Haozheng, who is a native of Guangdong. She took out a 
heavy pile of company documents from a drawer and recounted her one-year legal 
battle. “I’d have given up on my lawsuit long ago if not for Haozheng’s support. 
Think about the fact that I didn’t even have a place to sleep after clearing out of the 
dormitory.” 
 
In recent years, Foxconn has moved its business to new areas of China to stay 
competitive. In the course of the company-organized “harmonious migration” that 
was synonymous with the relentless territorial expansion of the Foxconn empire, 
workers have experienced new tensions and insecurities.586 Chunhua emphasized, 
“Many of my colleagues have been transferred out of Shenzhen. But I told my direct 
supervisors that I was not prepared to go to Yantai. I’d rather take another office job 
under the same terms at Longhua. In fairness, I should have the opportunity to 
discuss this situation with them and then work out a new contract.” 
 
To Chunhua’s surprise, in early October 2010, she was told to report to a production 
line leader of another business group, Communication and Network Solution 
Business Group (CNSBG). On 9 October, “I found that I could no longer access my 
office. My electronic work card was disabled.” Chunhua’s senior supervisor told her 
that “my personnel file had just been sent to the CNSBG and I should report for duty 
there.” Chunhua’s job duties were completely changed. “I was assigned to an 
assembly line. I would also have to work at night. I felt very bad about the demotion.” 
While assured she would receive the same pay, Chunhua became very upset. “I 
wouldn’t be working in the office any more. Is this reasonable?”  
 
On 11 October, Chunhua approached Mr. Liu, the Taiwanese director of her original 
business group and said, “This job transfer is unfair, isn’t it? I demand a proper job 
                                                      
586 In Foxconn’s propaganda, the development of local economies at “home” is branded, in Chinese, 
as hexie tuojiang (和諧拓疆). 
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assignment; otherwise Foxconn should compensate me for all my years of service 
and end the labor relationship in accordance with the law.” But Foxconn refused to 
offer Chunhua either an office job or severance pay.  
 
“Either I obey the order or quit empty handed. I couldn’t sleep all night.” On 12 
October, Chunhua was admitted to the Shenzhen Futian No. 2 People’s Hospital for 
depression and suicidal tendencies. The doctor advised her to take two weeks’ sick 
leave. “My health deteriorated. I was so angry that I could not eat or rest properly. 
Foxconn never returned my calls.” Between 5 November and 30 December 2010, 
Chunhua was sent to the Corning Psychiatric Hospital in Shenzhen for specialized 
treatment. The diagnosis was acute stress psychosis.  
 
Three Lawsuits against Foxconn 
 
Increasing numbers of aggrieved workers have filed claims with government 
institutions despite the fact that legal action requires an enormous investment of time 
and money. Between 2011 and 2014, I got to know office assistant Chen Chunhua, 
Xie Mingli587 a 30-year-old human resources manager, and 25-year-old technician 
Zhang Tingzhen (whose father Zhang Guangde acted on his behalf588). These three 
Foxconn employees and their families hired lawyers to pursue individual lawsuits 
against their employer.  
 
The burden of paying for legal services is explained by a Beijing-based legal 
practitioner: “There are 962 national-level laws and regulations relating to labor, in 
addition to countless local laws, regulations, and guidelines,” all riddled with 
contradictions and inconsistencies among them. He added that a lawyer would need 
“a considerable amount of time to become clear on all these rules, let alone a migrant 
worker.”589 Against all odds, Foxconn employees are trying to fight for their labor 
rights in the courts. 
 
What are the major obstacles faced by workers when they seek to use Chinese labor 
law to redress their grievances? What is the path to arbitration and litigation and 
what are the outcomes? These labor disputes take place in the context of a legal 
                                                      
587 Manager interviewee 1. 
588 Worker interviewee 2 (brain-damaged injured worker). The father and son, Zhang Guangde and 
Zhang Tingzhen, are the real names. The Zhang family has mobilized media and labor rights groups 
to support their claim for work-injury compensation since October 2010. 
589 Quoted in Aaron Halegua, 2008, “Getting Paid: Processing the Labor Disputes of China’s Migrant 
Workers,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 26(1), pp. 271-72. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133731 
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system in flux, with soaring numbers of cases filed throughout China since the 1990s. 
Ching Kwan Lee argues that “the law has become the pivotal terrain of labor politics” 
as the state seeks to channel labor conflict from protest in the streets to the courts.590  
 
“I’m Suing My Boss.” 
 
Chunhua did not return to work after being discharged from the hospital. “There’s 
been no discussion or consultation over a new job offer of any sort.” As she saw it, 
“Foxconn has unilaterally and arbitrarily changed my main work responsibility, 
violating a labor contract that was based on mutual consent. I demand compensation 
of 70,810 Yuan for reimbursement of medical fees and damage to my health. I’m 
suing my boss.” 
 
Labor bureaus are required by law to establish labor dispute arbitration 
committees.591 Arbitrators do not accept all worker demands, such as those for wage 
increases above the legal minimum, for adjudication. Labor dispute cases are also 
rejected when the workers in question cannot provide basic documentation indicating 
a contract defining an employment relation. But Chunhua succeeded in having her 
application formally accepted.  
 
“With Lawyer Long’s assistance, I put together my employment contract, staff card, 
wage slips, social insurance card, medical reports, and then drafted my first legal 
statement in January 2011. My case was filed and accepted at the labor bureau,” 
Chunhua explained to me. On 28 March 2011, the Shenzhen Bao’an District 
arbitration committee took evidence from both parties and began to process the labor 
dispute case. 
 
Arbitration committees are grassroots-level official organizations that bring together 
labor and management to resolve labor conflicts. An arbitration committee is often 
made up of three government officials, one of whom serves as the director. When a 
case is accepted, arbitrators rarely rule in favor of worker plaintiffs, because this 
would likely result in an appeal from the employer, who has the resources to 
continue the legal process.592 The professionalism and impartiality of arbitrators 
have repeatedly been questioned by workers and legal practitioners. A judge 
                                                      
590 Ching Kwan Lee, 2010, “Pathways of Labor Activism,” Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and 
Resistance, edited by Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden, London: Routledge, p. 76. 
591 Virginia E. Harper Ho, 2003, Labor Dispute Resolution in China: Implications for Labor Rights 
and Legal Reform, University of California, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies. 
592 Mary E. Gallagher, 2006, “Mobilizing the Law in China: ‘Informed Disenchantment’ and the 
Development of Legal Consciousness,” Law and Society Review 49(4), p. 801. 
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observed that labor dispute arbitration committees “have to be concerned with other 
factors…and are under pressure from enterprises when making decisions.”593 
 
Labor arbitrators, unlike judges, are not required to have received rigorous training 
in an accredited law school, although higher qualifications and relevant judicial 
experience is preferred. Based on observations in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, 
legal scholar Aaron Halegua concluded: “These labor officials, who are paid a fixed 
salary regardless of how many cases they process, prefer to work on as few cases as 
possible, and focus on convincing any worker that comes into the office not to file a 
complaint.” 594  Similarly, Virginia Harper Ho found that government staff in 
Guangzhou labor offices sometimes discouraged worker claims by “providing 
inaccurate information or by urging them to drop disputes.”595 The main objective, 
apparently, was to defuse labor conflicts and preserve the appearance of social and 
economic stability.  
 
The Verdict 
 
After three months, on 28 June 2011, Chunhua received the arbitrators’ decision. She 
had lost. “In my view, the arbitrators didn’t fulfill their responsibility to investigate 
the staffing arrangements at Foxconn. They determined that the job change was 
‘reasonable and lawful’; they’re biased towards management. I’m determined to take 
Foxconn to court,” Chunhua recalled. When she did so, the judge upheld the 
arbitrators’ original statement and decided in Foxconn’s favor. The judge announced 
that “there’s insufficient evidence to establish a causal relationship between health 
issues and management practice.”  
 
Chunhua reflected, “The new labor law means so little when it comes to regulating 
business behavior. In retrospect, the day I said ‘no’ to going along with the transfer 
to Yantai, I was destined to leave without getting a penny. My colleagues, many of 
them married with school-age children in Shenzhen, have quit without any 
compensation. Why? Our homes are here. We can’t just leave the place and start 
everything all over.”  
                                                      
593 Quoted in Feng Chen and Xin Xu, 2012, “‘Active Judiciary’: Judicial Dismantling of Workers’ 
Collective Action in China,” The China Journal 67 (January), p. 97. 
594 Aaron Halegua, 2008, “Getting Paid: Processing the Labor Disputes of China’s Migrant Workers,” 
Berkeley Journal of International Law 26(1), pp. 264-65. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133731 
595 Virginia E. Harper Ho, 2009, “From Contracts to Compliance? An Early Look at Implementation 
under China’s New Labor Legislation,” Columbia Journal of Asian Law 23(1), p. 54. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1432708  
164 
 
 
Chunhua pushed for a second trial. Research in 2009-2011 found that disgruntled 
workers often rejected arbitration decisions and appealed to higher courts when they 
perceived arbitrators’ severance and other legal awards to be significantly below 
what they believed the labor law guaranteed them. 596  Within 15 days of an 
arbitration ruling, workers have a right to apply for a trial of the original dispute. 
Such appeals have become increasingly common. If either side is dissatisfied with 
the verdict, it can appeal to a higher court, where a second trial is final. 
 
Throughout the long legal process, at no time did trade union officials attempt to 
mediate or safeguard Chunhua’s rights. “I walked in to the Employee Care Center in 
early October 2010 to ask the union staffer for help. She sent me back to the very 
supervisors with whom I had strong disagreements. At that moment, I felt helpless.”  
 
On 19 April 2012, Chunhua was notified of the result: Foxconn bore no 
responsibility for Chunhua’s “personal health problems.” In this final verdict, the 
judge ruled that she had no claim for compensation. In theory, however, workers like 
Chunhua should be compensated. In the event of a worker’s contract is terminated or 
she is unfairly dismissed, employers have severance obligations.  
 
In practice, the law is difficult to enforce. Observers widely recognize such limits of 
the enforcement of work and employment protections in China as deficiencies in 
inspection and dispute resolution. Under fiscal and administrative decentralization 
policies, local states frequently prioritize retaining revenues and accumulating 
resources rather over rigorous implementation of labor laws and regulations. Intense 
competition among localities to lure foreign and domestic investment results in lax 
enforcement of labor laws. As a result of the embedded conflict between legal norms 
and local accumulation, and in a situation in which trade unions offer scant support 
for workers, legal rights are at best weakly protected.597 At the local level, officials 
often bend the rules and regulations primarily to serve their own economic and 
political interests.598 Lower courts are subject to the funding and hiring decisions of 
local governments. Judges lack autonomy and independence to uphold the law, 
                                                      
596 Feng Chen and Xin Xu, 2012, “‘Active Judiciary’: Judicial Dismantling of Workers’ Collective 
Action in China,” The China Journal 67 (January), p. 96. 
597 Ching Kwan Lee, 2007, Against the Law: Labor Protests in China’s Rustbelt and Sunbelt, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, ch. 1. 
598 Haiyan Wang, Richard P. Appelbaum, Francesca Degiuli and Nelson Lichtenstein, 2009, “China’s 
New Labor Contract Law: Is China Moving towards Increased Power for Workers?” Third World 
Quarterly 30(3), pp. 485-501; Jenny Chan, 2009, “Meaningful Progress or Illusory Reform? 
Analyzing China’s Labor Contract Law,” 2ew Labor Forum 18(2), pp. 43-51. 
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especially in cases where outcomes are contradictory to powerful interests. Despite 
the fact that the lower courts are increasingly reaching out to other courts of equal 
rank for guidance in making difficult legal decisions — an impressive development 
of “horizontal networking” between the courts in fostering legal innovations — 
extensive external interference from higher courts and party officials persists.599 
Under these circumstances, workers’ rights often end at the courtroom door. 
 
China’s Labor Disputes 
 
Labor disputes submitted for government-sponsored arbitration spiraled since the 
mid-1990s with large-scale layoffs of state sector workers as China privatized many 
small and medium enterprises, breaking the social contract that had provided lifetime 
employment to state sector workers since the 1950s. Not only urban workers 
(including those who lost their jobs) but also migrant laborers were emboldened to 
use newfound legal provisions to defend their rights alongside protests and other 
direct actions.  
 
The central government’s promotion of the “rule of law” has inspired citizens to 
make their claims through fast-expanding legal institutions.600 From the late 1970s, 
Deng Xiaoping and his followers have striven to legitimize governance by replacing 
class struggle approaches with law and related institutions as an arena to mediate 
conflict through the courts rather than in the streets. Between 1978 and 1995, 49 
labor laws and regulations were enacted, including the national Labor Law, which 
came into force on 1 January 1995.601 New legal provisions, tested by workers in the 
labor dispute arbitration committees and courts, and particularly worker victories, 
however limited, have contributed to raising worker consciousness of labor rights.602 
Specifically, workers rarely succeeded in overturning layoffs, but mediation and 
arbitration sometimes secured increased payments or benefits for those laid off.  
 
In 1996, 48,121 labor disputes were accepted for arbitration, the total rising sharply 
to 120,191 in 1999, involving more than 470,000 aggrieved laborers (including local 
                                                      
599 Benjamin L. Liebman, 2007, “China’s Courts: Restricted Reform,” The China Quarterly 191, pp. 
620-38. 
600 Neil J. Diamant, Stanley B. Lubman and Kevin J. O’Brien, eds., 2005, Engaging the Law in China: 
State, Society, and Possibilities for Justice, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
601 Isabelle Thireau and Hua Linshan, 2003, “The Moral Universe of Aggrieved Chinese Workers: 
Workers’ Appeals to Arbitration Committees and Letters and Visits Offices,” The China Journal 50 
(July), p. 85. 
602 Mary E. Gallagher and Baohua Dong, 2011, “Legislating Harmony: Labor Law Reform in 
Contemporary China,” From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalization: Markets, Workers, and the State in a 
Changing China, edited by Sarosh Kuruvilla, Ching Kwan Lee and Mary E. Gallagher, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, pp. 36-60. 
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and rural migrant workers from firms of various ownership types).603 The upward 
trend continued through the 2000 decade, reflecting the widespread incidences of 
rights violations as the private sector expanded. Labor cases further skyrocketed 
during the 2008-09 economic recession with growing numbers of disputes over wage 
and insurance payments, illegal layoffs, and inadequate compensation payments. 
Compared to the 1995 Labor Law, the 2008 Labor Contract Law strengthens the 
deterrent effect of potential sanctions by specifying fines and penalties for 
enterprises that do not meet pre-existing requirements on employment agreements, 
overtime premiums, and social security.604 Moreover, effective 1 May 2008, the 
Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law made arbitration free of charge for all 
parties,605 and extended the statute of limitations for filing cases from two months to 
one year, thereby encouraging workers to bring their cases to arbitration. Unpaid 
workers were the greatest beneficiaries of extending the time limit for filing 
claims.606  
 
Arbitrated labor disputes peaked at 693,465 cases involving more than 1.2 million 
laborers nationwide in the economic crisis of 2008. Thereafter, newly accepted 
arbitration cases fell to 600,865 in 2010 and further to 589,244 in 2011, in which 80 
percent of the principal disputes were over labor remuneration (unpaid basic wages 
and/or overtime premiums), social insurance compensation (including pensions, 
compensation for occupational illnesses and injuries, medical expenses, and/or other 
welfare benefits), and employment relations (such as termination of labor contracts). 
Of all arbitrated cases, in 2011, laborers won only 33 percent while compromises 
were reached in an additional 54.5 percent of cases.607 In recent years, governments 
                                                      
603 China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2012, 2013, “Labor Disputes Accepted and Settled,” Beijing: 
China Statistics Press, pp. 352-53. 
604 Despite actions by the “sweatshop lobby” of transnational business, as represented by the 
American Chamber of Commerce, the US-China Business Council, and the European Union Chamber 
of Commerce, the National People’s Congress of China promulgated the Labor Contract Law in June 
2007, after three rounds of revisions. See, for example, Sean Cooney, Sarah Biddulph, Li Kungang 
and Ying Zhu, 2007, “China’s New Labor Contract Law: Responding to the Growing Complexity of 
Labor Relations in the PRC,” U2SW Law Journal 30(3), pp. 788-803; Kinglun Ngok, 2008, “The 
Changes of Chinese Labor Policy and Labor Legislation in the Context of Market Transition,” 
International Labor and Working-Class History 73 (Spring), pp. 45-64.The Labor Contract Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (中華人民共和國勞動合同法) was promulgated on 29 June 2007 
and took effect on 1 January 2008. Full text in English: 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471106.htm  
605 Labor bureaus had been charging claimants for arbitration. In the mid-2000s, the “application fee” 
or “processing fee” was at least 300 Yuan in Beijing and Shanghai.  
606 The Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (中華人民
共和國勞動爭議調解仲裁法) was promulgated on 29 December 2007 and came to force on 1 May 
2008. Full text in English: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471614.htm     
607 China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2012, 2013, “Labor Disputes Accepted and Settled,” Beijing: 
China Statistics Press, pp. 352-53. 
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at all levels have directed workers to resolve conflicts through workplace-based 
mediation and other informal means, hence reducing arbitration caseloads608 (see 
Figure 8.1).  
 
Figure 8.1 Arbitrated Labor Disputes in China, 1996-2011 
 
Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2012 (2013: 352-53). 
 
Many companies have failed to set up effective grievance mechanisms to resolve 
labor problems, and as a result, conflicts have intensified. Apparently Foxconn has 
refused to negotiate in good faith with aggrieved workers. Nor was it under pressure 
to do so from the company union. 
 
“This is Wrongful Dismissal.” 
 
When Foxconn decided to redraw the territory of its manufacturing empire across 
                                                      
608 Fu Hualing and Richard Cullen, 2011, “From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of 
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edited by Margaret Y. K. Woo and Mary E. Gallagher, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
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China, its workers were moved like any other commodity. But this process, along 
with its other working practices, has not gone unchallenged. Xie Mingli, a college 
graduate in industrial engineering and a manager in the personnel department at 
Foxconn Longhua, contested “wrongful dismissal” in April 2011. He refused to 
transfer from Shenzhen to the Chengdu iPad plant in Sichuan. “Upon graduating 
from a four-year program at a Zhengzhou university in Henan province, I set off to 
the south in July 2003. In Shenzhen, I reunited with my sister and mother who had 
previously migrated.” In August 2008, he found work at Foxconn — by moving to a 
larger firm, he hoped to be able to advance his career prospects. 
 
Mingli was responsible for staff recruitment and additional administrative work. In 
2010, when the iPad business group was formally set up, “I supported the senior 
managers of iDSBG [innovation Digital System Business Group] in drafting 
recruitment plans at Longhua.” He added that “the numbers of new workers kept 
increasing despite heightened media concerns over suicides at Foxconn.” Later in 
December, when the iPad assembly lines fully opened in Chengdu, Sichuan, Mingli 
traveled to the new plant for “short-term support” as requested. In March 2011, after 
completing the intensive recruitment campaign at the Chengdu plant, he returned to 
Shenzhen. “But I was repeatedly pressed to fill out a resignation form unless I agreed 
to transfer to Chengdu, where experienced human resources managers were in high 
demand. I strongly disagreed,” Mingli recalled. 
 
On 30 March 2011, Mingli complained to the district labor bureau about the 
company’s violation of the Labor Contract Law. Then, government officials 
contacted Foxconn, and the company human resources department head immediately 
responded by ordering the data security officer to invalidate Mingli’s work identity 
card. Mingli said, “On 1 April, at 7:40 a.m., I was prohibited from entering Foxconn 
Longhua. I called the police.” Effective 2 April, Foxconn charged Mingli with being 
absent from work without permission, and fired him.  
  
In my interview in October 2011, Mingli admitted that his thinking had been 
changing over the previous year, particularly after moderating an online forum for 
“Foxconn Friends”609 following the 2010 suicide wave in the spring. “We give 
advice to young workers in distress, the 16- and 17-year olds. We emphasize that the 
workers have rights, fairness and dignity. This time I need to safeguard my own 
rights and interests,” Mingli told me with a bitter smile. “Management fabricated my 
attendance record as a pretext to get rid of me without paying a penny. When 
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Foxconn abandons its employees, it does so without considering us as human beings. 
I decided to fight back.” 
 
“I Demand Compensation.” 
 
The law stipulates that the amount of severance is calculated on actual wages, 
including overtime premiums, bonuses and subsidies, and years of tenure. Employers 
who terminate an employee illegally are required to pay double severance in 
compensation. Accordingly, Mingli demanded that Foxconn compensate him as 
follows: first, severance pay for terminating the labor contract, that is, 19,815 Yuan 
(average salary 6,605 Yuan per month for three years of service); second, a punitive 
fine equivalent to the severance pay, in this case, 19,815 Yuan; third, payment of the 
March 2011 salary, bonus, housing subsidies, and transportation allowance (between 
Shenzhen and Chengdu), which adds up to 28,960 Yuan. Thus the total amount of 
compensation is 68,590 Yuan. He explained to me, “A major change of job location 
or work duties should be made with my consent. My demand is not about 
reinstatement. I’m not interested in continuing to work for such a company. I 
demand compensation. Foxconn thinks they can do whatever they want. I just have 
to let Foxconn know they can’t do this.” 
 
On 25 May 2011, the Shenzhen Bao’an District arbitration committee prepared to 
issue its ruling. “Foxconn has cultivated good relationships with the labor bureau. I 
am not optimistic about the judgment,” Mingli said. Arbitrators accepted the 
work-time record provided by Foxconn as authentic. “I lost.” The new law had 
increased the corporate cost of noncompliance. But in the case of Mingli and many 
others, the company was able to flout the letter and spirit of the law with impunity. 
 
“No one dares to serve as a witness or risk their job to testify for me,” Mingli told 
me. After discussing the situation with Lawyer Guan, Mingli decided that “I must 
count on myself.” On his last day of work, the security guards stopped him from 
entering the South Main Gate. They took away his staff card by force. “And I took 
pictures of them with my cell phone.” Mingli showed them to me. 
 
The trial took place on 19 August 2011. Three months past. On 15 November, Mingli 
received the verdict. “I’m disappointed. While the court awarded me 34,956 Yuan as 
compensation for damages, it was only about half of what I demanded. This little 
money doesn’t mean anything to a large corporation like Foxconn.”  
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“The Unequal Battle” 
 
Both Mingli and Foxconn appealed the verdict to the higher court. “The judge 
disregarded the arguments in my favor and upheld the verdict,” Mingli told me. In 
January 2012 Foxconn paid the fine to settle the lawsuit. Unemployed for ten months, 
Mingli was exhausted by the unequal battle. “I’ve done my best. The outcome, from 
my view, is negative.”  
 
Questions of legality are contested by adversaries in courts. “But the true question is 
the lack of labor unity and collective strength. If we had mutual support, we 
wouldn’t be so easily targeted and arbitrarily eliminated, labeled as rebels and 
redundant. When we’re forced to file a lawsuit, even if we win, we’re actually losers. 
We’ve got to rework the imbalance of power at the workplace,” Mingli reflected.  
 
“We’ve no alternative but to take a costly path. The Foxconn trade union is a 
political ornament used to legitimate management in the eyes of corporate customers 
and government officials. How can we trust the union chairwoman as a mediator 
when she is a special assistant to the CEO? Using the law as an instrument is a 
remedy. But what I’ve been looking for is more proactive…a genuine worker 
organization that builds workers’ power.” Mingli concluded, “workers’ collective 
action and capacity building is fundamental to social progress, and should 
complement the ongoing legal reforms.” 
 
Severely Injured Worker ot Compensated 
 
On Wednesday, 26 October 2011, a tragic work accident shattered a four-person 
family and sent reverberations through the ranks of Foxconn workers in Shenzhen. 
At 1:40 p.m. Zhang Tingzhen suffered an electric shock while repairing a spotlight 
exterior of the E12(A) Building at the Foxconn Longhua complex. Tingzhen fell 
from the ladder after being shocked by the high-voltage electric current. Falling from 
four meters, he landed hard on his head. He was provided with neither 
electricity-proof gloves nor an industrial safety belt. The case illustrates important 
dimensions of Foxconn’s labor practices and its treatment of workers. 
 
After being admitted to the nearest hospital, Tingzhen underwent emergency brain 
surgery. Half of his left brain had to be excised because of severe bleeding and 
trauma. Three weeks passed, and it was not until 16 November, after demands by his 
parents, that Foxconn transferred Tingzhen to the Shenzhen No. 2 People’s Hospital 
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for specialized diagnosis. He underwent four additional surgeries in the following 
five months to save him each time his condition became critical. 
 
Tingzhen is no longer able to communicate. He can utter only sounds. His brain is so 
severely damaged that his memory has completely been lost. The right side of his 
body is paralyzed. Once a fine athlete, he now faces a life heavily dependent on his 
parents and younger sister. He was only 25 years old when the accident took place. 
 
 
Zhang Tingzhen, 25, survived an electric shock and fall in an industrial injury. ow (left) and in 
happier times in the recent past. Photo credit: The Zhang family. 
 
As a result of severe brain damage, Zhang Tinghzhen cannot recognize his mother. Photo credit: 
The Zhang family. 
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Tingzhen, a graduate of a technical college in central China’s Henan province, was 
newly employed as an equipment and facility technician at the Foxconn Longhua 
factory complex. “His basic wage was 2,500 Yuan per month, starting from 4 August 
2011. With the addition of overtime premiums and benefits, his average income 
during the nearly three months of employment before the accident was over 4,000 
Yuan,” said Guangde, 50, Tingzhen’s father. 
 
Work injuries are ranked on a scale of 1 to 10, level-1 being the most serious. The 
age of the victim, type of injury, degree of disability, extent of employer negligence, 
and related workplace factors are the determinants of the amount of compensation 
that an injured worker will receive.610 Nevertheless, worker victims did not win all 
the cases, due to their lack of proof in showing the labor relations or corporate 
violations of production safety rules. 
 
“What is Tingzhen’s future? I’d been looking forward to seeing him married. I dare 
not think about this anymore…Foxconn doesn’t accept its responsibility. If there was 
adequate personal protective equipment, the accident could have been avoided,” his 
father sighed. 
 
 
Zhang Guangde embraces his son. In the hospital, Tingzhen is receiving physiotherapy, with 
unfailing encouragement from his sister, who looks on. Photo credit: The Zhang family. 
                                                      
610 The 2011 Regulations on Work Injury Insurance of the People’s Republic of China (中華人民共
和國工傷保險條例) (Articles 35 to 37) specify the insurance standards in accordance with the 
severity of disability.  http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-12/24/content_1772115.htm 
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In an October 2012 company statement, issued under public pressure one year after 
the serious accident, Foxconn explained that Tingzhen was “hired in Shenzhen” but 
“for a position at our Huizhou facility and was an employee of that facility.”611 
Foxconn provided an employment contract that it claimed was Tingzhen’s. It shows 
that Tingzhen’s staff ID number was F6203046, and that he was employed by Jizhun 
Precision Industry Company in Huizhou, not by Hongfujin Precision Industry 
(Shenzhen) Company, the registered business entity in Shenzhen, that is, Foxconn 
Longhua. Both enterprises are directly owned by Foxconn in the Pearl River Delta 
region of Guangdong province. Huizhou borders the provincial capital of Guangzhou 
to the west and Dongguan and Shenzhen to the southwest. “My son, from the first 
day he went to the Longhua Recruitment Center to interview, worked in Shenzhen. 
How can they [Foxconn Longhua human resources managers] say his employer is in 
Huizhou?,” Guangde told me angrily. 
 
To defend his son’s rights, Guangde filed a labor arbitration suit against Foxconn 
Longhua in Shenzhen. On 3 December 2012, Guangde received a five-page 
arbitration statement. The government arbitrators ruled against the existence of a 
labor relation between Tingzhen and Foxconn Longhua (Hongfujin Precision 
Industry Company). The official investigation endorsed Foxconn’s claim, as stated in 
the labor contract that the company produced, that Tingzhen had been hired by its 
Huizhou facility (Jizhun Precision Industry Company). While the work-related 
accident had occurred at the Shenzhen workplace, Foxconn Longhua could not be 
held responsible for the compensation.  
 
Guangde appealed to the court: “Is the employment contract forged? From the day of 
employment [on 4 August 2011] to the moment of the industrial accident [on 26 
October 2011], Tingzhen had worked at the Shenzhen Longhua plant. Therefore he 
should be entitled to medical treatment and occupational injury compensation right 
here in accordance with local standards. What Foxconn has done to my son violates 
social norms and lacks morality and humanity!” Guangde told the court. 
 
In effect, Foxconn has refused to compensate Tingzhen for his loss of health and 
work ability according to the Shenzhen standard of compensation. Under China’s 
work injury insurance regulations, the insurance payouts for treatment and disability 
support differ from city to city. Repeated attempts to hold Foxconn responsible for 
                                                      
611 Quoted in Ron Dicker, 11 October 2012, “Zhang Tingzhen, Foxconn Employee who Lost Half his 
Brain, Ordered to Leave Hospital,” The Huffington Post. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/11/zhang-tingzhen-foxconn_n_1957851.html  
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the work accident, which his parents say could have been prevented, have been 
rebuffed.  
 
Justice Denied 
 
Foxconn’s lawyer defended that Tingzhen had worked at the Shenzhen Longhua 
plant for 84 days, during which time his wages and benefits were paid via a debit 
bank account by Foxconn Huizhou. Guangde angrily denounced that “Foxconn labor 
contract trap!”612 With pent-up anger and helplessness over Foxconn’s refusal to 
accept responsibility and provide appropriate compensation, Tingzhen’s father 
showed the local government arbitration officials a large glass bottle with a bone 
removed from Tingzhen’s crushed skull. 
 
In February 2014, Guangde petitioned the government letters and visits office in 
Beijing to speed up the resolution to Tingzhen’s case. The agonizing experience of 
the Zhang family reveals how burdensome it is to mount a legal challenge, draining 
the energy of the family as it seeks to look after Tingzhen. “The company union 
leaders advised us to ‘return’ to Huizhou and go through the legal procedure. It’s 
absolutely unreasonable. We want justice,” Guangde said. 
 
Foxconn claimed that it would ensure that Tingzhen “receives the highest level of 
social insurance benefits he is due;” and reiterated that it “takes the health and safety 
of our employees very seriously.”613 But two and a half years has lapsed since the 
severe injury. As of this writing in March 2014, Guangde, together with his wife and 
daughter, cared for Tingzhen on a 24/7 basis at the hospital in Shenzhen. Disability 
assessment has not been done; hence there is no agreement on Tingzhen’s 
compensation and corporate responsibility for his long-term medical treatment. The 
difficulties workers and their families confront in seeking justice through the time 
consuming and costly route of filing lawsuits are fully displayed in this case. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In the course of protracted lawsuits, Chunhua, Mingli, and Tingzhen’s family had 
come to learn about the fundamental weaknesses of the Foxconn trade union. “Open 
and direct communication between employees and managers is the most efficient 
means to identify and resolve work problems and build a harmonious enterprise,” 
                                                      
612 Laodong hetong xianjing (勞動合同陷阱). 
613 Foxconn Technology Group’s 7-page statement dated 31 December 2013, pp. 5 and 7. 
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stated a 2008 Foxconn company report, issued shortly after the passage of China’s 
Labor Contract Law. 614  Yet, again and again, workplace-based mechanisms 
ostensibly designed for labor dispute mediation and grievance resolution were 
manipulated by managers who doubled as trade union staff. Worse yet, enterprise 
union turns its back on the labor disputants that I have described.  
 
Better law enforcement by the central and local governments “may institutionalize 
and rationalize the resolution of labor conflict.” 615  Aggrieved workers lodge 
complaints in the arbitration committees and the civil courts, thereby acknowledge 
the state’s legitimacy.616 But as more workers become disillusioned by an ineffective 
dispute resolution system that protects management, social instability and class 
contradictions deepen. The shared interests between government officials and private 
entrepreneurs remain deep-rooted. Ching Kwan Lee recognizes that “the law may 
not be effective in protecting citizens’ rights” in the struggle for social and economic 
rights. She writes, “still, many continue working through and around the law and its 
related trappings in the state apparatus.” 617  My research shows that workers’ 
growing expectations of economic gains and state protection can lead to greater 
disillusionment with government and management, and rising anger. In addition to 
legal challenges in the courts, since the early 1990s, we have witnessed growing 
numbers of individual and collective labor protests in China. The oscillation between 
legal and extra-legal avenues has at times fueled activism by some, but others have 
become depressed and embittered. Outside of state-sanctioned dispute resolution 
paths, workers have taken direct action to advance their rights and interests, to which 
I will turn in the next chapter.  
                                                      
614 Foxconn Technology Group, 2009, “2008 Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility 
Annual Report,” p. 16. http://ser.foxconn.com/ViewAnuReport.do?action=showAnnual 
615 Ching Kwan Lee, 2007, Against the Law: Labor Protests in China’s Rustbelt and Sunbelt, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 242. 
616 Mary Elizabeth Gallagher, 2005, Contagious Capitalism: Globalization and the Politics of Labor 
in China, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, ch. 5. 
617 Ching Kwan Lee, 2007, Against the Law, p. 260. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Worker Protests: Organizing on our Own 
 
The Federation of Trade Unions of Foxconn Technology Group 
promotes the interests of all of our more than 1 million employees in 
China and operates according to the relevant laws and regulations that 
govern such worker groups in their respective regions. 
— Foxconn Technology Group618 
  
Please remember [Foxconn CEO Terry Gou], from now on, to 
reassess the responsibilities of the company union so that genuine 
trade unions can play an appropriate role.  
— Foxconn worker Yu Zhonghong619  
 
On 23 September 2012 a siren pierced the night at the 80,000-worker Foxconn 
Taiyuan plant in northern China. Not only CEO Terry Gou, but also the Shanxi 
provincial governor Wang Jun and Taiyuan city leaders were awakened from their 
sleep. By 3 a.m. on 24 September, 5,000 riot police officers, government officials, 
and medical staff were stationed at the factory.620 Over the next two hours, the 
police took control over the factory dormitories and workshops of the entire Foxconn 
complex by detaining the most defiant workers. More than 40 others were beaten, 
handcuffed, and sent off in half a dozen police cars. In emergency mode, Foxconn 
announced a special day off for all workers and staff at the Taiyuan facility on 24 
September.621 On the same day, Apple CEO Tim Cook assured that stores would 
“continue to receive iPhone 5 shipments regularly and customers can continue to 
order online and receive an estimated delivery date.”622 Apparently, the continuous 
flow of product, speedy shipment, and on-time delivery were Apple’s top concerns. 
 
Following the riot, Yu Zhonghong,623 a 21-year-old high-school graduate who had 
                                                      
618 Foxconn Technology Group, 31 December 2013, “Union Committees,” Printed version. 
619 Qing ni jizhu, cong xianzai kaishi, shi gonghui chengwei zhenzheng de gonghui, fahui yingyou de 
zuoyong (請你記住，從現在開始，使工會成為真正的工會，發揮應有的作用。). 
620 Yan Shuang, 25 September 2012, “Foxconn Shuts Plant after Violence,” Global Times. 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/735139.shtml 
621 David Barboza and Keith Bradsher, 24 September 2012, “Foxconn Plant Closed after Riot, 
Company Says,” The 2ew York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/technology/foxconn-plant-in-china-closed-after-worker-riot.htm
l 
622 Apple, 24 September 2012, “iPhone 5 First Weekend Sales Top Five Million.” 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2012/09/24iPhone-5-First-Weekend-Sales-Top-Five-Million.html  
623 Worker interviewee 20. 
177 
 
worked at the site for two years, wrote an open letter to the company chief executive 
Terry Gou. The opening paragraph reads: 
 
A Letter to Foxconn CEO, Terry Gou
624
 
 
If you don’t want to be loudly awakened at night from deep sleep, 
If you don’t want to constantly rush about again by airplane, 
If you don’t want to be investigated again by the Fair Labor Association, 
If you don’t want your company to be called a sweatshop, 
Please treat us with a little humanity. 
Please allow us a little human self-esteem. 
Don’t let your hired ruffians rifle through our bodies and belongings. 
Don’t let your hired ruffians harass female workers. 
Don’t let your lackeys treat every worker like the enemy. 
Don’t arbitrarily berate or, worse, beat workers for the slightest mistake. 
 
Zhonghong’s angry letter to Terry Gou continues: 
 
You should understand that working in your factories: 
Workers live at the lowest level, 
Tolerating the most intense work, 
Earning the lowest pay, 
Accepting the strictest regulation,  
And enduring discrimination everywhere. 
Even though you are my boss, and I am a worker:  
I have the right to speak to you on an equal footing. 
 
The sense in which “right” is used is not narrowly confined to the realm of legal 
rights. Chinese workers in supply chain factories, facing pressure from the company, 
global capital (such as Apple) and the state (particularly provincial and lower-level 
governments), are demanding to bargain with their employers “on an equal footing.” 
At the same time as the government seeks to channel discontent through the courts, 
many labor actions are being staged outside of state-sanctioned paths.  
 
Zhonghong called on senior management and the company union to act responsibly 
toward the workers. The open letter ends with three reminders: 
 
                                                      
624 Zhi Gou Taiming de Yifengxin (致郭台銘的一封信), 24 September 2012. 
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1. Please remember, from now on, to treat your subordinates as 
humans, and require that they treat their subordinates, and their 
subordinates, and their subordinates, as humans. 
2. Please remember, from now on, those of you who are riding a 
rocket of fast promotions and earning wages as high as heaven 
compared to those on earth, to change your attitude that Taiwanese 
are superior. 
3. Please remember, from now on, to reassess the responsibilities of 
the company union so that genuine trade unions can play an 
appropriate role. 
 
In this chapter, I show that workers’ direct actions take multiple forms including riots, 
protests, mass suicide threats, slowdowns, and strikes. How did workers develop 
organizing tactics and collective bargaining methods, and what have been the 
outcomes? What are the reactions from Foxconn, brands (such as Apple), and the 
Chinese state to labor unrest? 
 
Worker Riots 
 
At the Foxconn Taiyuan factory, labor discontents grew in a series of open conflicts 
from the beginning of 2012. A strike took place in March 2012 and six months later, 
factory-wide riots erupted on 23-24 September, prompting Zhonghong to send the 
above letter. 
 
One of Zhonghong’s co-workers recalled, “After the Spring Festival holidays, 
assembly-line workers received a wage increase of only tens of Yuan to a maximum 
of one hundred per month, while our managers enjoyed increases of several hundred 
Yuan and many more benefits. We’re very angry about unfair wage policies.”625 On 
payday (13 March), some 1,000 Consumer and Computer Products Business Group 
(CCPBG) workers from Building A9 downed their tools to demand higher pay. “We 
marched to the main factory gate chanting, Bagong! Bagong! [Strike! Strike!]. We 
blocked Wucheng Road for half an hour, disrupting traffic, and prompting the police 
and government officials from both the Xiaodian District and Taiyuan City to 
intervene. A human resources manager with an amplifier tried to speak to the crowd 
only to be repeatedly shouted down.” 
 
Striking workers sought to draw public attention to their demands. In staging their 
                                                      
625 Worker interviewee 19. 
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collective actions in the street, they alarmed the stability-obsessed local authorities. 
The police force, supporting management, quickly broke up a 50-person picket line 
and pressured all the remaining workers to return to the factory and go back to work. 
This display of state force revealed clearly another dimension of the hand-in-glove 
relationship between the corporation and local government. 
 
Foxconn then launched a huge recruitment campaign to gear up its iPhone 
components production at the Taiyuan plant. The brief strike did not win workers a 
wage raise. Grievances over wages and benefits, speedups, and humiliating treatment 
of workers remained unaddressed. Communication between workers and 
management, particularly top Taiwanese as well as Chinese leaders, was blocked. 
 
On the shop floor, the change in production requirements from iPhone 4S to iPhone 
5 and the increase in hourly output targets placed workers under still more intense 
stress. In September, with record iPhone 5 pre-orders, shipping delays became a 
source of concern for Apple and Foxconn. But the tightly integrated global 
production regime also provided workers with an opportunity to demonstrate their 
collective strength. 
 
At about 11 p.m. on 23 September, “a number of security officers severely beat two 
workers for failing to show their staff IDs. They kicked them until they fell to the 
ground,” eyewitness Luo Dingguo 626  said. A “bloody fight” between several 
security officers and workers at the male dormitory, and the screams of the victims, 
alerted many others in the darkness. Dingguo added, “We cursed the security officers 
and demanded that they stop. There were more than thirty of us so they ran away!”  
 
But not for long. A squad of 50 security officers marched to the dormitory, 
infuriating the assembled workers. At midnight, tens of thousands of workers 
smashed security offices, production facilities, shuttle buses, motorbikes, cars, shops 
and canteens in the dormitory and factory complex. Some grabbed iPhones from a 
warehouse, where Zhonghong and his co-workers were on duty during the night shift. 
Many others broke windows, demolished company fences, and pillaged factory 
supermarkets and convenience stores. Workers also overturned police cars and set 
them ablaze. The security chief used a patrol car public address system to order the 
workers to end their “illegal activities.” The situation was getting out of control as 
more and more workers joined the roaring crowd. 
 
                                                      
626 Worker interviewee 21. 
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Zhonghong explained, “The violence was caused by pent-up frustration over our 
poor treatment. The beatings by the security guards simply provided the spark. You 
see, over these past two months we couldn’t even get paid leave when we were 
sick.”627 The ever-tightening, shorter iPhone production cycle pressured workers 
and frontline managerial staff, so that workers could not even take one day off in a 
week, and the sick were compelled to continue to work. 
 
Workers used their cell phones to send images to media outlets in real time. A Foxconn Taiyuan 
security room destroyed and a Foxconn bus front window smashed in the September 2012 
unrest. Photo credit: Yu Zhonghong. 
 
Some 5,000 armed police officers were dispatched to the Foxconn Taiyuan plant to “restore 
order” at 3 a.m. on 24 September 2012. Photo credit: Yu Zhonghong. 
 
                                                      
627 Worker interviewee 20. 
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Justifying the use of paramilitary force, Foxconn blamed the workers, alleging that 
they were fighting among themselves. The company statement reads: “A personal 
dispute between several employees escalated into an incident involving some 2,000 
workers. The cause of this dispute is under investigation by local authorities…but it 
appears not to have been work-related.” 628  Foxconn’s characterization of the 
problem as “a personal dispute between several employees” rubbed salt into the 
workers’ wounds. Dingguo said, “Foxconn didn’t admit the daily bullying of workers 
by its security force but shifted all the responsibility to us. Line leaders coerce us to 
meet the extremely tight deadlines.”629 Foxconn’s investigation of the incident as the 
result of a “personal dispute” meant they could ignore shop floor conditions. 
 
Dingguo observed that management has “good salaries, big families, and nice living 
conditions. When managers take journalists to tour the plant, they show them a clean 
and tidy female dorm room with six people. They should instead come to our 
twelve-person dorm to smell our room and talk to us!” Workers are quick to see 
through the hypocrisy of company leaders. 
 
At the same time, with Apple pressuring Foxconn to fulfill targets, the potential for 
workers to display their power appeared great. Workers interrupted the continuous 
production flow by up to a day in an effort to force their employer and government 
officials, including the local trade union, to enter negotiations. Nevertheless they 
were unsuccessful. 
 
Labor Strikes 
 
Foxconn Taiyuan manufactures iPhone casings and sends them to a larger 
Zhengzhou complex in adjacent Henan province for final assembly. Less than two 
weeks later, in October 2012, over 3,000 Foxconn Zhengzhou workers from one 
production department protested against their managers’ unreasonable approach to 
quality control. 
 
From late September to early October, consumers in the United States and elsewhere 
complained about scratches on the casing of a particular batch of the new iPhone 5, 
leading to product quality control investigations of final assembly at the Zhengzhou 
                                                      
628 Quoted in Cain Nunns, 26 September 2012, “Apple Profits Unharmed by Foxconn Factory Riots,” 
GlobalPost. http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/apple-profits-unharmed-foxconn-factory-riots 
629 Worker interviewee 21. 
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plant.630 New quality standards contributed to workers’ eye strain and headaches. Li 
Meixia,631 19, recalled, “We had no time off during the National Day celebrations 
and now we’re forced to fix the defective products. The new precision requirement 
for the screens of the iPhone 5 measured in two-hundredths of a millimeter cannot be 
detected by human eyes. We use microscopes to check product appearance. It’s 
impossibly strict.” On 5 October, the Friday afternoon, when production managers 
yelled at the workers and threatened to fire them if they did not “cooperate and 
concentrate at work,” Meixia and her co-workers walked out of the workshop to 
protest against abuses. Several workers were penalized for not meeting the 0.02 mm 
new standards and quarrels erupted between workers and quality control team 
leaders, resulting in group fighting and some injuries. 
 
In the case-manufacturing process, workers were also instructed to use protective 
cases to prevent scratches of the ultra-thin iPhone 5, and close attention to the most 
minute detail at a highly-pressured and fast working pace was and remains a major 
source of work stress. The strike at Meixia’s workshop paralyzed dozens of 
production lines in Zones K and L. Senior managers demanded that night-shift 
workers adhere to stringent quality standards. The brief strike was not successful in 
winning workers’ the reasonable rest periods they wanted.  
 
The increasing number of Chinese workers incorporated in transnational production 
is coinciding with a surge in worker unrest throughout the country. Foxconn workers 
at the Taiyuan and Zhengzhou factories did not join together in coordinated actions, 
despite playing closely related parts in the final stages of the iPhone supply chain. 
Confronting the unified power of the company, the management-controlled union 
and the local government, labor actions have been short-lived and confined to a 
single workplace. 
 
Slowdown on the Line 
 
On the factory floor, line leaders had been wearing light-blue vests with bold 
Chinese characters proclaiming their “loving heart”632 — testifying to a managerial 
culture of “love and care” in the aftermath of the suicides. But Foxconn’s 
competitive advantage in electronics was built on the intensification of labor, quality 
                                                      
630 Andrew Grush, 24 September 2012, “iPhone 5’s Killer New Feature: Scuffs, Scratches and Dents,” 
Mobile Magazine. 
http://www.mobilemag.com/2012/09/24/iphone-5s-killer-new-feature-scuffs-scratches-and-dents/ 
631 Worker interviewee 25. 
632 Ai xin (愛心). 
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control and, often, 12-hour shifts which belie the talk of loving hearts. In October 
2011, the Technology Merging Services Business Group (TMSBG) of the Foxconn 
Longhua plant in Shenzhen reported a slowdown in Amazon Kindle assembly. 
 
Facing the speedups that regularly accompany the unveiling of new models, on 20 
October, a group of 60 night-shift workers decided to go slow. “The A1 Line was 
composed of 41 male and 19 female workers,” Cao Yi,633 a young Hunanese said. 
His five closest friends from Hunan, Chongqing and Guizhou worked on the same 
line. Yi complained vociferously, “We’ve been pushed like mad dogs to meet 
impossible production targets.” 
 
Yi had been working at Foxconn for two months. “Our hands and our minds never 
rest. There was no way we could ever work fast enough to meet the production quota, 
so we decided to ease off!” His fellow workmates supported the decision. “This 
week, the output quota has been adjusted upward for the second time, from 1,800 to 
2,100 units; it’s really too much,” Yi’s friend echoed.634   
 
The A1 Line workers took action after the midnight meal break. Yi was responsible 
for product quality assurance in the middle of the line. There were two other quality 
checkers, one each at the first quarter and third quarter positions on the line. “I 
instructed the first process-checker and the workers at the front of the line to set a 
slow pace, so that workers on the whole line could comfortably handle the work,” Yi 
explained to me. Some 20 workers listened to Yi attentively in the factory canteen 
and nodded their heads. In the following four hours after work resumed, the e-book 
readers flowed slowly along the conveyor belt. Every worker on the line was either 
actively or passively participating in the industrial action. 
 
At the early breakfast hour, Yi and three leading workers celebrated their small 
victory. However, the coordinated slow down by several dozen workers immediately 
drew supervisory attention and tighter surveillance. Workers were ordered to meet 
the strict production quota the following nights. In response, Yi decided to 
“creatively make defective products.”  
 
In the male dormitory, Yi and his co-workers spread word about the proposed action, 
involving as many workers as possible so that no individual could be identified or 
singled out for punishment. In many open labor confrontations, either employer or 
                                                      
633 Worker interviewee 16. 
634 Worker interviewee 18. 
184 
 
government officials in question require workers to elect their representatives, 
generally limited to five, to engage in negotiations and talks,635 but these leaders can 
then be dismissed. Mutual protection and trust among “underground activists” were 
thus very important to the success of a collective action.  
 
Yi and his co-workers texted the “call for action”636 message through their cell 
phones. They also held small group discussions in dormitory rooms. That Thursday 
night, on 27 October 2011, many workers on the A1 Line intentionally left out a 
screw on the Amazon Kindle casing. Others did not affix the bar code in the right 
place. The petty sabotage was soon discovered. As product quality was the highest 
priority, the line leader had to check each and every work procedure. The speed of 
the line eventually slowed down when the assistant line leaders realized the 
seriousness of the workers’ resistance. Workers had joined together to score another 
small victory.  
 
Yi and others challenged their subordinate position, so patently at odds with the 
managerial discourse of love, care and employee support. The shop floor had 
become a battlefield. 
 
Management had other weapons. In early November 2011, the A1 Line was 
thoroughly reorganized, and Yi and his workmates were dispersed among the F4 and 
F5 factory complexes. The length of the work day, intensity of labor, pace of work 
and social organization of the labor process have been crucial arenas of contestation 
between the workers and their managers from the remote past to the present, and the 
struggles go on. Foxconn eventually crushed this protest, yet the workplace-based 
development of communication among workers and the experience of collective 
mobilization suggest possibilities for future labor actions. It also made clear the 
limits of actions in which worker organization was forced to remain covert and 
informal (and in which the formal union staunchly supported management). 
 
  
                                                      
635 With the small number of worker representatives elected, things are put under control, and this 
strategic intervention marks the formal beginning of “fragmentation and co-optation” of worker power. 
See Ching Kwan Lee and Yonghong Zhang, 2013, “The Power of Instability: Unraveling the 
Microfoundations of Bargained Authoritarianism in China,” American Journal of Sociology 118(6), 
pp. 1475-1508. 
636 Xingdong huyu (行動呼籲). 
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Group Fighting and Work Stoppage 
 
In high-speed production, arguments between workers and quality controllers, and 
quarrels between managers and workers, all give rise to seething anger. Sometimes 
this has led to group fighting. As company conflict resolution channels are 
ineffective, workers have felt compelled to express grievances through violence, 
including violence directed against management and against the dormitories whose 
facilities are failing them.  
 
 
Foxconn Chengdu factory’s 18-story male dormitory, Block 2. Most of the workers found their 
living conditions intolerable. oisy, dirty, smelly and above all, lacking water and electricity, 
the dormitories were the subject of frequent complaints. Photo credit: Jenny Chan. 
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When Foxconn opened its operation in Sichuan province in the fall of 2010, the local 
government provided the company with new blocks of high-rise dormitory buildings 
with basic amenities, among many other incentives to locate its factories in their area. 
This is but one example of collaboration between entrepreneurial local governments 
and businesses. Each dormitory of Foxconn Chengdu’s plant has 18 floors, with 24 
rooms per floor and eight workers per room. Employers contract with private 
property management firms to run the dormitories, who then directly sign rental 
leases with the concerned workers. 
 
The first-phase Xinan male worker dormitory, located two kilometers from the 
manufacturing complex, houses 20,000 people. On the night of 6 January 2011, one 
of the two elevators in the 18-story block was out of order. Thousands of workers, 
after an exhausting work shift, had to climb the stairs to their rooms only to find that 
there was no hot water for showers. That month, the average temperature was 
between 1°C and 5°C, and electricity and water supplies repeatedly failed. Several 
workers angrily ran to the dormitory roof, destroyed the water tank, switched off the 
power, and cut off the entire water supply system. Workers were shouting, yelling 
and rushing out of their rooms to find out what was going on. They threw glass 
bottles, plastic basins, trash bins, stools and fire extinguishers from the upper floors 
to the ground below. By 10 p.m., the police had arrested more than two dozen 
workers and a lockdown halted the protests. The company branded the workers’ 
behavior “senseless.”637 
 
In addition to the poor living environment, workers protested against their very low 
wages: the basic monthly pay was just 950 Yuan, falling short of the 1,600 Yuan 
they had been promised.638 Foxconn justified the difference by arguing the higher 
figure was their “comprehensive income,”639 that is, the basic wage plus overtime 
premiums and bonuses. 
 
Foxconn workers earned just a little for assembling iPads. By contrast, Apple made a 
big fortune by selling iPads globally. Not long after the original iPad was introduced 
in April 2010, Apple reinvented the iPad to boost sales. A company press statement 
dated 2 March 2011 reads, “While others have been scrambling to copy the first 
generation iPad, we’re launching iPad 2, which moves the bar far ahead of the 
                                                      
637 Manager interviewee 4. 
638 Worker interviewees 31, 36 and 40. 
639 Zonghe gongzi (綜合工資). 
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competition and will likely cause them to go back to the drawing boards yet 
again.”640 
 
Eventually on 2 March 2011 — when Apple launched iPad 2 in the American 
markets — an open dispute over wages broke out at the Foxconn factory. More than 
200 workers argued with their supervisors over job evaluations and wage 
adjustments that were supposed to take place after the six-month probationary period. 
A 17-year-old worker told me, “We were hired in September 2010 and then were 
sent right away to the Shenzhen iPad assembly lines for three months. Later, when 
the new workshops were open, we came back. We’ve been working for another three 
months now at the Chengdu plant. But management claimed that we had not passed 
the probationary requirements. Why? They owed us an explanation. We’re very 
angry!”641 
 
Refusing to work after lunch, the workers occupied the B22 factory canteen and 
demanded to negotiate with senior managers. When their demand for a 20 percent 
pay rise was turned down, at 3:30 p.m., they marched out of the canteen to gather at 
the main entrance of the plant at Zone C. Their goal was to draw public and 
government attention to their grievances in order to increase pressure on 
management.642  
 
Traffic police and company security officers quickly arrived on the scene. Only then 
did the company manager invite the workers’ representatives to sit down and talk, 
indicating the success of the strategy. Mr. Chen, the corporate human resources 
manager who mediated the dispute, later recalled that the protesting workers 
responded that they had no representatives, “we’re all leaders.”643 Concerned about 
retaliation, such as blacklisting or firing, the workers tried to protect each other in a 
collectivity with no visible leaders.644 Without representation and support from the 
official union, workers improvised their organizing and negotiation methods. 
 
The Foxconn Chengdu plant was — and still is — the crucial supplier of iPads for 
                                                      
640 Apple, 2 March 2011, “Apple Launches iPad 2.” 
https://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/03/02Apple-Launches-iPad-2.html   
641 Worker interviewee 31. 
642 Worker interviewee 41. 
643 Manager interviewee 2. 
644 In the face of managerial retaliation and/or state repression, workers’ collective actions were thus 
rendered “leaderless,” even when there were in fact labor leaders behind the scene. See also, Pun Ngai, 
Chris King-Chi Chan and Jenny Chan, 2010, “The Role of the State, Labour Policy and Migrant 
Workers’ Struggles in Globalized China,” Global Labour Journal 1(1), pp. 132-51. 
http://digitalcommons.mcmaster.ca/globallabour/vol1/iss1/8/ 
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the world. The iPad strikers timed their wage bargaining action to the strategic 
moment when Apple announced the debut of iPad 2 on 2 March 2011. They were 
becoming more aware of the need to work together to demand higher pay, better 
conditions, and stronger labor rights protection. At the same time, the company 
moved to hire more student interns to fill the assembly lines and to “divide the labor 
force,” while the managing director made a concession to worker demands, agreeing 
to “increase some wages” to quell the small dispute occurring at a time when 
management faced intense pressure from Apple.645  
 
Mass Suicide Threats 
 
In recent years Foxconn has accelerated mass transfers of workers from coastal cities 
to interior regions to offset rising labor costs. At the Wuhan plant in central China’s 
Hubei province, workers protested against unfair staffing policies and the resultant 
wage cuts in early 2012. Since its arrival in the region in 2007, Foxconn has grown 
to be the largest employer in the Wuhan East Lake Hi-Tech Development Zone. On 3 
January 2012, 150 workers from the AP5 workshop threatened to jump from the 
factory building if managers refused to solve the wage disputes following their 
compulsory transfer from Shenzhen to Wuhan. The return of the specter of suicides 
quickly drew government and media attention. Standing on the roof, workers posted 
their news in real time on the Internet via cell phones, thus attracting attention from 
Microsoft. The one-day walkout caused the shutdown of an Xbox 360 game-console 
workshop.646  
 
As of January 2012, Foxconn paid its workers at the Wuhan factory a basic wage of 
1,350 Yuan per month, which was 200 Yuan lower than the wage in Shenzhen. The 
newly transferred workers from the two Foxconn Shenzhen facilities were also 
furious about the rough treatment they received from Foxconn Wuhan managers, 
who told them they would be fired if they did not return to their post immediately.647  
 
The standoff continued into the night. Local government officials remained highly 
alert to outbreaks of large protests, which they viewed as a destabilizing force that 
could undermine economic goals and provoke the disapproval of higher authorities. 
Under mounting public pressure, at 9 p.m., Tang Liangzhi, the mayor of Wuhan city, 
                                                      
645 Manager interviewee 2. 
646 WantChina Times, 13 January 2012, “Wuhan Foxconn Protest Resolved Promptly: Microsoft.” 
http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20120113000026&cid=1102 
647 Worker interviewees 27 and 28. 
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finally talked the protesting workers into coming down,648 after demanding that 
management compensate the affected workers in accordance with the law.  
 
Workers could “choose” to continue working at the Wuhan plant, or leave and 
receive severance pay. As of the morning of 4 January, 45 workers had quit. The 
Hi-Tech Development Zone trade union federation, which had initially failed to work 
with the Foxconn union branch to protect the workers, subsequently failed to help 
the remaining 100-plus strikers bargain for new work assignments. In their new jobs 
workers received 13 percent less than their former posts at the Shenzhen plant.  
 
 
Threatening to jump from the factory’s rooftop while negotiating for a fair wage. Foxconn 
Wuhan workers — highly sensitive about media’s preoccupation with Foxconn and global 
brands — used their cell phones to send out photos and called for help in January 2012. Photo 
credit: An anonymous Foxconn worker. 
 
Three months after the January 2012 mass suicide threat, workers used the same 
headline-grabbing means in another effort to seek a pay raise. When they were 
transferred from Shenzhen to Wuhan, not only were their basic wages cut, but they 
soon discovered that the move resulted in a substantial loss of welfare benefits. Su 
Hualing,649 a 19-year-old Hubei native, explained her anger: “My health insurance 
plan cannot be transferred from Shenzhen to Wuhan. Are my employer’s 
contributions to the Shenzhen social security scheme over the past two years all gone? 
                                                      
648 Worker interviewees 29 and 33. 
649 Worker interviewee 27. 
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I am told that I can only claim my own premiums, but not those of the employer. It’s 
because the Shenzhen government department keeps the ten percent monthly 
contributions made by Foxconn [based on Hualing’s basic pay].” This despite the 
fact that she remains a Foxconn employee. The inability of rural migrant workers to 
carry their benefits to new localities when they change jobs, leave the labor market 
(due to child-birth and child-rearing) or retire, due to the lack of coordination 
between government administrative institutions, has been a chronic problem in 
China.650  
 
Foxconn did not compensate its workers for their loss of health insurance. Instead, it 
stated that the Shenzhen government had not permitted the company to carry forward 
the insurance premiums for its transferred employees, thus pinning blame for the 
problem on the local government. Similarly, the Foxconn trade union did not act on 
workers’ behalf in this situation. The institutional subordination of the grassroots 
union to enterprise management and local government is a major obstacle to the 
protection of worker interests in grievance resolution.651 Within the subservient 
structure, workplace union branches almost invariably take a pro-management stance 
in mediation and pre-empt workers’ organizing efforts. 
  
As a result, Hualing and her co-workers had no choice but withdraw their own 
individual payments from the insurance account from the Shenzhen Human 
Resources and Social Security Bureau. They were unable, however, to recoup those 
that Foxconn made in their names. “I’m very upset,” Hualing said. She had 
discovered one of the most vexing problems confronting workers for whom medical 
insurance and other social benefits including pensions are not portable. At present, 
government social security reforms are piecemeal and limited in scope. Hualing 
voiced legitimate concerns about basic health care needs and the responsibility of the 
company, which had transferred her to its new low wage plant, to compensate her for 
the losses. Besides lower wages and benefits, Hualing added, “working conditions 
are awful.” 
 
Although the subordination of labor at Foxconn is the product of the intertwined 
interests of government, company and union, discontent in the form of protest has 
                                                      
650 See, for example, Mark W. Frazier, 2011, “Social Policy and Public Opinion in an Age of 
Insecurity,” From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalization: Markets, Workers, and the State in a Changing 
China, edited by Sarosh Kuruvilla, Ching Kwan Lee and Mary E. Gallagher, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, pp. 61-79.   
651 Feng Chen, 2009, “Union Power in China: Source, Operation, and Constraints,” Modern China 
35(6), pp. 662-89; Feng Chen, 2007, “Individual Rights and Collective Rights: Labor’s Predicament 
in China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 40, pp. 59-79. 
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thus far been directed exclusively at the employer. Hualing and her co-workers told 
me that their “total income was drastically reduced following their move to the 
Wuhan plant in January 2012.”652 At the Personal Computing Electronics Business 
Group (PCEBG), managers cancelled workers’ weekend overtime pay, replacing it 
with compensatory time off. Under this policy designed to cut overtime payments, 
during February and March 2012, many workers only made basic wages, despite 
putting in “tens of hours of overtime work on the weekends.”653 The reason is that 
workers were not paid double wages for overtime work on Saturdays and Sundays; 
instead, the company cooked the books by offering “free time” in lieu of the 
overtime wages in the weeks following peak intensity periods. 
 
On the morning of 25 April 2012, when workers received their wage statements for 
the month, anger boiled over at this injustice. Nearly 200 mold-stamping workers of 
the DT2 workshop took the lead in walking off the factory floor. On the roof of the 
three-storey building, they chanted, “Wo yao jiaxin!” (I want a raise!); and, “Li 
Wenzhong, gundan!” (Down with Li Wenzhong [the business group leader]!).654 
After a standoff of more than 10 hours, city government officials were forced to step 
in to promise increased wages. The ticking bomb of a prolonged walkout or mass 
suicides was removed. While the protesting workers did not succeed in having the 
business group chief removed from his position, they won hard-earned weekend 
overtime wages. This modest worker victory, derived from their collective power at 
the point of production, may embolden them to fight for more rights in the future. 
 
Foxconn spokesman Simon Tsing did not comment on the wage and benefit cuts, 
merely telling Reuters that “the dispute” has been settled after “negotiations 
involving the human resources and legal departments as well as the local 
government.” He also emphasized that “no one had actually jumped off any 
building.”655 
 
It is noteworthy that the aggrieved workers at the assembly workshop did not face 
obstruction from their line and team leaders during the protest. Wang Shuping,656 a 
23-year-old line leader, explained, “We were concerned about the big problem as our 
own interests had been similarly hurt by the forced transfer and subsequent wage and 
benefit cuts.” 
                                                      
652 Worker interviewees 27 and 28. 
653 Worker interviewee 28. 
654 Worker interviewees 27 and 29. 
655 Quoted in Reuters, 27 April 2012, “Workers Protest at Foxconn Plant in China.” 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/27/us-china-foxconn-idUSBRE83Q0JV20120427  
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Indeed, this was a rare instance in which frontline workers and line and team leaders 
found their interests aligned. When overtime hours were cut, the wages of employees 
and line and team leaders were also cut. Several line leaders encouraged the new 
workers to join the industrial action without fear of retaliation from them. Following 
the protests, Foxconn senior managers have always demanded that frontline leaders 
not support disruptive actions. The pledge states: 
 
As a manager of the company, regardless of the reason, I will not 
insinuate, instigate or incite employees to use improper means to 
express their demands. Under no circumstance will I participate in an 
illegal assembly, march, demonstration, organization or activity. 
Should I discover employees’ participating in an illegal assembly, 
march, demonstration, organization or activity, I will persuade them 
to stop and report it immediately.657  
 
Employees, from assembly-line workers to low-level management personnel, had 
vented their anger in joint struggles. Foxconn senior managers subsequently adopted 
stricter measures to deter workers and staff from uniting to protect worker interests 
or press for changes. Line leaders were prohibited from releasing any “unauthorized 
information” about the company that might harm its reputation.  
 
Labor Unrest and Enterprise Union Reforms 
 
As disputes over working and living conditions have triggered collective actions, 
local government officials including the trade union cadres have intervened in highly 
publicized labor conflicts. This is merely a reactive approach. What are the prospects 
for workers to really exercise their trade union rights? How to establish an effective 
mechanism for resolving disputes through collective bargaining at the enterprise 
level? 
 
Workers are accumulating organizing skills and demanding with greater persistence 
their rights to decent wages, safe working conditions, and responsive union 
representation. Some, including rural migrants, have acquired experience in union 
elections at the enterprise level, such as those in Reebok supplier factories in the 
                                                      
657 The Foxconn management directive is reprinted online at the Boxun net on 16 May 2012, entitled 
“Wuhan yuanqu guanli renyuan guanli zeren chengnuo shu” (Agreement to Wuhan Factory 
Management Responsibilities by Staff) 武漢園區管理人員管理責任承諾書. 
http://boxun.com/news/gb/china/2012/05/201205162012.shtml   
193 
 
early 2000s658 and Walmart retail stores in 2006.659 In fact, free nomination of 
candidates and direct union elections are not new. As early as 1988, the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), based on direct elections in the Shekou export 
processing zone in Shenzhen and elsewhere, proposed that “trade union leaders at all 
levels should be democratically elected” in an orderly manner.660 The initiative, 
however, was shelved following the crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen Movement. 
 
From the mid-1990s, against the background of radical restructuring resulting in the 
loss of union members in the state sector, enterprise union reforms sped up. Some 
open-minded union leaders have supported greater worker participation in union 
activity. Responding to worker actions, they seek to create unions more responsive to 
worker grievances in an era of rampant social inequality and rising protest.661 In 
August 2010, Kong Xianghong, vice-chair of the Guangdong Federation of Trade 
Unions, presided over the direct election of shop-floor union representatives at the 
Honda (Nanhai) auto factory and subsequent collective wage bargaining in 2011.662 
However, many workers were disappointed at the fact that the discredited factory 
union chair was permitted to retain his post as head of a partially reformed union and 
the two “elected” vice-chairs were top-level managers, reflecting continued 
managerial control. Moreover, while the company was forced to yield on the 
important wage issue, it was able to ignore all other worker demands including those 
for women’s rights and improved welfare benefits (paid maternity leave and a 
one-hour meal break among them). As a result, the union committee quickly lost the 
confidence of rank-and-file workers.663 Nevertheless, the Honda strike was widely 
recognized as among the most important worker victories, a product in part due to 
the fact that the company was Japanese owned and the Guangdong Federation of 
Trade Unions has been among the most responsive to worker demands. 
 
                                                      
658 Anita Chan, 2009, “Challenges and Possibilities for Democratic Grassroots Union Elections in 
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663 Rena Lau, 2012, “Restructuring of the Honda Auto Parts Union in Guangdong, China: A 2-Year 
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Union building with the active involvement of workers is a long and painstaking 
process, all the more so in an era in which the union movement is in retreat before 
the neo-liberal wave in many countries including those of Western Europe and North 
America. Tim Pringle, in assessing the future of Chinese union reforms, stresses the 
need not only for “more accountable enterprise-level union chairpersons and 
committees” but “more supportive, interactive and, at times, directive relationships 
between the higher trade unions and their enterprise-level subordinates.”664 In 2012, 
Wang Tongxin, vice-chair of the Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions, called for 
“power for the workers” 665  and supported the municipal government plan to 
facilitate direct union elections at 163 enterprises (each with more than 1,000 
workers) whose union committees were up for re-election during the year and shortly 
after. This suggests that a directly elected union leadership may be emerging within a 
“party state-led” model of dispute mediation and unionization in Guangdong’s 
workplaces.666 The context is one of growing workers’ coordination such that, as 
Mary Gallagher suggests, “the state has struggled to maintain its labor system 
through more direct management of labor disputes.”667  
 
The special circumstances surrounding the Honda case suggest that it cannot be 
widely generalized, even at other large foreign-owned enterprises. The Guangdong 
union federation officials have not targeted union reorganization at Foxconn. Direct 
state management from above has inevitably met with resistance by strong capital, in 
this case, the country’s largest company union with a membership of over 500,000 
employees in Shenzhen alone, or a total of 1.4 million employees throughout the 
country.668 As of spring 2014, union reorganization through workers’ democratic 
participation at Foxconn, according to an interviewed line leader, has not yet 
begun.669 The corrupt Foxconn union, not unlike many other enterprise unions, has 
                                                      
664 Tim Pringle, 2011, Trade Unions in China: The Challenge of Labour Unrest, Abingdon, UK: 
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failed workers time and again. The ACFTU, in short, remains mostly ineffective at 
the workplace level. Bargaining by workers’ direct actions, in the form of riots or 
otherwise, has been and remains a viable way to address workers’ shared grievances. 
Yet the iron triangle of company, company union and the local Chinese state, 
maintains fundamental control over the workplace and labor. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The oppressive conditions that confront Chinese workers in the market economy 
have led to a crescendo of protests since the early 1990s with specific demands for 
access to economic rights and social equity. With Foxconn and other large 
companies building subsidiaries and relocating workers from coastal to interior 
regions, worker protests are spreading throughout China. As labor actions proliferate 
and a younger generation is becoming more familiar with the Internet, they are 
acquiring new communication skills and knowledge of their rights. Foxconn workers 
use their cell phones to send messages to journalists and attract the media’s attention, 
generating public pressure over their bosses. In the face of rising labor protests in 
supplier factories, an anonymous Apple executive told the 2ew York Times on 26 
December 2012 that “the days of easy globalization are done.”670 But many workers 
have not experienced the “ease” or benefits that have been lavished on corporations 
and their executives.  
 
Tensions boil over in many Foxconn plants when shipping deadlines approach and 
management demands longer working days without adequate rest. In response, 
worker protestors have opted for independent organizing strategies that prioritize 
direct action at the point of production. They have condemned and bypassed the 
management-controlled union. With workers aware of the opportunities presented by 
the demand by Apple, Amazon, Microsoft and other companies to meet quotas for 
new product models or holiday sales, they have come together at the dormitory, 
workshop or factory level to voice demands. They “name and shame” what they see 
as the Foxconn “sweatshop”, urging global brands to live up to their professed 
corporate citizenship ideals.671 When the work pressure becomes intolerable, they 
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stop working, though only temporarily.  
 
In class struggles, workers (and their supporters) are the agency of historical 
development, and their efforts will continue to bring about labor reforms and 
institutional changes. If fair union elections and collective bargaining were 
guaranteed, beginning with Foxconn’s Longhua and Guanlan mega factories in 
Shenzhen, this would be a landmark event for workers across China. To preserve its 
leadership and the authoritarian regime, the Chinese state has partially responded to 
aggrieved workers’ demands (such as overtime wages and severance pay), and 
simultaneously channeled discontent through the bureaucratic mechanisms while 
acting decisively to crack down on large-scale protests.672 In most instances, worker 
solidarity dissipated when leaders were intimidated or arrested, or when 
state-brokered settlements provided workers with limited gains while leaving the 
political structure and the fundamental pattern of social inequality intact.673 It is 
unclear how long this government interventionist strategy will remain viable, 
particularly when workers’ basic rights and interests are routinely violated in the 
radical transformation of the economy.  
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Chapter 10 
 
Conclusion 
 
Few in China would want a return to the days of Mao Zedong… But 
the [1949] revolution is among the significant legacies of Chinese 
society….it continues to inspire confidence in the possibility of a 
different kind of society. It is this legacy that continues to fuel serious 
criticism in China. 
—Arif Dirlik674  
 
China is widely recognized as the workshop of the world — a colossus of mass 
production and export-driven growth. Production, distribution, and consumption 
drive the accumulation of profit and capital in China and globally. Apple, Samsung, 
Microsoft, Amazon, Sony, Nintendo, Lenovo and others compete in smartphone, 
computer, tablet, and game-console sales. All of them turn to Foxconn, among others, 
as the efficient producer for their products. We may say that conditions at Foxconn, 
with its 1.4 million employees, reveal in microcosm the lives of hundreds of millions 
of workers in an industrializing and urbanizing China, now the second largest global 
economy. 
 
Since the 1980s, the Chinese state has partnered with global and domestic capital to 
create a new working class centered on rural migrant workers. Hailed by private 
capital and reform intellectuals for their willingness to accept low wages and adapt 
to market changes, rural migrant workers are contrasted with the old urban state 
sector labor force once hailed as the “Masters of Society” and now derided as 
“inflexible” and “unproductive.” Political scientist Dorothy Solinger in her important 
comparative study of China, France and Mexico between 1980 and 2000, starkly 
contrasts the gains of capital and the state vis-à-vis labor’s losses, including lifetime 
employment, health and pension benefits, and status.675 Following the massive 
layoffs that accompanied restructuring and privatization of state-owned enterprises 
in the mid to late 1990s, and the subsequent expansion of private domestic and 
foreign firms, the status distinctions between migrants and locals have been 
somewhat blurred, notably in low-margin manufacturing and assembly. Many more 
young workers are now involved in global production chains earning low wages with 
little security guarantees.  
                                                      
674 Arif Dirlik, 2008, “Introduction,” Boundary 2 35(2), pp. 12-13. 
675 Dorothy J. Solinger, 2009, States’ Gains, Labor’s Losses: China, France, and Mexico Choose 
Global Liaisons, 1980-2000, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
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In 2013, China’s gross domestic product totaled 56.9 trillion Yuan, a 7.7 percent 
increase from the previous year, overshooting the official target of 7.5 percent.676 
Behind the façade of economic prosperity, however, social and class inequality 
deepens. Under the new central government leadership of President Xi Jinping and 
Premier Li Keqiang, researchers have resumed reporting statistical information about 
income inequality after more than a decade’s silence. The latest data in 2013 
indicated that China’s Gini677 is 0.47 (internationally, a Gini coefficient of 0.4 or 
above is considered high) — a level comparable to Nigeria, and slightly higher than 
that of the United States (0.45), all of which rank high in social inequality.678 This 
constitutes a sharp turnaround for a nation notable for low levels of income 
inequality during the period of state socialism from the 1950s through the 1970s. 
 
Social analysts have observed the state policy shift to “the social,”679 or class 
compromise, in the course of rapid marketization. In 2013, the State Council issued a 
35-point document entitled “Several Opinions on Deepening the Reform of the 
Income Distribution System” to address rising income inequality, in line with the 
broad developmental goals of “putting people first” and rebalancing efforts outlined 
in the two previous five-year plans beginning from 2005. 680  Tax revenue 
redistribution from large state-owned enterprises — many of which are highly 
profitable — could contribute to reducing inequality. Increased public spending on 
education, health care, and affordable housing could also benefit low-income 
households, including many rural migrant families and their children. 
 
Specifically, Beijing government leaders have also called on multinational 
companies to “expand cooperation with China, actively participate in the 
                                                      
676 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 21 January 2014, “Preliminary 
Accounting Results of GDP in 2013.” 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201401/t20140121_503020.html  
677 The Gini coefficient ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds with perfect equality (where 
everyone has the same income) and 1 corresponds with perfect inequality (where one person has all 
the income and everyone else has zero income). Rigorously calculated, it may be indicative of broad 
trends of income distribution and inequality. Many believe that China’s official Gini results understate 
inequality. Nevertheless, official results documenting growing inequality over several decades are 
clearly indicative of broad trends. 
678 The Economist, 26 January 2013, “Gini Out of the Bottle.” 
http://www.economist.com.hk/news/china/21570749-gini-out-bottle  
679 Ching Kwan Lee and You-tien Hsing, 2010, “Social Activism in China: Agency and Possibility,” 
Reclaiming Chinese Society: The 2ew Social Activism, edited by You-tien Hsing and Ching Kwan Lee, 
London: Routledge, pp. 1-13. 
680 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2013, “Guanyu shenhua shouru fenpei zhidu 
gaige ruogan yijian” (Several Opinions on Deepening the Reform of the Income Distribution System) 
關於深化收入分配制度改革若干意見, No. 6, 3 February. 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-02/05/content_2327531.htm 
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development of the western part of China, pay more attention to caring for workers 
and share development opportunities with the Chinese side.”681 In these and other 
ways, the Party center signaled its concern over growing inequality and the potential 
for rising social conflict. But obstacles to advancing social equality and securing 
decent livelihood for the disadvantaged are formidable. Local governments and 
capital collaborate to bolster economic growth. Despite labor legislation and new 
regulations designed to protect workers, implementation has at best been weak and 
the laws have often been bent to accommodate company interests. 
 
Perhaps the heart of the problem lies in the fact that while the center has called for 
protection of the interests of rural migrants, such as full and free access to public 
schools and health care programs, it has not provided or has not been able to provide 
the financing to assure the desired results without changing the capitalist mode of 
production and development. As a result, labor grievances build up and social 
activism repeatedly explodes in the form of strikes, protests, demonstrations and 
court challenges.682 
 
China’s Developmental Model and its Limits 
 
China’s emergence as the world factory was driven by the vast pool of rural migrants 
unleashed in the wake of decollectivization, economic policy shifts promoting rural 
to urban migration and export-oriented industrialization, the privatization of 
substantial portions of industry, and substantial foreign capital investment. The 
nation is riven by deep tensions played out across spatial and class lines. When Time 
magazine nominated workers in China as the runners-up in the 2009 Person of the 
Year, the editor commented that Chinese workers have brightened the future of 
humanity by “leading the world to economic recovery.”683 What is certain is that the 
new generation of workers continues to struggle to build a brighter future in the 
midst of profound social and economic change while facing insecurity and 
inequality.684  
                                                      
681 Quoted in Xinhua, 28 March 2012, “Vice Premier Li Keqiang Meets Apple’s Tim Cook.” 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-03/28/c_131494793.htm 
682 Mark Selden and Elizabeth J. Perry, 2010, “Introduction: Reform, Conflict and Resistance in 
Contemporary China,” Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, edited by Elizabeth J. Perry 
and Mark Selden, London: Routledge, pp. 1-30. 
683 Austin Ramzy, 16 December 2009, “Person of the Year 2009, Runners-Up: The Chinese Worker.” 
Time. 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1946375_1947252_1947256,00.html 
684 On recent discussions about precarious work and precarious labor (in China, the United States, 
and other social context), see Arne Kalleberg, 2009, “Precarious Work and Insecure Workers: 
Employment Relations in Transition,” American Sociological Review 74(1), pp. 1-22; Ching Kwan 
Lee and Yelizavetta Kofman, 2012, “The Politics of Precarity: Views beyond the United States,” Work 
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Unraveling the contradictions beneath the competitive “China price,” (i.e. the low 
prices of Chinese exports to the world market), Alexandra Harney draws attention to 
the true cost of Chinese competitive advantage, and issues a warning: “The high 
costs the country pays to achieve the China price make sustaining it a high-wire 
act.”685 Indeed, I have shown that Chinese migrant workers — not least those in the 
employ of such enormous and technologically adept companies as Foxconn — are 
compelled to perform a “high-wire act,” one that entails high risks, dangers and 
sacrifices for many, allowing disproportionate rewards for a few. 
 
The responsibility for the China price is not, of course, that of Chinese workers, who 
some see as job stealers from European or North American workers. Chinese 
workers, together with their peers in other emerging economies, are put under 
extreme pressure in global production structures that work to the advantage of Apple, 
Foxconn, and other corporations. In the global race to the bottom, transnational 
capital has accelerated their move to Bangladesh, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia and 
other countries in search of cheaper and more vulnerable labor.686 Indeed, as the 
combination of labor protests and state policies inexorably drive up Chinese wages, 
goods such as electronics and textiles labeled “Made in China” have fiercely 
competed with products from lower wage countries in Asia and elsewhere. Hundreds 
of millions of Chinese workers are subjected to market uncertainties, while young 
migrant workers’ direct actions staged at global factories are testimonies to the 
plights of a new working class.  
 
Suicide as Protest 
 
Suicide is an intensely personal, as well as social, response to one’s circumstances. 
In November 1970 in South Korea, 22-year-old textile worker Chun Tae-il 
immolated himself as a means to call on the government to protect workers’ rights. 
His desperate act inspired the labor and democratic movements that followed and 
helped transform South Korean politics and society, galvanizing “collective action 
by mobilizing the ‘hearts and minds’ of the target audience.”687 Did the Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                      
and Occupations 39(4), pp. 388-408; Guy Standing, 2011, The Precariat: The 2ew Dangerous Class, 
London: Bloomsbury; Ronaldo Munck, 2013, “The Precariat: A View from the South,” Third World 
Quarterly 34(5), pp. 747-62. 
685 Alexandra Harney, 2008, The China Price: The True Cost of Chinese Competitive Advantage, 
New York: The Penguin Press, p. 11. 
686 See for example, Jaesok Kim, 2013, Chinese Labor in a Korean Factory: Class, Ethnicity, and 
Productivity on the Shop Floor in Globalizing China, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
687 Kim Hyojoung, 2008, “Micromobilization and Suicide Protest in South Korea, 1970-2004,” 
Social Research 75(2), p. 549. 
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workers at Foxconn, not unlike their Korean peers,688 engage in micro-mobilization 
by leaping to their deaths to awaken the people? 
 
Some Chinese workers and commentators certainly think so. A young migrant 
worker Xiaoxiao memorializes the 12 Foxconn workers who attempted suicide at the 
two Shenzhen factory complexes in the first five months of 2010. His poem uses the 
Chinese character for tiao689 (jump or leap) twelve times to represent the workers, 
who he identifies as “our martyred workmates.” 
 
Grieving Our Martyred Foxconn Workmates
690
 
 
From the radio 
Music lingers in the ears 
On the television 
A pleasing screen before the eyes 
You, around me, your harmonious exterior  
Covering capital’s hideous heartbeats 
 
A hideous spirit is hard to hide  
The golden era’s cloak wraps tightly  
 
Leap 
I use my life to end your glee 
Leap 
I use my life to stop the production line 
Leap 
I use my life to proclaim to the people 
Leap 
I use my life to protest against the times 
Leap 
I use my life to peel away your cloak 
Leap 
I use my life to let people see you reek of blood  
Leap 
                                                      
688 Jamie Doucette, 2013, “Minjung Tactics in a Post-Minjung Era? The Survival of Self-Immolation 
and Traumatic Forms of Labour Protest in South Korea,” 2ew Forms and Expressions of Conflict in 
the Workplace, edited by Gregor Gall, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 212-32. 
689 Tiao (跳). 
690 Daonian Fushikang gongyou lieshi (悼念富士康工友烈士). 
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I use my life to reveal people’s needs 
Leap 
I use my life to awaken them from their anesthesia  
Leap, Leap, Leap 
We use our lives to excavate a deeper passage 
Leap 
I use my life to seek human dignity 
 
Xiaoxiao, a rural migrant factory worker 
(Translated by Greg Fay) 
 
Xiaoxiao, identifying with his peers, writes in the first person: “I use my life to 
proclaim to the people; I use my life to reveal people’s needs; I use my life to seek 
human dignity.”  
 
If suicide is understood as one extreme form of labor protest chosen by some to 
expose an oppressive production regime in which migrant and other workers are 
deprived of dignified work and lives, many more workers are choosing other courses. 
The testimony of young woman worker Rong Fang691 is illustrative: 
 
One day my co-workers stopped work, ran out of the workshop and 
assembled on the grounds. I followed them. The dispute was over the 
under-reporting of overtime hours and the resulting underpayment of 
overtime wages. After half a day, the human resources managers 
agreed to look into the problems and promised to pay the back wages 
if there had been a company mistake. At night, in the dorm room, my 
older friend explained to me that I had participated in a strike! 
 
A new generation with greater rights consciousness than its predecessors is voicing 
its demands. Assessing the power of labor at key nodes of global production, worker 
activists have rightly concluded that, powerful as it is, Foxconn is vulnerable to work 
stoppages under tight shipment deadlines when new models are released and during 
holiday seasons. They recognize, too, its vulnerability to international pressures in 
the wake of suicides in a media-connected world. Disgruntled workers are calling on 
Apple to take responsibility for conditions at the supplier factories that produce its 
electronic goods. 
 
                                                      
691 Worker interviewee 23. 
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Corporate Social Responsibility in the Electronic Battlefield 
 
In the wake of the multiple suicides of 2010 and continuing labor conflicts, Apple 
has demanded that its suppliers meet international standards of corporate social 
responsibility. Facing adverse publicity and urgent calls that it put its house in 
order,692 Apple has repeatedly emphasized its “suppliers’ responsibility” for wages, 
working hours, occupational safety and health, environmental standards, and more 
recently, proper training for student interns. The point has been hammered home in 
eight supplier progress reports issued between 2007 and 2014. Recurrent labor crises, 
including excessive overtime, at Foxconn are however not merely Foxconn’s 
problem, despite the fact that Apple consistently defines them as such in its 
monitoring of its largest supplier. 
 
Probably no corporation has been more successful than Apple in deflecting criticism 
and articulating claims to moral governance by talking about corporate responsibility. 
Apple’s chief executive Tim Cook has delivered numerous business ethics talks. He 
said in a February 2012 company statement, “We believe that workers everywhere 
have the right to a safe and fair work environment.”693 In a December 2012 media 
statement, Apple claimed that “our efforts range from protecting to empowering to 
improving the lives of everyone involved in assembling an Apple product. No one in 
our industry is doing as much as we are, in as many places, touching as many people 
as we do.”694  
 
For Apple (and other technology giants) to hide behind the cloak of their corporate 
social responsibility statements is to mask the reality of the demands it places on 
Foxconn and other suppliers, demands that lead inevitably to 12-hour working days 
and seven day work-weeks during peak periods. My study of the Apple-Foxconn 
relationship demonstrates the over-riding power of the buyer to dictate terms 
governing the production relationship: Foxconn is compelled to honor Apple’s 
demands for quality and speed, or face loss of the contract. If Foxconn bears direct 
responsibility for conditions in its factories and labor force, it faces formidable 
pressures from Apple and other buyers to meet their demands. In short, the 
                                                      
692 See for example, Apple Labor: How are the Factory Workers Making Apple Products Treated? 
(2012-presnt). http://www.applelabor.com/  
693 Apple, 13 February 2012, “Fair Labor Association Begins Inspections of Foxconn.” 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2012/02/13Fair-Labor-Association-Begins-Inspections-of-Foxconn.h
tml  
694 Apple, 26 December 2012, “Apple’s Statement on Factory Conditions in China.” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/27/business/apples-statement-on-factory-conditions-in-china.html?r
ef=business 
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responsibility for illegal overtime, pressing workers to the limit, is shared by the two 
corporate giants, Apple and Foxconn. And it is Apple, with its superior bargaining 
power, that ultimately calls the shots. 
 
At the industry level, the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), an 
association of 84 corporate members worldwide as of December 2013, emphasizes 
that members, including Apple and Foxconn, should comply with the EICC Code of 
Conduct.695 The Code, established in 2004, aims to ensure worker safety and 
fairness, environmental responsibility, and business efficiency. When allegations of 
violations of the Code are raised, it is the member’s responsibility to address the 
allegation and prove that it should remain a member in good standing. The industry 
association has neither the mandate nor the capacity to conduct independent 
investigations at Foxconn in China or elsewhere. Like many other private regulatory 
organizations, the EICC relies primarily on cooperation from members to promote 
labor and social standards in global production. The standards are not legally binding, 
but they play a role in advancing claims for companies seeking to burnish their 
global image. 
 
My core concern is not only the construction of guiding principles at the global level, 
but above all their effective implementation. Samsung is competing with Apple to 
become the trendsetter in hi-tech electronics and outsourced manufacturing and 
assembly involving 249 first-tier suppliers in China as of 2012.696 Workers and 
activists have accused Samsung of irresponsible ordering practices resulting in 
dangerous factory conditions. With rights violations spiraling, workers have stood up 
to fight.697 The promises of corporate social responsibility programs, in the words of 
Garrett Brown, coordinator of the Maquiladora Health and Safety Support Network, 
“have been fatally undermined by the ‘iron triangle’ of lowest possible per-unit price, 
highest possible quality, and fastest possible delivery times.”698  
 
In December 2013, the Fair Labor Association, after monitoring Apple and Foxconn 
for two years, conveyed its expectation in the final report that “Apple will continue 
                                                      
695 The Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition Code of Conduct: 
http://www.eicc.info/eicc_code.shtml   
696 Samsung, 26 November 2012, “Samsung Electronics Announces Corrective Measures of Working 
Conditions at Supplier Factories in China.” 
http://www.samsung.com/us/news/newsRead.do?news_seq=20315&page=1  
697 Asia Monitor Resource Center, 2013, Labour Rights in High Tech Electronics: Case Studies of 
Workers’ Struggles in Samsung Electronics and its Asian Suppliers, Hong Kong: Asia Monitor 
Resource Center. 
698 Garrett Brown, 4 August 2010, “Global Electronics Factories in Spotlight,” Occupational Health 
and Safety. http://ohsonline.com/articles/2010/08/04/global-electronics-factories-in-spotlight.aspx 
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to monitor compliance at Foxconn.”699 Specifically, the assessors introduced Apple 
sourcing teams to the Principles of Fair Labor Responsible Sourcing so that they 
could work with Foxconn to “identify and improve the materials and production 
planning processes that contribute to excessive overtime.”700 The critical point, 
however, is that Apple has yet to disclose any detail about its sourcing practices, and 
thus there is no basis for independent researchers to benchmark it against the Fair 
Labor Responsible Sourcing Principles, or the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights endorsed by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011.701 
Consumers in China, the United States and elsewhere are still left in the dark 
regarding the sourcing practices of Apple.  
 
Apple University and Academic Advisory Board 
 
Apple, as an industry leader in the tech and business worlds, has frequently found 
itself in the spotlight. In 2012, CEO Tim Cook set up an academic advisory board 
charged with improving its “worker programs” at supplier factories.702 The eight 
advisors from U.S. universities — Richard Locke (Brown University), Mary 
Gallagher (University of Michigan), Eli Friedman (Cornell University), Mark Cullen 
(Stanford University), Margaret Levi (Stanford University), Dara O’Rourke 
(University of California, Berkeley), Annelee Saxenian (University of California, 
Berkeley) and Charles Sabel (Columbia University) — form a research team for 
Apple.703 In collaboration they are to gain access to Apple’s supplier responsibility 
program results. Moreover, they will “conduct or commission new research on labor 
standards within Apple’s supply chain.”704 
 
How will the advisory board, led by Professor Richard Locke, help to improve 
workers’ lives? An important question is: whether undertaking research through 
                                                      
699 Fair Labor Association, 12 December 2013, “Final Foxconn Verification Status Report,” p. 3. 
http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/final_foxconn_verification_report_0.pdf  
700 Fair Labor Association, 12 December 2013, “Final Foxconn Verification Status Report,” Appendix 
2. http://www.fairlabor.org/report/final-foxconn-verification-status-report  
701 United Nations Human Rights Council, 2011, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework,” John Ruggie’s Report 
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises. 
http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/A.HRC.17.31.pdf  
702 Apple, 2013, “Apple Supplier Responsibility: 2013 Progress Report,” p. 24. 
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703 Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies, 26 June 2013, “Locke to Chair 
Apple’s Academic Advisory Board.” 
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704 Cornell Chronicle, Cornell University, 6 August 2013, “Apple Inc. Names ILR (Industrial and 
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Apple-facilitated projects will serve the interests of the corporation, or workers — 
the direct producers — in China and other countries? Will the Apple advisors and the 
Apple University academics critically examine the purchasing practices of the firm 
in ways that might ease the burdens of workers? 
 
In 2008, when Steve Jobs’ health deteriorated and he prepared for a liver transplant, 
Apple launched what it calls Apple University in Silicon Valley as a means of 
charting its future and teaching its executives to “think like Steve Jobs.”705 Under 
the leadership of former Yale Management School Dean Joel Podolny, Apple 
University serves as a business school to train Apple’s own executives with an eye to 
assessing critically Apple’s and its competitors’ strategies. From 2011, Joshua Cohen, 
professor of political philosophy at Stanford University, has joined Apple University 
as faculty member.706 Is Apple University a place from which to raise ethical and 
fair labor issues or a place for such issues to be silenced? Fundamentally, what are 
the alternatives to capitalist relations of production, such that the collective 
consumption needs of workers are cared for and the nature of work and labor 
transformed? 
                                                                                                                             
Forces of Labor: A ew Chinese Working Class 
 
“If past patterns are any guide to the future, then we should expect major waves of 
industrial labor unrest…to occur in those regions that have been experiencing rapid 
industrialization and proletarianization,” Beverly Silver concludes in her survey of 
world labor movements since 1870. Focusing on the automobile industry, the 
dominant industry of the 20th century, she documents the emergence of strong new 
working class forces in primary sites of global investment as workers gained 
bargaining power leverage. Commenting on the rise of labor protests in the new 
millennium, she says “of greatest world-historical significance, in this regard, is the 
case of China.”707 Can we discern the prerequisites for a breakthrough in labor 
relations in electronics or other industries? 
 
There are a few examples in which successful strikes inspire a wave of actions 
involving tens of thousands of Chinese workers from within a workplace or region. 
                                                      
705 Daniel Eran Dilger, 6 October 2011, “Apple University Revealed as Plan to Teach Executives to 
Think Like Steve Jobs,” AppleInsider. 
http://appleinsider.com/articles/11/10/06/apple_university_revealed_as_plan_to_teach_executives_to
_think_like_steve_jobs 
706 Joshua Cohen, Stanford University: https://politicalscience.stanford.edu/faculty/joshua-cohen  
707 Beverly J. Silver, 2003, Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 168-69. 
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A number of the most impressive cases involved foreign-owned firms. For example, 
in the Dalian Development Zone in Liaoning, northeast China, more than 20,000 
workers went on strike from July to September 2005, affecting 18 Japanese- and 
Korean-invested enterprises, winning big wage increases.708 Workers from different 
companies in the same industrial zone often compare wages and benefits, and are 
ready to take action when the moment is right. In this and other cases, workers used 
mobile phone text messaging to mobilize and coordinate. In May and early June 
2010, 1,800 workers and student interns at Honda (Nanhai) participated in a 
factory-wide strike to demand a 800 Yuan pay raise; following a partial victory at 
Honda, auto workers at supplier factories of Toyota and Hyundai were emboldened 
to take their demands to managers, leading to a strike wave in the Pearl River Delta 
in Guangdong.709 In April 2014, over 40,000 workers from all departments at the 
world’s largest footwear supplier, Yue Yuan in Dongguan, jointly demanded “social 
insurance and housing fund payment,” 710  halting production for 12 days and 
winning partial concessions.711 Workers fighting to improve working conditions and 
living standards increasingly exhibit self-confidence and mobilization capability. 
However, they continue to face a formidable alliance of capital and the local state in 
preserving a business-friendly environment. While workers frequently succeed in 
gaining modest victories at a single factory or workshop, they face great difficulties 
in extending successes throughout an industry. 
 
Chinese labor protests suggest the range of grievances and workers’ demand for 
social protections. Limited institutional spaces of collective bargaining and 
workplace democracy are opening up. Article 4 of the 2008 Labor Contract Law 
requires employers to discuss enterprise rules (such as labor remuneration, working 
hours, rest and vacation, occupational safety and health, insurance and welfare, 
training, labor discipline, and work quota management) with a meeting of all 
                                                      
708 Feng Chen, 2010, “Trade Unions and the Quadripartite Interactions in Strike Settlement in China,” 
The China Quarterly 201 (March), pp. 104-24. 
709 Qiao Jian, 2013, “The Status of Chinese Workers in 2010: Share the Fruits of Economic 
Development and Collective Labor Rights,” Chinese Research Perspectives on Society, Volume 1, 
edited by Lu Xueyi and Li Peilin, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, pp. 217-37. 
710 Huanwo shebo, huanwo zhufang gongjijin (還我社保，還我住房公積金). 
711 On 5 April 2014, more than a thousand Yue Yuen employees — a majority the older workers — 
blocked the Gaobu Bridge in Donggua, demanding the government and the company to address the 
severe underpayment of social benefits, including old-age pensions. When the worker-management 
communications broke down, a factory-wide strike took place between 14 and 25 April, 2014, forcing 
the top company leaders, local trade union officials, and the municipal human resources and social 
security unit to step in to solve the problem. From 1 May 2014, management promised to provide 
social insurance in accordance with workers’ actual wages, yet refused to pay the “historical debts,” 
that is, unpaid social benefits owed to employees. See, for example, “Dongguan Yu Yuan Da Bagong” 
(Dongguan Yue Yuen General Strikes)東莞裕元大罷工. 
http://www.youth-sparks.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=4086&extra=&page=6   
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employees or elected worker congresses, and to confirm the rules only following a 
“consulting process” with worker representatives or the trade union on an equal 
footing.712 In May 2010, in the midst of worker suicides and protracted strikes in the 
Pearl River Delta industrial cities, the Guangdong provincial federation of trade 
unions proposed “Regulations on Democratic Enterprise Management,” which had 
been shelved in 2008 during the global economic slowdown. One article stipulates 
that company management must bargain with union representatives in good faith 
within 15 days of a request. Following this long-delayed attempt to carry out 
collective bargaining, in October 2013, the Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress 
released “Regulations on Enterprise Collective Consultations and Collective 
Contracts (Revised Draft)”713 for public discussions. The legislature’s goal is to set 
up an effective wage negotiation system, among others, so as to harmonize labor 
relations on the principles of equality and mutual respect in the province. Employees 
can initiate a collective bargaining process, and management must “present a 
point-by-point written reply within 20 days of receiving the notice” (Article 25 of the 
Revised Draft).714 But as of June 2014, in part due to joint opposition by the Hong 
Kong General Chamber of Commerce and other major business associations,715 the 
legislation to establish collective negotiations and democratic enterprise management 
remains pending. Chinese workers’ struggles for social and economic protections, 
with support from concerned scholars and activists at home and abroad, will carry 
on. 
 
Together with rising wages, some jobs are moving abroad and others are moving 
from coastal to lower-wage inland areas, particularly in the west in the face of fierce 
                                                      
712 Labor Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, effective 1 January 2008: 
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委員會, 11 October 2013, Guangdongsheng qiye jiti xieshang he jiti hetong tiaoli (xiuding caoan) 廣
東省企業集體協商和集體合同條例(修訂草案). 
http://www.rd.gd.cn/rdgzxgnr/flcazjyj/201310/t20131011_136865.html  
714 Kong Xianghong, 2012, “Capacity-Building and Reform of Chinese Trade Unions: Using Legal 
and Democratic Means to Resolve the Conflict of Roles of Trade Union Chairs,” Industrial 
Democracy in China: With Additional Studies on Germany, South-Korea and Vietnam, edited by 
Rudolf Traub-Merz and Kinglun Ngok, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, pp. 83-84. 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/china/09128/09128-english%20version.pdf 
715 Corporate concerns center on the restriction of employer’s ability to implement company rules, 
the growth of trade union or employee-elected representatives’ power, and the rising costs in 
negotiation over wages, production quotas, sick leave and annual leave, and other labor welfare. See, 
for example, The Bulletin, January 2014, “Collective Negotiations,” The Hong Kong General 
Chamber of Commerce. 
http://www.chamber.org.hk/FileUpload/201401151554451727/Guangdong.pdf; Eddy Li, 3 March 
2014, “Collective Negotiations in Guangdong Should be Conducted Cautiously,” The Chinese 
Manufacturers’ Association of Hong Kong. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2014-03/03/content_17316030.htm      
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market competition and rising costs. Recent government statistics still show that the 
east coast is the primary destination for rural migrant workers nationwide. However, 
as enterprises build new factories in regions with lower wages, central and western 
China have narrowed the gap in industrial employment in accord with national 
policy: in 2013, 162 million migrants worked in the eastern region, 57 million in the 
central region, and 50 million in the western region.716 A substantial number of 
workers are being recruited from within or sent back to their home province, in some 
cases close to their home town, where they may draw on local social networks for 
support. With a greater sense of entitlement associated with belonging to a place, and 
perhaps greater social resources to bring to the fight for their interests, the result 
could be enhanced working-class power in factories and worker communities at a 
time of demographic trends favorable to workers. 
 
Other conditions may be favorable to labor organizing. The large supplies of surplus 
labor which allowed China’s extraordinary industrial growth and urbanization over 
the quarter century from the 1980s to the 2008 recession have now given way to a 
contraction of labor supply as a result of rigorous birth planning and other factors 
associated with social change. Demographic changes have slowed the growth of the 
working-age population at a time of general aging, increasing the marketplace power 
of young productive workers.717 Chinese fertility is presently 1.6 children per 
woman, down from more than six children in the 1950s and 2.5 in the 1980s. The 
number of laborers aged 20 to 24 is expected to decline from 125 million people in 
2010 to around 80 million in 2020.718 China’s 2010 Population Census, moreover, 
showed that the age group 0-14 comprised 16.6 percent of total population, down 6.3 
percent compared with the 2000 census data, suggesting reduction of labor supply in 
coming decades.719 China’s leaders have begun to recognize these demographic 
realities, formally ending the one-child family policy at the end of 2013.720 They 
                                                      
716 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2014, “Tujie 2013 2ian Zhongguo 
2ongmingong” (A Graphical Illustration of the Chinese Rural Migrant Workers in 2013) 圖解 2013
年中國農民工. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201405/t20140512_551634.html  
717 Deborah S. Davis, 2014, “Demographic Challenges for a Rising China,” Daedalus: The Journal 
of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 143(2), pp. 26-38; Karen Eggleston, Jean C. Oi, Scott 
Rozelle, Ang Sun, Andrew Walder and Xueguang Zhou, 2013, “Will Demographic Change Slow 
China’s Rise?” The Journal of Asian Studies (June), pp. 1-14. 
718 Baochang Gu and Yong Cai, 2011, “Fertility Prospects in China,” United Nations Population 
Division, Expert Paper No. 2011/14, p. 13. 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/expertpapers/2011-14_Gu&Cai_Expert-paper.pdf  
719 China conducts national censuses in the years ending in 0 (and 1% population census, known as 
mini-census, in the years ending in 5). See China’s National Bureau of Statistics, 28 April 2011, 
“Press Release on Major Figures of the 2010 National Population Census.” 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/t20110428_402722237.htm  
720 Under the “selective two children policy,” which was endorsed by the Third Plenary Session of 
the 18th Communist Party of China in November 2013, couples are allowed to have two children if 
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have also sought to boost labor productivity through expanded investments in rural 
education and vocational skill training. 
 
As the backbone of the nation’s industrial development, young workers have higher 
expectations than the first wave of rural migrants. They aspire to develop technical 
skills, earn living wages, enjoy comprehensive welfare, and hold the full range of 
citizenship rights in the towns and cities they inhabit. “Realize the great Chinese 
dream, build a harmonious society,” reads a local government banner.721 To realize 
individual and national dreams, they will have to advance the fight for justice and 
dignity. Workers’ protests and strikes may become better organized and planned. In 
globally connected production, a new generation of migrant workers could shape 
Chinese and world labor politics. 
  
                                                                                                                                                      
either parent is an only child. Previously, each spouse needed to be an only child to have a second 
child. However, China’s extraordinary phenomenon of “excess males” will continue to confound its 
hopes for a baby boom. 
721 Shixian weida Zhongguo meing, quanmian jianshe hexie shehui (實現偉大中國夢，全面建設和
諧社會). 
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Appendix 1 
 
Suicides at Foxconn in China, 2010 
 
Name    Gender Age Native 
place 
Foxconn 
facility 
Date of 
suicide 
Remarks 
1 Rong Bo M 19 Hebei Langfang 8 Jan 2010 Jumped from the 8/F 
2 Ma Xianqian M 19 Henan Guanlan 23 Jan 2010 Fell from building 
3 Li Hongliang M 20s Henan Longhua 11 Mar 2010 Jumped from the 5/F 
4 Tian Yu # F 17 Hubei Longhua 17 Mar 2010 Jumped from the 4/F 
5 Li Wei # M 23 Hebei Langfang 23 Mar 2010 Jumped from the 5/F 
6 Liu Zhijun M 23 Hunan Longhua 29 Mar 2010 Jumped from the 14/F 
7 Rao Shuqin # F 18 Jiangxi Guanlan 6 April 2010 Jumped from the 7/F 
8 Ning Ling F 18 Yunnan Guanlan 7 April 2010 Jumped from building 
9 Lu Xin M 24 Hunan Longhua 6 May 2010 Jumped from the 6/F 
10 Zhu Chenming F 24 Henan Longhua 11 May 2010 Jumped from the 9/F 
11 Liang Chao M 21 Anhui Longhua 14 May 2010 Jumped from the 7/F 
12 Nan Gang M 21 Hubei Longhua 21 May 2010 Jumped from the 4/F 
13 Li Hai M 19 Hunan Guanlan 25 May 2010 Jumped from the 4/F 
14 He (surname) M 23 Gansu Longhua 26 May 2010 Jumped from the 7/F 
15 Chen Lin # M 25 Hunan Longhua 27 May 2010 Slit his wrists after 
failing to jump 
16 Liu (surname) M 18 Hebei Nanhai 20 July 2010 Jumped from building 
17 Liu Ming F 23 Jiangsu Kunshan 4 Aug 2010 Jumped from the 3/F 
18 He (surname) M 22 Hunan Guanlan 5 Nov 2010 Jumped from building 
# Survived with injuries. 
Note: Langfang city, Hebei province; Guanlan town, Shenzhen city, Guangdong province; Longhua 
town, Shenzhen city, Guangdong province; Nanhai city, Guangdong province; Kunshan city, Jiangsu 
province. 
Source: Field research data and various news reports. 
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Appendix 2 
 
List of Interviewees, 2010-2014 
 
All the interviews were recorded with the consent of the informants. In keeping with 
good research practice I have kept the digital files and interview transcripts, as well 
as the identity of the 115 interviewees, strictly confidential. There were two 
exceptions to this practice. The workers and their families — suicide survivor Tian 
Yu (17-year-old female worker, interviewee 1) and severely injured Zhang Tingzhen 
(25-year-old male worker, interviewee 2) — had their stories reported in the media. 
 
Foxconn workers (43 persons) 
I conducted interviews with workers at internet cafés, restaurants, street-side stalls, 
basketball courts, parks, hospitals, worker dormitories, private living rooms and 
non-government workers’ centers, where my interviewees were not subject to 
company surveillance. All workers interviewed were rural migrants aged 16–28, 
with middle school, high school, or vocational high school qualifications. They 
worked in assembly (semi-finished and finished products), quality testing 
(functionality and audiovisual appearance), metal processing, packaging and support 
service units. In each interview I followed a similar checklist of questions, including 
workers’ relations with co-workers and line leaders, involvement in company trade 
union activities and/or elections, participation in individual and collective labor 
struggles, wages and benefits, working hours, occupational health and safety, living 
conditions and opportunities for promotion. 
 
 ame, gender, 
birth-year, 
native-place 
Educational 
attainment 
(completion year) 
Foxconn work position, business group, 
location 
1. * Tian Yu 
F, 1993, Hubei 
[Tian Jiandang, 
father of Yu] 
Vocational school 
(2009) 
Assembly-line worker (Apple products), 
integrated Digital Product Business Group 
(iDPBG), Shenzhen 
2. * Zhang Tingzhen 
M, 1986, Henan  
[Zhang Guangde, 
father of Tingzhen] 
Vocational college 
(2010) 
Technician, Corporate Support Service, 
Shenzhen/Huizhou 
3. Chen Chunhua 
F, 1980, Henan 
Vocational school 
(1998) 
Office worker, Consumer and Computer 
Products Business Group (CCPBG), Shenzhen 
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4. Cui Hong 
M, 1987, Hunan 
Vocational school 
(2006)  
Assembly-line worker (Machine maintenance), 
Communication and Network Solution Business 
Group (CNSBG), Shenzhen 
5. Zhang Zhuxiang 
F, 1986, Henan 
Middle school  
(2000) 
Assembly-line worker (repair and rework), 
innovation Digital System Business Group 
(iDSBG), Shenzhen 
6. Zhou Yan 
F, 1991, Hunan 
Vocational school  
(2007) 
Office worker, Super Precision Mechanical 
Business Group (SHZBG), Shenzhen 
7. Wu Zongbai 
M, 1988, Chongqing 
High school  
(2006) 
Assembly-line worker (repair and rework), 
innovation Digital System Business Group 
(iDSBG), Shenzhen 
8. Gao Wuhao 
M, 1990, Shannxi 
Vocational school  
( 2008) 
Assembly-line worker (repair and rework), 
innovation Digital System Business Group 
(iDSBG), Shenzhen 
9. Han Xiangxiang 
F, 1991, Guangxi  
Vocational school 
(2010) 
Assembly-line worker (Motorola handset), 
Communication and Network Solution Business 
Group (CNSBG), Shenzhen/Nanning 
10. Tang Zuwei 
M, 1988, Guangxi 
Vocational school 
(2006) 
Assembly-line worker (set-top box), 
Communication and Network Solution Business 
Group (CNSBG), Shenzhen/Nanning 
11. Yan Zhu 
F, 1992, Guizhou 
Vocational school 
(2010) 
Assembly-line worker, Super Precision 
Mechanical Business Group (SHZBG), 
Shenzhen 
12. Zhang Rongchao 
M, 1990, Hubei 
Vocational school 
(2009) 
Line leader, Super Precision Mechanical 
Business Group (SHZBG), Shenzhen 
13. Li Buzhi 
F, 1990, Jiangxi 
Vocational college 
(2011) 
Assembly-line worker, Super Precision 
Mechanical Business Group (SHZBG), 
Shenzhen/Chengdu 
14. Xia Zongtao 
M, 1989, Jiangxi 
Vocational college 
(2011) 
Assembly-line worker, Super Precision 
Mechanical Business Group (SHZBG), 
Shenzhen/Chengdu 
15. Xie Subin 
F, 1986, Hunan  
Middle school 
(2001) 
Laser-soldering, Communication and Network 
Solution Business Group (CNSBG), Shenzhen 
16. Cao Yi 
M, 1990, Hunan 
Vocational school 
(2010) 
Quality control (Amazon Kindle), Technology 
Merging Services Business Group (TMSBG), 
Shenzhen 
17. Zhang Li 
F, 1993, Chongqing  
Vocational school 
(2011) 
Quality control (Amazon Kindle), Technology 
Merging Services Business Group (TMSBG), 
Shenzhen 
18. Tan Hong 
M, 1991, Hunan 
Vocational school 
(2011) 
Assembly-line worker (Amazon Kindle), 
Technology Merging Services Business Group 
(TMSBG), Shenzhen 
19. Cui Daqing 
F, 1992, Guizhou 
Middle school 
(2008) 
Assembly-line worker (iPhone), Consumer and 
Computer Products Business Group (CCPBG), 
Shenzhen/Taiyuan 
20. Yu Zhonghong 
M, 1991, Shanxi 
High school 
(2010) 
Assembly-line worker (iPhone casing), Super 
Precision Mechanical Business Group 
(SHZBG), Shenzhen/Taiyuan 
21. Luo Dingguo 
M, 1992, Shanxi 
Vocational school 
(2011) 
Assembly-line worker (iPhone casing), Super 
Precision Mechanical Business Group 
(SHZBG), Shenzhen/Taiyuan 
22. Li Xiaoxiang 
M, 1993, Jiangxi 
Vocational school 
(2010) 
Assembly-line worker, Net-Work 
Inter-Connection Business Group (NWInG), 
Shenzhen 
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23. Rong Fang 
F, 1994, Hunan 
Middle school 
(2010) 
Assembly-line worker, Personal Computing 
Electronics Business Group (PCEBG), 
Shenzhen 
24. Chen Yuzhong 
M, 1990, Hubei 
Vocational school 
(2008) 
Assembly-line worker (metal-case molding), 
Personal Computing Electronics Business 
Group (PCEBG), Shenzhen 
25. Li Meixia 
F, 1993, Henan 
Vocational school 
(2011) 
Quality Control, integrated Digital Product 
Business Group (iDPBG), Shenzhen/Zhengzhou 
 
26. Lu Jiang 
M, 1991, Henan 
Vocation school 
(2010) 
Quality Control, integrated Digital Product 
Business Group (iDPBG), Shenzhen/Zhengzhou 
 
27. Su Hualing 
F, 1991, Hubei 
Vocation school 
(2010) 
Assembly-line worker, Personal Computing 
Electronics Business Group (PCEBG), 
Shenzhen/Wuhan 
28. Mao Yaqing 
F, 1993, Hubei 
Middle school 
(2009) 
Assembly-line worker, Personal Computing 
Electronics Business Group (PCEBG), 
Shenzhen/Wuhan 
29. Wu Qiuzi 
M, 1994, Hubei 
High school 
(2011) 
Line leader, Personal Computing Electronics 
Business Group (PCEBG), Shenzhen/Wuhan 
30. Ma Quan 
M, 1991, Sichuan 
Vocational school 
(2010) 
Assembly-line worker (iPad-case polishing), 
innovation Digital System Business Group 
(iDSBG), Chengdu 
31. Wang Ruishi 
M, 1994, Sichuan 
Vocational school 
(2008) 
Assembly-line worker (iPad-case polishing), 
innovation Digital System Business Group 
(iDSBG), Chengdu 
32. Ouyang Zhong 
M, 1988, Sichuan 
Vocational school 
(2007) 
Assembly-line worker, innovation Digital 
System Business Group (iDSBG), Chengdu 
33. Wang Shuping 
M, 1989, Sichuan 
Middle school 
(2006) 
Line leader, Personal Computing Electronics 
Business Group (PCEBG), Wuhan/Shenzhen 
34. Wang Fenghui 
M, 1987, Henan 
High school 
(2007) 
Line leader, integrated Digital Product Business 
Group (iDPBG), Shenzhen 
35. Liang Zejun 
F, 1986, Hunan 
Vocational school 
(2005) 
Office worker, Administration, Logistic and 
Customer Service, Shenzhen 
36. Cui Yuanyuan 
F, 1992, Jiangxi  
Middle school 
(2009) 
Assembly-line worker, Super Precision 
Mechanical Business Group (SHZBG), 
Chengdu 
37. Duan Dong 
M, 1991, Sichuan 
Middle school 
(2007) 
Quality control, Super Precision Mechanical 
Business Group (SHZBG), Chengdu 
38. Zhu Weili 
M, 1986, Sichuan 
Middle school 
(2003) 
Assembly-line worker, innovation Digital 
System Business Group (iDSBG), Chengdu 
39. Fan Chunyan 
F, 1989, Sichuan 
Middle school 
(2006) 
Assembly-line worker (iPad component 
cleaning), Precision Mechanical Business Group 
(SHZBG), Chengdu 
40. Feng Qingliang 
F, 1990, Sichuan 
Vocational school 
(2008) 
Line leader, innovation Digital System Business 
Group (iDSBG), Chengdu 
41. Zhang Heqing 
M, 1994, Sichuan 
Middle school 
(2010) 
Assembly-line worker (iPad component 
cleaning), Precision Mechanical Business Group 
(SHZBG), Chengdu 
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42. Chen Ximei 
F, 1992, Guizhou 
Vocational school 
(2011) 
Assembly-line worker, integrated Digital 
Product Business Group (iDPBG), Shenzhen 
43. Lin Xiaochang 
M, 1985, Hubei 
Vocational school 
(2011) 
Assembly-line worker, Precision Mechanical 
Business Group (SHZBG), Shenzhen 
 
Foxconn student interns (38 persons) 
My interviews revealed that the student interns were pursuing a wide range of majors 
including arts, graphic design, automotive repair, petro-chemistry, Chinese herbal 
medicine, horticulture, agriculture, secretarial services, computer science, business 
management, accounting, textile and clothing, sales and marketing, hotel and tourism, 
electronics and mechanics and many more. All the interns were aged between 16 and 
18 and of rural background. They were dispatched to Foxconn’s Shenzhen and 
Chengdu facilities from eight vocational and technical schools for “skills training.” 
The duration of internships lasted from three months to one year. A majority of my 
student interviewees were in the first or second year of studies, while eight were in 
their third and final year. 
 
 ame, gender, 
birth-year, 
native-place 
Major of studies  Vocational school Foxconn job 
1. Zhang Lintong 
M, 1994, Henan 
Arts Technical school (1), 
Henan 
Assembly (iPhone) 
2. He Linzhu 
M, 1994, Henan 
Arts and Design Technical school (1), 
Henan 
Assembly (iPhone) 
3. Li Wei 
M, 1993, Henan 
Automotive repair Technical school (1), 
Henan 
Assembly (iPhone) 
4. Yang Quan 
F, 1993, Henan 
Automotive repair Vocational school (2), 
Henan 
Quality control 
5. Huang Shuo 
M, 1992, Henan 
Automotive repair Vocational school (2), 
Henan 
Quality control 
6. Yang Xue 
F, 1993, Sichuan 
Secretarial services Vocational school (3), 
Sichuan 
Assembly 
7. Huang Lifang 
F, 1994, Sichuan 
Secretarial services Vocational school (3), 
Sichuan 
Assembly 
8. Liu Siying 
F, 1992, Sichuan 
Electronics and 
mechanics 
Vocational school (3), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (printed 
circuit boards) 
9. Fang Tiantian 
M, 1993, Sichuan 
Electronics and 
mechanics 
Vocational school (4), 
Sichuan 
Packaging 
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10. He Gaoxue 
F, 1992, Sichuan 
Textile and clothing Vocational school (4), 
Sichuan 
Packaging 
11. Cao Wang 
F, 1994, Sichuan 
Textile and clothing Vocational school (4), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
12. Chen Hui 
F, 1994, Sichuan  
Construction Vocational school (4), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
13. Lin Qiang 
M,1994, Sichuan 
Hotel and tourism Vocational school (4), 
Sichuan 
Quality control 
14. Wang Ling 
M, 1993, Sichuan 
Business 
administration 
Vocational school (4), 
Sichuan 
Quality control 
15. Wang Meiyi 
F, 1994, Sichuan 
Sales and marketing Vocational school (5), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
16. Chen Jifeng 
M, 1994, Sichuan 
Sales and marketing Vocational school (5), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
17. He Pingping 
M, 1993, Sichuan 
Sales and marketing Vocational school (5), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
18. Zhang Xubi 
M, 1992, Sichuan 
Agriculture Vocational school (5), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
19. Wang Xiaodong 
M, 1992, Sichuan 
Horticulture Vocational school (5), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
20. Li Duanyi 
M, 1992, Sichuan 
Horticulture Vocational school (5), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
21. Shen Yong 
M, 1993, Sichuan 
Electronics and 
mechanics 
Vocational school (5), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
22. Jin Qiu 
M, 1993, Sichuan 
Electronics and 
mechanics 
Vocational school (5), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
23. Xiao Li 
M, 1994, Sichuan 
Automotive repair Vocational school (6), 
Sichuan 
Quality control 
24. Han Biqi 
F, 1993, Sichuan 
Automotive repair Vocational school (6), 
Sichuan 
Quality control 
25. Zhang Yanrong 
M, 1994, Sichuan 
Automotive repair Vocational school (6), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
26. Chen Leshan 
M, 1992, Sichuan 
Electronics and 
mechanics 
Vocational school (6), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
27. Li Hanwen 
M, 1993, Sichuan 
Electronics and 
mechanics 
Vocational school (6), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
28. Chen Weida 
M, 1994, Sichuan 
Business 
management 
Vocational school (7), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
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29. Liu Shihan 
F, 1993, Sichuan 
Accounting  Vocational school (7), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
30. Sun Meiling 
F, 1994, Sichuan 
Accounting Vocational school (7), 
Sichuan 
Assembly (iPad) 
31. An Qing 
F, 1993, Sichuan 
Computer science Vocational school (7), 
Sichuan 
Packaging 
32. Yu Baijie 
M, 1992, Sichuan 
Computer science Vocational school (7), 
Sichuan 
Packaging 
33. Chen Ji 
M, 1994, Sichuan 
Computer science Vocational school (7), 
Sichuan 
Quality control 
34. Jia Dexi 
M, 1995, Sichuan 
Chinese herbal 
medicine 
Technical school (8), 
Sichuan 
Quality control 
35. Li Ming 
M, 1993, Sichuan 
Petro-chemistry Technical school (8), 
Sichuan 
Laser soldering 
(iPad) 
36. Peng Ying 
F, 1994, Sichuan 
Petro-chemistry Technical school (8), 
Sichuan 
Laser soldering 
(iPad) 
37. Yu Yanying 
F, 1993, Sichuan 
Petro-chemistry Technical school (8), 
Sichuan 
Assembly 
38. Tan Huaizhong 
M, 1992, Sichuan  
Petro-chemistry Technical school (8), 
Sichuan 
Quality control 
(iPhone) 
 
Vocational school teachers (14 persons) 
The female and male teachers, from the same eight vocational and technical schools in 
my sample, were responsible for their students’ internships at Foxconn. The teachers 
reported for duty at the designated administrative building from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., 
Monday to Friday, and maintained the smooth running of the “work-study program.” 
All of them had prior experience in managing similar school-business collaborative 
projects. The teachers were housed in the factory dormitories during the entire 
internship period. 
 ame, gender, 
Birth-year, 
ative-place 
Teaching 
responsibility 
Vocational school Foxconn student 
internship  
1. Teacher Zhu 
M, 30s, Henan 
Administrator Technical school (1), 
Henan 
Shenzhen  
(Jun 2010-spring 
2011) 
2. Teacher Ding 
F, 28, Henan 
Class mistress Technical school (1), 
Henan 
Shenzhen  
(Jun 2010 – spring 
2011) 
3. Teacher Wan 
M, 40s, Henan 
Class master Vocational school (2), 
Henan 
Shenzhen  
(Jun 2010 – spring 
2011) 
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4. Teacher Yang 
M, 30s, Sichuan 
Class master Vocational school (3), 
Sichuan  
Shenzhen 
(Summer 
2011-2012) 
5. Teacher Wang 
F, 30s, Sichuan 
Career counselor Vocational school (3), 
Sichuan 
Shenzhen  
(Summer 2010 – 
spring 2011) 
6. Teacher Yin 
M, 51, Sichuan 
Career counselor Vocational school (4), 
Sichuan  
Chengdu  
(Mar – summer 
2011) 
7. Teacher Tian 
M, 40s, Sichuan 
Class master Vocational school (4), 
Sichuan 
Chengdu  
(Sep 2011 – Jan 
2012) 
8. Teacher Tan 
M, 30s, Sichuan 
Class master Vocational school (5), 
Sichuan 
Chengdu 
(Sep 2011– Jan 
2012) 
9. Teacher Chong 
M, 40s, Sichuan 
Career counselor  Vocational school (5), 
Sichuan 
Chengdu 
(Sep 2011 – Jan 
2012) 
10. Teacher Zhou 
M, 30s, Sichuan 
Administrator Vocational school (6), 
Sichuan 
Chengdu 
(Sep 2011 – Jan 
2012)  
11. Teacher Pu 
M, 26, Sichuan 
Class master Vocational school (7), 
Sichuan 
Shenzhen/Chengdu  
(2010/2011) 
12. Teacher Jiang 
F, 25, Sichuan 
Administrator Vocational school (7), 
Sichuan 
Chengdu 
(Sep-Dec 2011) 
13. Teacher Cai 
F, 26, Sichuan 
Class mistress Technical school (8), 
Henan 
Shenzhen/Chengdu 
(2010/2011) 
14. Teacher Xu 
M, 27, Sichuan 
Class master Technical school (8), 
Henan 
Chengdu 
(Sep-Dec 2011) 
 
Foxconn managers (14 persons) 
The manager interviewees were responsible for production management (four 
persons), commodity procurement (three persons), product engineering (two persons) 
and human resources (five persons). Twelve were junior to mid-level and two were 
senior managers who have been working at Foxconn from three to ten years. I 
interviewed them individually or in a pair as preferred. Interview questions covered 
the managers’ major responsibilities and challenges, liaison with corporate customer 
representatives, staff supervisory structure, product research and development, 
business growth, corporate culture, production automation plan, crisis management 
at times of worker suicides, strikes and/or protests, relationships between company 
development and governmental support and recent labor policy reforms. 
 ame, gender, 
age 
Educational attainment  Foxconn work position, location  
1. Manager Xie  
M, 30 
Industrial engineering, university 
graduate 
Human resources (corporation), 
Shenzhen 
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2. Manager Chen 
M, 24 
Business management, university 
graduate 
Human resources (corporation), 
Shenzhen/Chengdu 
3. Manager Zhu 
M, 31 
Business administration, college 
graduate  
Human resources (business group), 
Chengdu 
4. Manager Ding 
M, 29  
English, university graduate Human resources (business group), 
Chengdu 
5. Manager Li 
M, 30s 
Finance, university graduate  Human resources (business group), 
Shenzhen 
6. Manager Wan 
F, 28 
Industrial engineering, university 
graduate 
Production management, Chengdu 
7. Manager Xia 
F, 25 
Engineering, college graduate Production management, Chengdu 
8. Manager Lin 
M, 27 
Computer and information 
technology, university graduate  
Production management, Shenzhen 
9. Manager He 
M, 33 
Computer and information 
technology, university graduate 
Production management, Shenzhen 
10. Manager Xu 
M, 30s 
Business administration, 
college graduate 
Commodity procurement, Shenzhen 
11. Manager Zheng 
M, 30s 
Marketing, college graduate Commodity procurement, Shenzhen 
12. Manager Qin 
M, 40s 
Marketing, college graduate Commodity procurement, Chengdu 
13. Manager Liang 
M, 30 
Industrial engineering, university 
graduate 
Product engineering, Shenzhen 
14. Manager Tan 
M, 34 
Mechanical engineering, 
university graduate 
Product engineering, Chengdu 
 
Government officials (6 persons) 
All the interviews were conducted at the local government offices (at the township, 
district, and city levels). A Foxconn manager and two school teachers helped to 
identify interested officials at the early stage of my research. In my second visit to 
Foxconn Chengdu, I was referred to two other officials for additional interviews.  
 
 ame, age Government responsibility  Collaboration with Foxconn 
1. Mr. Han 
Mid-30s 
Vocational education and 
policy development 
Coordinate student internships at Foxconn 
Chengdu (2011-2012) 
2. Mr. Li 
40s 
Vocational education and 
policy development 
Coordinate student internships at Foxconn 
Chengdu (2011-2012) 
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3. Mr. Wang 
40s 
Economic policy Alleviate poverty through employment 
promotion in Sichuan (2010-2013) 
4. Mr. Zhan 
Late 30s 
Work and employment 
services 
Recruit workers and interns for Foxconn 
Chengdu (2011-2012) 
5. Mrs. Zheng 
Early 30s 
Work and employment 
services 
Recruit workers and interns for Foxconn 
Chengdu (2011-2012) 
6. Mr. Jian  
40s 
Labor and social security 
policy 
Labor protection in Shenzhen Bao’an 
District (2011-present) 
 
  
221 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Foxconn Locations around the World, 1974-2014 
Country City/Town 
1. Taiwan Head office, Huyue Factory, Minsheng Factory, Dingpu Factory (New 
Taipei City), Hsinchu Science Park branch office (Hsinchu City), Neihu 
branch office (Taipei City) 
2. China In four provincial-level municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and 
Chongqing) and 15 provinces, including Guangdong (Shenzhen, 
Foshan, Zhongshan, Huizhou, Dongguan), Jiangsu (Kunshan, Nanjing, 
Changsu, Funing), Zhejiang (Hangzhou, Ningbo, Jaishan), Fujian 
(Xiamen), Shandong (Yantai), Liaoning (Yingkou, Shenyang), Shanxi 
(Taiyuan, Jincheng, Datong), Hebei (Langfang, Qinhuangdao), Henan 
(Zhengzhou), Hubei (Wuhan), Hunan (Hengyang), Guangxi (Nanning), 
Jiangxi (Fengcheng), Sichuan (Chengdu), and Hainan Island (Haikou) 
3. Japan Toyko, Sakai, Kyoto, Nagano, Chiba, Yokohama 
4. South Korea Seoul 
5. Australia Rydalmere (Sydney) 
6. New Zealand Wellington 
7. Canada Toronto 
8. United States Boston (Massachusetts), Harrisburg (Pennsylvania), Raleigh (North 
Carolina), Sunrise, St Lucie (Florida), Chicago (Illinois), Memphis 
(Tennessee), Dallas, Fort Worth, Austin, Houston (Texas), San Diego, 
Los Angeles, San Jose, Santa Clara, Fremont (California), Hillsboro 
(Oregon), Plainfield (Indiana) 
9. Mexico San Jerónimo, Ciudad Juárez (Chihuahua), Reynosa, Guadalajara, 
Tijuana 
10. Brazil Jundiaí, Itu, Sorocaba, Indaiatuba (São Paulo), Manaus (Amazonas), 
Santa Rita do Sapucai (Minas Gerais) 
11. Turkey Parsel Çorlu/Tekirdag  
12. Hungary Komárom, Székesfehérvár 
13. Czech Republic Pardubice, Kutna Hora 
14. Slovakia  Nitra 
15. Germany Dusseldorf 
16. Austria Vienna 
17. The Netherlands Amsterdam, Eindhoven, Heerlen 
18. Denmark Copenhagen 
19. Sweden Lund 
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20. Finland Helsinki  
21. Russia St. Petersburg, Moscow 
22. Scotland Glasgow 
23. Ireland Limerick 
24. United Arab Emirates Dubai 
25. India Chennai, Sriperumbudur (Tamil Nadu) 
26. Vietnam Bac Ninh, Bac Giang 
27. Malaysia Kuala Lumper, Penang, Kulai (Johor) 
28. Singapore 
29. Indonesia 
Ruby Land Complex, 54 Genting Lane 
Jakarta 
Source: Foxconn websites. 
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